740.0011 Pacific War/1095

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Atcheson)61

Mr. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy called on an officer of this Division this afternoon and stated that the British Ambassador in Tokyo had raised the question whether endeavor should not be made to effect an arrangement with the Japanese Government under which, in the event of British-Japanese hostilities, British and Japanese officials and nationals in the territory of the other would be withdrawn or exchanged. Mr. Hayter did not know whether the British Ambassador in Tokyo had in mind an arrangement designed also to be effective as regards Manchuria and Japanese-occupied areas of China. Mr. Hayter stated that the British Foreign Office, before acting in the matter, desired that the British Embassy discuss it with the Department with a view to learning our views.

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Although it is possible that the Japanese Government would not be willing to enter into such an arrangement, especially with regard to Manchuria and occupied areas of China, it is believed that, for the sake of the personal safety of American officials and other American nationals, it would be advisable for this Government as well as the British to attempt to make such arrangement. Such attempt might, at this time, be advisable also in that it would be definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firmness of the American position in the present crisis and would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government the seriousness with which we view the present situation.

It is our opinion that, if endeavor is made to effect such an arrangement, earnest effort should be made to have included within its scope both the occupied areas in China and Manchuria. It seems to us that there is a fair possibility that American officials and other nationals in Japan would, in case of hostilities between Japan and this country, receive reasonably correct treatment (although such treatment in the case of nationals placed in concentration camps would naturally, because of the lower standard of living in Japan, involve much more physical discomfort than would be the case in this country). On the other hand it is likely that our officials in Manchuria, who have no official status vis-à-vis the “Manchukuo” regime, and our nationals there as well as our officials and nationals in occupied areas of China, might receive extremely harsh treatment especially as the Japanese military authorities in control of those areas are to be classed in general among the extremists and are in general anti-American.

The proposed agreement would seem necessarily to envisage assent on the part of this Government to the withdrawal from United States territory of a number of Japanese subjects many times as great as the number of American nationals in territory controlled or occupied by Japan.

The officer of this Division on whom Mr. Hayter called informed Mr. Hayter that the matter would be brought to the attention of the high officers of the Department and that the British Embassy would be informed as soon as it was possible to reach a conclusion. It is suggested that, if it is decided that endeavor will be made to effect the suggested arrangement, the American approach to the Japanese Government be made independently of the British.62

As the making of such an approach would be interpreted by the American public as a definite indication that this Government expects [Page 716] war between Japan and the United States, the Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the advisability of this Government’s making such an approach at this time.

  1. Initialed by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton).
  2. Comment was offered by certain interested officers of the Department: By the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck): “No objection. Do not clearly perceive a need”; by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth): “No objection”; by the Chief of the Special Division (Green): “It would appear highly desirable to take such a step immediately”; by the Under Secretary of State (Welles): “I agree.” The memorandum was noted by the Secretary of State.