There is attached for your consideration a memorandum outlining the
latest developments and suggesting the policy which it is believed
we should follow in the event of unilateral Soviet action in this
matter.
[Annex]
Recommendations as to Policy in the Event of
the Expected Developments in the Soviet-Polish Dispute
From the failure of the secret conversations which Prime Minister
Mikolajczyk has been having with the Soviet Ambassador to the
Czechoslovak Government in London, and Stalin’s reply to the
President discouraging a visit by Mikolajczyk to Moscow, it is
clear that there is virtually no hope of any resumption of
diplomatic relations between the Polish Government-in-exile and
the Soviet Government. The last Soviet conditions conveyed to
Mikolajczyk amounted not to a demand for the reorganization of
the Polish Government-in-exile but for its dissolution and the
formation of an entirely new Government; it is also clear from
Stalin’s statement to Professor Lange46 when he was in
Moscow, that the Soviet Government does not intend to set up a
Soviet military administration in the liberated areas of Poland
proper.
Under the circumstances, with the Soviet armies beginning to
enter Poland, the most likely alternative, and all our
information tends to bear this out, would be for the Soviet
Government to deal with and possibly recognize some rival Polish
organization as the provisional representative of the Polish
people. This rival organization would probably be the “National
Council of Poland” whose representatives recently visited
Moscow. This Council has already been referred to in the
Soviet-controlled Polish press in Moscow as the provisional
government of Poland. Should this probable development take
place, and it may occur in the very near future, the situation
which the British and ourselves have sought to avoid will be
created. The British and the United States Governments would be
dealing with and recognizing as the only legal representative of
Poland the present Polish Government-in-exile in London while
the Soviet Union would be dealing with and supporting, if not
openly recognizing, a rival organization. This split between
British-American policy on one hand and Soviet policy on the
other in regard to Poland would be complete. The obvious danger
of civil war is very real, with one side (and probably the
losing one) fighting with at least moral support from the United
States and Great Britain, while the other was being actively
supported by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there is no doubt
that the recognition by the Soviet Government of a rival Polish
organization would impose a severe strain on the unity of the
Allies since throughout the world such a rival government or
organization would be regarded as a Soviet puppet whether or not
this was strictly true.
[Page 1298]
In considering the best, or rather the least undesirable, policy
for this government to follow in the face of some such
development, it must be borne in mind that there is very great
doubt as to the degree of real support which a rival Polish
organization would have inside Poland. It is virtually certain
that the entire weight of the Soviet propaganda machine, both
from Moscow and sympathetic sources abroad, will be brought to
bear to convince the world that the new organization represents
the “real democratic forces” inside Poland and as such is
entitled to be considered in international affairs as the legal
de facto government. It is felt,
however, that before this government considers any revision of
its present attitude of recognizing and dealing only with the
Polish Government in London, substantial proof must be
forthcoming either through reports of American observers in
Poland or by means of a genuine election that the new
organization commands the support of the majority of the Polish
people. Therefore, during the war until this question can be
clarified, we should abstain from any act or word which would
further the propaganda attempts to depict such organization as
the genuine representative of the Polish people.
On questions involving relief and other practical matters, this
principle should in general be followed, but for humanitarian
reasons, it might be possible to examine each case on its
merits. In short, the only possible policy for the United States
Government is to watch closely the developments in Poland and
avoid being stampeded by any propaganda campaign into the
support of claims which subsequent events might reveal to be
unfounded. We should, on the other hand, avoid any positive
statement which would bind us irrevocably to the permanent
support of the Polish Government-in-exile per
se.
