Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt ¹⁴

June 6, 1944

Summary of Remarks of the Polish Prime Minister Mr. Mikolajczyk to the undersecretary concerning the polish situation and Polish-Soviet Relations

Polish-Soviet Relations.

Whereas previously the Soviet position was that the Polish Government must accept the Curzon Line as the Polish-Soviet frontier before a resumption of relations, there have recently been indications that the Soviet Government now considers the resumption of relations to be the first step, and a definite frontier settlement to await the end of the war. This change in emphasis in the Soviet position is probably due to the Soviet realization of the strength of the Polish Underground and the Soviet failure to obtain any appreciable support within Poland by by-passing the Polish Government and official Underground.

Informal contacts on the political level through an intermediary in London have led to nothing since Soviet officials, although without definite instructions from Moscow, insist upon reorganization of the Polish Government to an extent which would be impossible for the Polish Government to accept. These Russian officials had mentioned specifically the Polish President, Commander-in-Chief, and Ministers of War and Information as unacceptable individuals to the Soviet Government.

While it is not entirely clear on what basis the Soviet Government would consider a resumption of relations the general atmosphere is somewhat more propitious than at any time since the rupture.

Underground Relations with the Soviet Armies.

On entering Polish territory the Soviet Armies had refused to recognize any Underground and had subsequently attempted to induce Polish resistance groups to join General Berling’s divisions. Upon realization of the strength of the Polish Underground organization, even east of the Curzon Line, the Soviet Commander in Volhynia established contact the beginning of April with members of the Underground. However, as the result of a German counter-attack these contacts had been broken off, and since then the only contacts have been between Soviet partisans and the Polish Underground. The Polish Underground was highly organized and prepared to take its part as an army in the decisive battles to come but needed more supplies and the establishment of coordinated contact on a centralized basis with the Soviet Armies. The Prime Minister has with him a General recently arrived from Poland who was a strategic staff officer of the Underground Army, and he felt that it was very important that this General should be brought into contact while he is here with the appropriate American military officers.

The Prime Minister gave the following summary of the attitudes and views of the Polish Government and the Polish people towards present and postwar problems.

1. All Poles desired good and neighborly relations with the Soviet Union but not that Poland should become a satellite in any sense.

2. No settlement, territorial or otherwise, could be accepted which would leave the Polish people with the sense that injustice had been done to them.

3. Poland should not emerge from the war with diminished territory. The Polish people, who had endured frightful hardships for five years in fighting Germany, would not understand why Poland should be asked to sacrifice territory. Frontier adjustments in the east could be made a part of the general settlement. The Polish Government did not desire to discuss now any general territorial compensation in the west for losses in the east since the shifts of population proposed by Churchill might well be unacceptable to British and American public opinion at the end of the war. The only territorial acquisitions which the Polish Government envisaged are East Prussia and Silesia: the first, for the purpose of providing Poland with a free and broad access to the sea which would also serve as an outlet for eastern and other countries in central Europe; and Silesia, not only for ethnic reasons but also to deprive Germany of a most important industrial base.

4. There should be absolutely no interference in the internal life of Poland by any outside power.

5. The Polish Government favored the idea of economic federations in Europe in order to counteract German economic supremacy. Without such economic associations Germany, although defeated, will have, by organizational economic measures effected during the war, a completely dominant position in Europe, many of which measures it might prove impossible to disentangle. The Polish Government considered it of great importance that the occupied countries of Europe should at least be given every opportunity to start on an economic level with Germany and utilize for the good of all the most acceptable economic measures which the Germans have introduced. This could only be done by strong economic ties between non-German states. The Polish Government did not in any sense regard such federation or association as a cordon sanitaire against Russia.

6. The Polish Government and people felt themselves at the present time isolated and that matters of direct concern to Poland were being discussed by the three great powers without Polish participation. Furthermore, because of the hostile attitude of one of the powers Poland’s interests in general were being adversely affected since there seems to be a tendency because of the Soviet attitude to exclude Polish representatives from consideration of questions in which as an independent state Poland was interested.

7. The Polish Government desired to discuss the question of relief supplies, Lend-Lease assistance and matters affecting the economic reconstruction of the Polish State with the Government of the United States and in particular the question of the administration of Poland as the country was liberated. There exists an organized, secret administration of the Polish State which numbers 30,000 people, but as yet there has been no agreement with any country as to the administration of Poland by this organization.

14. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. Mr. Stettinius sent this summary to the President on June 6, 1944.