868.01/10–1144
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
The Greek Ambassador99 came in to see me to say that he hoped to see the President tomorrow. He wished to express the very great concern of his Government at the delay in signing the proposed Bulgarian armistice. They were aware that this armistice called for the withdrawal of Bulgarian forces from Thrace and Macedonia.
During the delay, a series of confused reports were coming out of Sofia. A Bulgarian general had reviewed a “Macedonian” brigade, presented it with a flag, and encouraged it to plant that flag in Salonika. Reports of agreement with the Soviet general in Sofia for establishment of a Macedonian state had come out of the Bulgarian radio, though they were later denied. The fact was that the Bulgarian forces were running Thrace. Tito appeared to be getting into it.
He said that Greece, of course, recognized the nearness of Russia and the power of Russian influence, but they did not know what Soviet ideas were about non-interference with the Greek state. Bulgarian encouragement of Macedonian or Thracian ambitions was of course nothing more than a Bulgarian plan to dismember Greece, and all this went on under the eyes of a Soviet field marshal. He said that he imagined this would be one of the subjects discussed between Churchill and Eden on the one hand, and Stalin on the other, in Moscow. He asked what we thought the Russian views really were.
I said that I could not comment on that. The views of the United States Government had been made known; we had advocated putting the withdrawal clause in the armistice terms, and Secretary Hull had backed this up by public reference in the press. I had no reason to believe that our views were changing. I was not informed as to the Soviet view. I said that the representations and the telegrams from his Government (copies of which are attached)1 would receive prompt consideration.