740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/12–2744: Telegram
The American Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 29—1:20 a.m.]
46. Reurtel 16, December 23, 7 p.m. I am sorry if any of my telegrams on our relations with the Russians here have conveyed an impression of vexation on our part, or surprised annoyance with the situation that we have found. Both General Crane and I have sought to cultivate an attitude of détente, and even of some detachment. It has not seemed to us in view of what transpired in Moscow during the armistice negotiations that accounts of petty annoyances generally merit inclusion in our reports. As I suggested in my telegram 11 of December 7, 9 a.m., we are aware that American-British-Soviet collaboration is not to be made or unmade over Bulgaria.
The situation about which the Department specifies a desire for further information may be summarized as follows: We are all of us, mission and delegation on the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, restricted to Sofia and certain limited areas of its environs unless accompanied by a Russian officer. The airport for example is out of bounds, yet officers to accompany us are only infrequently readily available. The inconvenience thus caused in meeting planes after days of waiting for permission to bring in a plane can well be imagined. An instance of serious delay and inconvenience resulting from the requirement to obtain from Moscow clearance of planes is the fact that on Christmas day we received our first pouch from the Department since my arrival here November 17th. For three weeks General Crane has been awaiting permission for the rear echelon of his staff to enter [Page 511] Bulgaria. Most of his personnel has now been cleared, presumably by action of General Deane,93 but the local Russian authorities have not yet seen fit to reply to General Crane’s original and subsequent requests for clearance of this personnel and for members of his delegation [who?] are still held up in Istanbul because no clearance has been received for them. Also the OSS94 team has been sent away again as the result of the insistence of General Biryusov. There can be no doubt that General Biryusov persists in the view that it is for Moscow to determine the extent of our personnel here, not ourselves. The matter of Bulgarian funds has been settled satisfactorily so far as we are concerned.
It is my view that the situation outlined above is important only as it provides evidences of the “Soviet” as distinct from “Allied” character of the Control Commission. The really disturbing fact is that the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission operates as part and parcel of the Russian Command and is not a separate body on which Generals Crane and Oxley has [apparent omission]; and the very presence here of American and British generals and their staffs confirms in the minds of the Bulgarian population that decisions taken with respect to their affairs by the Russians are “Allied”, not “Russian”, decisions. In fact we institute [constitute?] something of a screen behind which the Russians today may take any decision that pleases them with respect to any and all aspects of Bulgarian political, economic and social life.
Let us take an example that is of direct interest to us. A few days ago the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed regret to me that the “Allied Control Commission” had decided that postal relations should not be restored at this time with the U.S. When questioned he manifested surprise that we had not known that he had received a letter to that effect, signed by the Russians in the name of the “Allied Control Commission”. This letter was in reply to one he had sent to the President of the Commission. From what he told me, I gathered that this was merely one of numerous letters addressed by him to the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission and one of numerous replies. Neither Crane nor Oxley has ever been consulted with regard to action on matters submitted to the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission by the Bulgarian Government. Therein lies the proof of our false position here with respect to the Bulgarian public and Bulgarian authorities.
Restrictions on our movements and the arrival and departure of our planes and limitation on our personnel may be annoying and destructive of prestige locally but they do not involve our responsibilities as a signatory of the armistice convention. It is this latter consideration [Page 512] that is really important, especially as there is no matter settled or left unsettled in this country today without positive, negative or tacit decision by the Russian authorities. How much of this is in the name of the “Allied Control Commission” we have no way of knowing. Only when rumors reach us from the street are we in a position to make a check. Except when inquiry can be based on a specific case, the Russians say they take no action in the name of the Commission and we can hardly expect a Bulgarian Government, that must and ideologically wishes to get along with the Soviet authorities, to come running to us with complaints. On the other hand, I do not believe we can afford to ignore the view of many leading Bulgarians, that it is “shameful” for the Anglo-Saxon Powers to have signed an armistice and exercise no power in the execution of that armistice.
General Crane and I are fully aware that we are here as investments of American policy but we also know that in the minds of the Bulgarian population America and Britain represent one set of political, economic and racial ideas and Soviet Russia another set. We realize too that whereas the British are naturally anxious for our sympathetic interest in their local difficulties with the Russians, so too are the Russians pleased when we do not manifest that sympathy. This is the reason why the Russians apply to us their restrictive measures with less brusqueness than they do in the case of the British. These are considerations that will naturally affect the Department’s final decision with respect to the nature of the representations that may be made in Moscow.
Also I would suggest that in connection with such representations no generalizations be made on the basis of our experience to date in the two countries, Bulgaria and Rumania. It is justifiable to suppose that, in the case of Rumania, Russia anticipates no serious interference in her management there. Here Russia fears that she may not count on such a free hand. Bulgaria is too close to Greece for Britain to be as detached with respect to what may happen here as to what may happen in Rumania and the Russians know it. Bulgaria is one of those limitrophe areas where the tide of political conflict between British and Soviet international interests is bound to ebb and flow perhaps for a long time to come. Also, as General Donovan96 pointed out to King Boris, “Bulgaria is the key to the Balkans”. It will be recalled that the King replied that all depends upon who holds the key. As matters go here, certainly will they go in Yugoslavia and probably also in Hungary.
Repeated to Caserta as 35 and Moscow as 26.