837.00/4480: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received 8:40 p.m.]
500. For the President. At the urgent request of Dr. Grau I had a long interview with him at midnight last night in a private house. He attempted at some length and in great detail to excuse the utterly unjustifiable and false charges which he and the members of his government had formulated against me on the ground that he has been misinformed. I stated that this was entirely a personal question; that the allegations made had been completely ignored by me; and that the conduct of my official duties would be in no way affected thereby. He spoke with great indignation of the “international conspiracy” which had been formed to prevent recognition of his government and stated that the “boycott” so created presented an insurmountable obstacle. I replied that I was not competent to speak for any government but my own and that in the case of the United States neither any conspiracy existed nor had I before heard any rumors of such a conspiracy; that the policy that we were pursuing as announced by the President of the United States was based upon our desire to take no official [Page 534] action which would result in injustice to the Cuban people; and that that policy would be continued in the most friendly spirit towards every element in Cuba without prejudice and without favoritism.
He then related in extenso what he considered the achievements of his government. He felt that only malicious intrigues could have prevented his government from obtaining the confidence of all. I remarked that every liberal minded person must favor what he claimed was his desire to benefit the conditions of the laboring classes in Cuba but that I could not help but feel that the lack of study and the confiscatory nature of many of the decrees which he had issued affecting legitimate and vested interests in Cuba must necessarily impair confidence. I called his attention specifically to the decree issued yesterday affecting the Cuban Electric Company and to various other decrees of recent date affecting the just rights of many foreign interests other than American in Cuba. After a long harangue on the purity of the ideals of his colleagues, their opposition to Communism and their desire to benefit the Republic he admitted that some of his decrees and notably the Cuban Electric Company decree might not have received sufficient preparation and in the case of the latter assured me that the government would abide by any decision of the Supreme Court modifying the more obnoxious features of that decree.
He then requested me to help him in finding a solution of the political problem. I reminded him that in September I had expressed to him my belief that any provisional government in Cuba could only govern successfully if it adopted a spirit of compromise and sought popular support in order to carry out its obligations. I said that it was increasingly apparent that every day that passed made a concentration government less possible; that the many deaths and imprisonments for which his government had been responsible had aroused popular hostility to a high pitch; that the attacks directed by his government against the legitimate political groups and organizations had inspired the belief that the government intended through force to prevent those organizations from having any fair chance in the coming elections and that the government had determined to control the form of the proposed new constitution without giving the Cuban people any opportunity freely to express their opinion with regard thereto; and that finally the instability of the government and the ill-considered and radical decrees issued had vitally impaired business confidence. I stated that it was well known that revolutionary plans were being formulated on a very large scale and that these plans would almost inevitably be carried out and that in that event, given the disturbed social condition of the country, any fair minded observer could foresee widespread destruction of property and bloodshed on an extensive scale.
[Page 535]I questioned him as to why, when a formula of solution had been proposed through the Uruguayan Minister a week ago which was in a form acceptable to the majority of the opposition parties, he himself had not accepted it after a prior expression of his willingness to agree to it. His reply to this query led me to believe that he had agreed to it at a moment when he feared for his own security and that later, upon being reassured, he had gone back upon his commitments.
I then requested him to advise me what he was actually prepared to do in order to seek a solution of the country’s difficulties. He then stated clearly and definitely that if no conciliatory agreement was possible he was willing to resign at any moment; that if an agreement was possible based upon the form suggested by the Uruguayan Minister, namely, his retention in the Presidency for a relatively brief period, virtual control of the government to be vested in a concentration Cabinet and an advisory council composed of representatives of all groups, he would only demand the outward semblance of control as a means of justifying his continuation in office. I thereupon stated that I could assure him that I would do everything possible to urge a joint agreement along the lines proposed but that my participation in such negotiations must necessarily be entirely confidential and informal and that so far as I was concerned the control of these negotiations must be retained by the Uruguayan Minister.
There is a very strong move on foot among the more influential of the present Army officers with the full support of Batista to remove Grau and his government and replace it by a National Government under the Presidency of Mendieta. In order to combine the two tendencies I have suggested to Torriente that he prepare a modification of the Uruguayan Minister’s formula so as to include agreement by all that upon the resignation of Grau he be replaced by Mendieta. If this can be accomplished, and Mendieta has assured me that he would accept the proposal, the growing dissidence in the Army will be stopped and revolutionary plans will be checked since Mendieta is the only Presidential candidate who has the complete confidence of the present leaders of the Army and upon whom all political factions have agreed.
I do not wish to appear unduly pessimistic but I am not hopeful of the outcome of the present negotiations. Grau is now under the complete domination of the worst elements in his government and while at times, as last night, he [apparent omission] to grasp the extreme gravity of the situation, I have no confidence in the sincerity of his desire to seek a solution unless this is forced upon him through fear. Between the individuals in the government who are seeking to create a frankly communistic government in Cuba and those who are solely in the government [Page 536] for the profits they can obtain, both of which elements have the upper hand and are working together, Grau remains the figurehead he has been from the beginning. There is strong reason for thinking that his renewed attempt to seek a compromise responds to a plan on the part of his Secretary of the Interior to prolong these negotiations until a favorable moment arises for a new coup d’état and the replacement of Grau and the present Cabinet by a dictatorial government composed solely of elements of the extreme Left.