711.60C/6–944
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)
| Participants: | Polish Prime Minister, Polish Ambassador, Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Matthews,17 and Mr. Durbrow. |
The Prime Minister brought up the question of the possibility of his paying a visit to Stalin. Mr. Stettinius, in discussing this question, stated that the President, as well as himself, felt that most likely it would be a good idea for Mr. Mikolajczyk to make such a visit, and that careful consideration should be given to all aspects thereof. In weighing the various pros and cons, consideration was given to the question of whether this would be the proper time to make such a visit or whether it might be advisable to delay it.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the President also had given careful consideration to the possible effects and repercussions of the visit and, on second thought, he wondered whether it would be advisable for him to send a message at this time to Stalin suggesting that Mr. Mikolajczyk visit Moscow.
In exploring the situation further, Mr. Stettinius asked whether, if Mr. Mikolajczyk agreed that it might be advisable to make a trip at this time, someone else other than the President or Mr. Churchill could make the suggestion to Stalin that he see the Polish Prime Minister. The only name that was mentioned was that of Beneš, and the Prime Minister replied that, although he was on good personal [Page 1278] terms with Mr. Beneš, he did not feel that an approach to Stalin made by Beneš would be the proper way to handle this matter.
The Prime Minister and the Ambassador finally came to the conclusion that there were so many imponderables and possible repercussions that it might not be advisable to attempt to make the trip at this time. It was therefore suggested that the matter should be held in abeyance for at least one month and further consideration could then be given to the advisability of making this trip.
In view of this decision, consideration was given to other possible approaches to the Soviet Government looking toward bringing about closer collaboration with the Polish Government. It was suggested that it might be possible for the President and Mr. Churchill to make a joint approach to Stalin suggesting the desirability from every point of view of bringing about close collaboration and coordination of activities between the Red Army and the Polish Underground. It was indicated that the President and Churchill might make this suggestion solely on military grounds but pointing out that such collaboration would be most effective in helping not only the Red Army in the East but would have a beneficial effect in tying down further German troops which might be used against the Anglo-American Armies in the West.
The Prime Minister thought that perhaps an approach might be made at this level, but he wondered whether, if the approach was made at the military level, the Soviet authorities might accept with alacrity military collaboration, but as their armies advanced, they would go ahead independently on the political level and organize the administration in Poland along their own lines without consultation with the Polish Government-in-exile. No final decision was made as to the advisability of making this second approach.
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- H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs.↩