838.51/2642
The Minister in Haiti (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 15.]
Sir: With reference to my despatch No. 31 of April 28, 1933 (Subject: New Treaty) and with particular regard to the penultimate paragraph on page six of that despatch,52 I have the honor to inform the Department that I took the first opportunity that offered to bring to M. Hibbert’s attention the apparent divergence existing between the President’s views on treaty revision as he had expressed them to me and as he, M. Hibbert, had explained them to me.
I later had an opportunity to talk with M. Hibbert in person when he told me that he had had a talk with the President and was still of the opinion, in spite of what the President had said to me, that if we would be willing to separate Protocols A and B and to conclude an immediate accord covering Protocol A, the President on his part would give us the written assurance that at a later date, following the adjournment of the present session of the Legislature, he would conclude an accord with us covering the financial control after 1936, the terms of which would be in substance those of Protocol B of the September 3, 1932 treaty. I asked M. Hibbert if he knew what terms [Page 742] the President would, in such a case, propose for Protocol A. He said he thought the completion of the Haitianization of the Garde by December 31, 1933 and withdrawal of the Marine Corps immediately thereafter: also, the withdrawal of the Scientific Mission, but an officer of the Mission, presumably Captain Chambers the present Director of the Scientific Mission, either to be designated as a member of the American Military Mission, which would remain as planned under Protocol A of the treaty of September 3, or such an officer designated to assist the Service d’Hygiène.
This conversation took place on May 6th last. On May 10th, at the President’s request, I called to see him. M. Blanchet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was also present. After handing me a personal letter to President Roosevelt (see Legation’s despatch No. 48 of May 11, 1933),53 the President went on to ask me whether I had anything new from Washington with regard to the plan we had discussed at our last meeting. I told him that I had not and reminded him of what I had said during our last talk, that I did not feel that in its somewhat indefinite form the State Department had very much to act upon: that I had no instructions to discuss such a plan and had no idea how Washington would view the idea of reaching separate accords on Protocols A and B, but that I felt they would be more disposed to consider the matter if the Haitian Government was, on its part, prepared to give definite assurances that an accord covering financial control after 1936, when reached, would be substantially that set forth in Protocol B of the treaty of September 3.
In spite of what M. Hibbert had told me, the President returned to the same position he had taken during our last talk, presenting the old arguments and expressing his inability to see why, if an irrevocable mandate were given to the bank that the payments for the service of the loan were to take precedence over all other payments, this would not be a sufficient guarantee to the bondholders.
He said that, unfortunately, the spirit of nationalism which had prompted the rejection not only of the treaty but the principle of the treaty last September appeared, if anything, to be strengthening and he felt it would be impossible to secure ratification by the Legislature of an accord that was substantially that rejected last September. I asked him whether he felt that such an accord would have to be submitted to the Legislature for approval. After all, Article VIII of the Protocol of 1919, which had received the necessary approval of the competent Haitian authority, called for some such agreement later and I thought it at least open to debate whether an executive accord would not be sufficient. He said this was so, as far as concerned the handing back to Haitian control of departments or services, such [Page 743] as in the accord of August 5, 1931 and the proposed accord covering matters dealt with in Protocol A of the Treaty. But an agreement covering financial control after 1936, rather than giving something back to Haiti, extended American control and therefore would have to receive legislative approval. And this, he felt, would not be accorded to an agreement following substantially the terms of Protocol B of the September 3 treaty. It would, on the contrary, stiffen Nationalist opposition. However, he felt that if we reached an accord on Protocol A which he could promulgate, this, coupled with the carrying out of the public works program envisaged, would have an excellent effect on the country, etc., etc. At the same time he would be willing to give his solemn assurance that the accord to be reached on Protocol B would adequately protect the bondholders. I replied that, without in any way wishing to doubt this, I did not feel that my Government would consider such a suggestion unless it had very definite assurances as to what the terms of such an accord would be. If I could inform Washington that the Haitian Government would be willing to give us a written assurance that, following an accord on Protocol A, it would at a later date, prior to the 1934 session of the Legislature, reach an accord covering financial control substantially that of Protocol B of the treaty of September 3, this would be a clear and definite proposal for them to consider. The President, however, refused to commit himself and merely stated that he would be willing to give assurances which would, he felt, adequately protect the bondholders.
In all of these talks, I have made it plain that I was without any instructions from the Department other than to discuss a treaty along the lines of that which I had recently presented to them for consideration. I am sure that this is clearly understood. In fact, in my talk with the President reported above, when he told me that he felt the plan he suggested was the one that offered most hope of success and was really the course to follow, I reminded him that there was another possible course; namely, to continue on as at present until some later time when perhaps things seemed more propitious for a treaty along the lines of that of September 3. He disputed this, however, insisting that we must put an end to the persistent rumors with regard to the Haitianization of the Garde and the withdrawal of the Marines and that he felt that this could best be done by reaching an accord immediately and making it public.
I am not yet in a position to make more definite recommendations to the Department as to what would seem—from this angle—to be the best course to pursue, as the situation is changing rapidly and there seems to be much conflict of opinion among President Vincent’s advisers as to the course the Haitian government should follow.
[Page 744]In the meantime, it would be helpful to me to have an informal expression of the Department’s views as to the general proposal of concluding separate accords on pending issues, provided, of course, that before reaching any agreement regarding the Haitianization of the Garde and withdrawal of the Marine Brigade, the Haitian Government would give written assurances regarding an accord on the question of future financial administration.
Pending an indication of the Department’s views and clarification of the situation here, I shall not seek further conversations with the Haitian Government.
Respectfully yours,