740.0011 European War 1939/12548: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:10 p.m.]
891. Berlin’s 2556, June 25, 4 p.m.5
1. The position here is still as reported in recent telegrams, namely, the press has excluded from publication any discussion or other indication of approval or disapproval with regard to the German attack on [Page 988] Soviet Russia or with regard to alleged Soviet provocations, and elements within the Japanese Government which formulate national policy, such as the Cabinet and the High Command, continue to hold conferences. There is no reason to believe that decision on future policy has yet been taken. Therefore, any analysis which could be made at this time of the position which Japan may take in view of the new situation in Europe must of necessity be speculative. The German view of the Japanese reaction as reported in the telegram under reference, however, would appear to be so disingenuous as to require comment on the basis of our observations here.
2. The statement that the general Japanese reaction is one of full sympathy for Germany is wholly imaginative, as no indication of Japanese reaction has been permitted to appear, or at any rate has appeared, in the press. There is, of course, a large and strong element whose sensibilities have not been offended even by disclosure of Germany’s calculated betrayal of Soviet Russia: an element which has been well entrenched at the Foreign Office as well as in the army and navy. Leaders of this group, including several retired admirals and generals, are reported to be making strong representations to the Government to adopt a policy of unequivocal support of Germany. Apart from the fact that Japanese privately express themselves as being shocked by the long calculated and callous attack by Germany on the nation whose cooperation alone made practicable Germany’s decision to start the European war, the facts that such representations are thought to be necessary by the pro-German group and that the Government is continuing to examine the situation, are clear evidence that the German view of the Japanese reaction as being one of “full sympathy” for Germany is incorrect.
3. As the Department is aware, Wang Ching Wei’s visits to Japan resulted from his dissatisfaction over Japan’s neutrality treaty with Soviet Russia and Japan’s efforts to conclude a working arrangement with Chinese Communists. As one of the ostensible reasons for Wang’s flight from Chungking was Chiang Kai Shek’s cooperation with the Communists and with Soviet Russia, the former was being placed in a logically difficult position by his associates, the Japanese, seeking collaboration with both the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia. In our view the reference in the recent joint statement to combating communism, which we believe was inserted in the statement because of Wang’s insistence, has significance the compass of which is restricted to the Far Eastern situation. That the Germans can find still wider significance in that reference is an interesting disclosure of failure thus far on the part of the Japanese Government to furnish Germany a more substantial basis for hope of Japanese collaboration against Soviet Russia. It must be evident that the present situation is one [Page 989] which presents Japan with a unique opportunity to procure Soviet assistance to bring to an end the conflict with China, which remains as Japan’s first preoccupation, as it is the cause and origin of the extremely dangerous position in which she now finds herself.
4. With regard to the question whether there should have been prior consultation with Japan before the attack on Soviet Russia, we do not believe that the final Japanese decision will be largely influenced by relevant stipulations or absence thereof in the treaty of alliance. From a legalistic point of view Japan could properly observe simultaneously the letter of that treaty and also of the neutrality treaty with Soviet Russia.
Indeed if Japan’s position were to be decided purely on the basis of legal considerations such decision would not have required any delay. The fact is of course that Japan is again at the crossroads. She entered into an alliance with Germany on the basis of expectation that peace, if not close cooperation, would be maintained between Germany and Soviet Russia. The betrayal of that expectation has overturned one of the fundamental bases of Japan’s adherence to the Axis.
5. To sum up, thus far there is no evidence that any decision on policy has been taken by the Japanese Government and there is no definite indication at this time of the trend of thought which will eventually prove dominant. It seems to us that, unless decision is taken to go “all out” on the side of Germany, a decision which would not seem to consort with the prevailing political atmosphere, a situation such as this, arising in considerable measure from failure on the part of the Japanese to read aright the German character, cannot be passed off without important internal adjustments. We would expect in such event that procedure would follow closely that taken when the Hiranuma Cabinet fell as a result of the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty, namely, that policy would first be formulated and that adjustments of personnel within the Government would be made along the lines best calculated to implement such policy.
Sent to the Department. Repeated to Berlin and Moscow.
- Not printed.↩