Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/12–241

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[Washington,] December 2, 1941.

Question Whether the Department Should Release to the Public the Text of the Documents Handed to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26

It is difficult to come to a definite conclusion in regard to the question of the advisability of making public the documents which the Secretary handed to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26⁵⁷ until decision shall first have been arrived at on several other important questions. Among these questions are:

(1) Whether this Government decides not to tolerate further and new steps of aggression by Japan; and

(2) Whether the President is to send a message to Congress on the Far Eastern situation and, if so, when.

The principal argument in favor of making the documents public is that the American public would be informed thereby of the full scope of the reply made by this Government to the Japanese Government, and the American public would be enabled to see for itself that this Government was taking a stand foursquare with the fundamental principles in which this country believes.

The disadvantages in making public the documents in question at this time may be outlined as follows:

(1) The press in this country and the American public would construe the documents as something in the nature of an ultimatum to Japan, whereas they are now regarded as matters presented for consideration by the Japanese Government.

(2) The statement in the documents that Japan will withdraw all her armed forces from China would, if made public at this time, be construed by China as a commitment on the part of the United States to see that that was accomplished. Moreover, there is no reference in the documents presented to the Japanese to the question of Manchuria, and China would almost certainly contend that the language as used in the documents presented to the Japanese Ambassador committed the United States to insisting that all Japanese armed forces be withdrawn from Manchuria and that Manchuria be regarded as all other parts of China. Any such claims on China’s part would not be legally warranted by the language used in the documents under reference. However, that China would make use of the language along the lines indicated seems clear beyond doubt.

(3) To make public at this time the text of the provision relating to the Tripartite Alliance would afford Germany a useful pretext toward influencing Japan to closer association with Germany. Even should we come to the point of war with Japan, it seems to me advisable that in our broad strategy we endeavor in so far as practicable to keep alive dissatisfaction and animosity between Germany and Japan.

The making public at this time of the documents handed the Japanese Ambassador will not, it is believed, “kill” the story that for a brief period this Government was giving tentative consideration to some sort of a temporary modus vivendi with Japan. It is believed, further, that the American people in general believe that the Government is taking a strong stand in discussions with Japan.

If this country should become involved in hostilities with Japan, practically all objection to making public the documents under reference would disappear. Even then, however, it would seem advisable to make those documents public not by themselves but along with other documents giving a fairly complete account of the entire conversations.

In the meantime, if it should be felt that further publicity need be given to the contents of the documents under reference, it is suggested that the substance of the documents might be communicated orally to American correspondents as background.

57. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 766 and 768.