762.94/519: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:50 p.m.]
738. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Department’s 448, April 10, 7 p.m. I very much appreciate the Department’s constructive suggestions and particularly the discretion which it left to me.
As I deemed it preferable not to put anything in writing, I called on Matsuoka this afternoon and read to him the following list of excerpts from my report of our previous conversation: (1) that he had made no commitments in Berlin or Rome; (2) that Japan had entered the Tripartite Pact to “preserve the peace”; (3) that Japan was not obligated to go to war with the United States but that if the United States declared war on Germany the situation might be different; (4) that Matsuoka does not anticipate that Germany will declare war on the United States but if so hopes that the United States will make no move in the Pacific until Japan has made its position clear; (5) that Japan will adhere to its obligations under the Tripartite Pact; (6) that Hitler and Ribbentrop had expressed to him the desire to limit the sphere of the war and had stated that they had no desire to become involved in a war with the United States; (7) that Hitler and Ribbentrop had suggested to him that he take steps to discourage anti-American agitation in Japan; (8) that he, Ribbentrop, and Hitler had all expressed a desire for peace; (9) that he had been favorably impressed [Page 937] by Hitler personally; (10) that Ribbentrop had expressed admiration; (11) that Hitler expected to win the war by submarine and aerial activities against Britain and would attempt an invasion of Britain only if necessary; (12) that Italy was largely already under the control of the Germans and that he could see no possibility for Britain to drive a wedge between Germany and Italy; (13) that he had made substantially no progress in his talks with Molotov due to the excessive Soviet demands; (14) that the United States could be indifferent to the Soviet Union but that Japan must come to an agreement or become embroiled; (15) that he desired to put an end to the war in China and had suggested that the President could accomplish this by indicating to Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would refuse further assistance if he did not accept a fair and reasonable peace; (16) that he had expressed a desire that the President and Mr. Hull trust him.
As I read the foregoing Matsuoka categorically indicated his approval of each statement. His only comment was in connection with items 3, 8, 10 and 15 which he amplified as follows:
As to item 3, he remarked that he considered that under the Tripartite Pact Japan is obligated to go to war with the United States should the United States declare war on Germany but that, of course, “We would confer with Germany first.”
As to item 8, he said that Hitler and Ribbentrop while expressing their desire for peace had made it clear to him that they did not consider that there was any possibility for peace at the present time and Hitler had emphasized to him several times that there would be no peace “unless England capitulated.”
As to item 10, he amplified the same by stating that Ribbentrop had expressed the opinion to him that Britain was stronger defensively at the present time than “when the war started”.
As to item 15, he amplified the same by stating that peace between Japan and China could only result from direct negotiation between the two countries as the Japanese public would not accept an intermediary.
Repeated to Tokyo.