740.00119 E.W./10–1744: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5 p.m.]
3965. ReDepts 2437 and 2439 [2438], October 14, midnight.11 We are assured by the British that the details of their negotiations with the Russians over the past weekend with respect to the Bulgarian armistice have been communicated to the British Embassy in Washington in order that they may be made available to the Department and that the Foreign Office has been asked to communicate them to Winant. The Department is therefore presumably aware that in the case of Bulgaria, the Russians steadfastly refused to consider the inclusion in the armistice terms of any specific reference to an equal voice in the Control Commission for the three Powers after the termination of hostilities with Germany. The clause finally agreed upon merely specified that for the entire period of the armistice, there should be established an Allied Control Commission which would regulate and supervise the execution of the terms under the chairmanship of a representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and United States and that until termination of hostilities against Germany, the Commission would be under the general direction of the Allied [Page 460] (Soviet) High Command. Nothing was said about the remaining period; and Molotov has now made it plain in a letter to Eden that the Soviet Government expects and intends that even during this remaining period, the Soviet representative would continue to exercise leadership in the work of the Commission. (I believe that the Department will also be informed by the British Embassy of the tenor of this letter.)
The British do not consider the working [wording] of the article as far as it goes unsatisfactory. As far as Molotov’s letter is concerned, they are merely acknowledging it without commenting on the content; but they clearly realize that it is not going to be easy to get anything like an equal voice in the Control Commission and I do not have the impression that they intend to oppose strongly the stand Molotov has taken.
The Russians further refuse to include a general clause requiring Bulgaria to carry out any demands of the Allies with regard to the restoration of peace and security. This, too, the British have reluctantly accepted but have managed to get in a clause about demobilization and a provision in the proposed tripartite protocol which would assure Russian support in inducing Bulgaria to provide food for Greece and Yugoslavia.
It must be anticipated that in negotiations for the Hungarian agreement, the Russians will probably refuse to go farther than they have gone in the Bulgarian agreement with respect to the participation of the United States and United Kingdom in the work of the Control Commission. This means that they may refuse to agree to the inclusion of any provision for equal participation after the termination of hostilities with Germany and that they may not in fact be willing even to contemplate such equal participation in practice. It is probable that they will likewise refuse to consider the inclusion of a general powers clause. They have reiterated to the British interminably their contention that all these armistices should be on the same model.
Before we go into the Hungarian negotiations, it would be very useful to know just to what extent our Government is willing to insist on these points. Given the general inelasticity of Soviet negotiation procedure, it is not to be anticipated that anything can be accomplished by argument or persuasion with the Soviet negotiators. In the Rumanian negotiations when the Russians were prepared to insist on something, Molotov had no hesitation in saying “Without this clause there will be no agreement”. What I would like to know is whether, if worst comes to worst, we would be authorized to say the same thing with respect to any of the points at issue. If we are prepared to take this stand, it would be much better if we here know of this in advance and can take a firm and consistent line through [Page 461] the entire negotiations without having to wire Washington for new instructions. If we are not prepared to insist on these points, there is little to be gained by explanation and argument directed to men who lack authority to consider arguments on their merits.
The same applies to the clause about reparations concerning which the Department has made its position clear in a separate cable.12 Mr. Eden will discuss this question with Molotov today and I expect to send another cable on this subject as soon as I am informed of the results of their conversation.
My own recommendations with respect to the above are as follows:
- 1.
- I do not think it advisable that we should press for the general powers clause. Regardless of the provisions we are able to agree on with respect to the Control Commission, the Soviets whose forces will presumably be in effective occupation of the country will undoubtedly play the leading part in the Commission in practice. To insist on far-reaching powers for the Commission would thus operate in practice simply to increase the powers of the Soviet Commander in that area who will presumably be the Soviet representative on the Commission.
- 2.
- With respect to the direction of the Control Commission, I feel that we should with the cooperation of the British press as strongly as possible for recognition of a tripartite division of authority for the period following termination of hostilities against Germany; I do not think that we should make a decisive issue of this point.
- 3.
- With respect to reparations, I believe that we should adhere firmly to our position and refuse to yield even at the risk of a breakdown of the negotiations.
While I realize that events in Hungary13 may delay the conclusion of an armistice with Hungary, we have had no indication that the preliminary discussions are not to be continued.
Sent to Department as 3965, October 17, 2 p.m.; repeated to London as 221 and Rome as 7.