852.00/3922: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Acting Secretary of State16
[Received November 28—1:30 to 3:30 p.m.]
1160. In the course of a conversation this morning Delbos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said to me that he regarded the present situation as extremely grave: “Europe is on the verge of general war.”
He stated that the Madrid Government had not consulted him but had consulted Eden with respect to its appeal to the Council of the League of Nations. Eden had advised against this step. He, Delbos, felt that it was unwise since Italy would certainly refuse to attend any such meeting and both Italy and Germany would ignore any decisions.
He said that Litvinov had advised the Spanish Government that he felt the League Council could do nothing effective at this moment but that he would support the position of Madrid.
Delbos said that he had proposed to the British Government a project for the settlement of the Spanish conflict which the British Government [Page 579] seemed to regard favorably. He had not yet received a definite reply from the British Government but expected one shortly. His project was for England and France jointly to issue an appeal (which would be close to a demand) to the Governments of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union to make a gentleman’s agreement on their honor immediately to stop all supplies of men and munitions to the conflicting parties in Spain and to join England and France in an immediate proposal to Franco and the Madrid Government that they should accept mediation at once.
He said that he feared an attack in force by the Italian fleet and the Italian army disguised as Franco troops on Barcelona was imminent.
1162. He then said that he had a remark to make which he would not dare to make officially but which he would like to make to me personally.
He had agreed that the joint action of Great Britain and France would be insufficient to produce any result. He believed, however, that if the President of the United States should join in this joint démarche the chances of success would be great. He wished to ask me therefore what would be the attitude of the United States Government with respect to this matter.
I replied speaking personally and not officially that it was my opinion that the President could not join in any such joint démarche at the present time, that the President being on the high seas17 and that his purpose now was to produce a solidarity for peace between the nations of the Western Hemisphere that it might be most prejudicial if he should at this moment involve himself in rearranging the affairs of the continent of Europe.
I added that it seemed to me that with [without?] the support of the President of the United States the démarche would have no effect. It must be known to him as it was known to me that Franco was so short of effectives that if he should not receive immediate and great support from Italy and Germany his movement would collapse and that Spain would rapidly be in the hands of the Communists and that Portugal would follow shortly thereafter.
Delbos said that he feared this was the truth and that he feared the Italians and Germans would regard the joint demands of France and England as in reality directed against Franco; and that they would refuse to commit themselves in any way.
1163. He finally said that he quite understood that the President should not wish to intervene in European affairs at this moment but that he hoped that when the President returned to Washington the middle of December he would make his great moral authority felt for the preservation of peace in Europe by some decisive intervention.
[Page 580]He said that as the head of the great democracy which possesses the greatest material and financial resources in the world the President enjoys a unique prestige.
I replied that I was glad that he had mentioned the great material and financial resources; that we had learned by our unhappy experience after the armistice that the great moral authority which President Wilson had enjoyed had been based on the fact that the countries of Europe stood in desperate need of our soldiers, munitions, warships, and money; that in proportion as the need for these material aids had diminished so in proportion President Wilson’s moral prestige had decreased. I felt that it was the duty of anyone who was a true friend of France as I was, to warn him not to base his foreign policy or any part of it on an expectation that the United States would ever again send troops or warships or floods of munitions and money to Europe.
He replied apparently with complete comprehension that he fully understood and concurred in this position; that he had meant nothing more than the assistance of the United States in the moral sphere.
I replied that there was in addition a line on which we could go forward and on which we were most eager to go forward; the line of removal of restrictions to international trade and other economic barriers and that we could also participate in a movement for general disarmament. We could not, however, under any circumstances guarantee anything in Europe.
1164. He replied that he quite understood that we must follow a policy of absolute neutrality but that he clung to the hope that our neutrality might be tempered by friendship for the democracies of France and England.
I answered that our friendship for France and England was no secret to any one and would continue to flourish but that it was the feeling of the entire American people as well as the President and all members of the Government that we should not jeopardize our neutrality by favoritism.
Delbos then said that he felt that on the return of the President to Washington it would be essential in the interests of peace to attempt to devise some working agreement between the French, British and American Governments. In order to sweeten the atmosphere somewhat he felt that it might be desirable, instead of sending the customary “ritual refusal” to pay the French debt to the United States, for France on this December 15 to reply by a note which stated that France desired to reopen the debt negotiations and had a full intention to reach a debt settlement. He asked me please to reply to him unofficially and personally what I thought of this idea.
I answered that the decision seemed to me to be one which concerned exclusively the French Government; that I should not care to advise [Page 581] him with respect to a matter which would certainly raise great discussion within France. He pressed me however to give him my personal opinion and I said that while such a reply might tend to sweeten the atmosphere the effect of it would depend entirely on what the French Government had in mind. If it was simply an empty gesture which would cause every one in the world to start discussing again the French debt to the United States the effect might be bad. If on the other hand the French Government was determined to pay its debt the effect might be good. It depended entirely on what the French Government had in mind.
He replied that he himself had voted for the debt payment; that Blum and the Socialists were now in favor of the debt payment and that they both intended to attempt to reach a genuine debt settlement.
I derived the impression that it had been decided to make a statement in this sense on December 15. Delbos and I agreed that we should both deny that we had spoken of the debt question.
1165. Delbos then informed me that he believed the French Government in the very near future would follow United States authorities’ example and transfer its Embassy from Madrid to Valencia.
In conclusion he said that he had just been having another controversy with the Soviet Government about their interference in the internal affairs of France. He said that he had instructed Coulondre18 to state to Litvinov that the French Government must demand that the Soviet Government cease directing and “heating up” the French Communists. He said that the reply of Litvinov had been that the Soviet Government had nothing to do with the French Communist movement and the additional phrase “then you do [not? ] wish the Soviet Government to begin giving decorations to the French Communists”. He said that he had called in Potemkin, Soviet Ambassador in Paris, and said that the French were not altogether fools and that they had heard that there was a man named Stalin who had a certain influence in both the Soviet Government and the Comintern and that if the Soviet Government intended to maintain good relations with the French Government the present attacks on the French Government by the French Communists which were ordered and organized in Moscow must cease.
In spite of the fact that I talked very directly to Monsieur Delbos he was extremely cordial and throughout our conversation showed every evidence of desiring to cultivate most amicable and close relations between our two countries.
I venture to suggest that this is a good moment to press any matters in which we are especially interested.
- This telegram was received in five sections, numbered separately as Nos. 1160, 1162, 1163, 1164, and 1165. No. 1161 (not printed) is a separate telegram relating to a different subject.↩
- En route to Buenos Aires to attend the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.↩
- Robert Coulondre, French Ambassador in the Soviet Union.↩