837.00/4206: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 17—4:18 a.m.]
367. It seems an appropriate moment, in view of the apparent impasse that has been reached between the supporters of the Grau San Martín government and the elements opposed to it in the negotiation of an agreement which would provide for a government which might meet with general popular support, to lay before you the following considerations in view of my belief that we must now decide upon a definite course in accordance with a permanent policy towards Cuba which will further the ultimate interests of the United States both political and commercial not only in Cuba but on the continent as well.
The situation now existing and the events leading up to it are in brief summary as follows:
The Céspedes Government was supported by every one of the so-called revolutionary parties or associations opposed to Machado with the exception of the students. It was accepted by the bulk of the old Liberal, Conservative and Popular Parties, who realized the fall of Machado made a reorganization of those parties possible and felt that the rank and file of the parties would receive both political and individual guarantees. It was strongly supported by all commercial and financial interests as is demonstrated by the fact that an unprecedented revival of business took place commencing 10 days before [Page 488] the downfall of the government. While mob lynching of spies and criminals employed by Machado and the imprisonment of his chief henchmen occurred during that period the government was taking measures to restore authority and there was neither intimidation, assassination nor censorship of speech or press by the government itself.
The downfall of the Céspedes Government was due I believe to an Army mutiny. The mutiny was caused partly by the desire of the sergeants and soldiers to remove most of their officers; partly by their well-founded belief that some of the officers were plotting for the restoration of General Menocal to power; and principally because of the propaganda spread by Communist and radical agitators among the soldiers that their pay was to be cut from $22 to $13 a month. The mutiny was not directed against Céspedes or his Cabinet; it was not political in its origin and it was not, as appears to be believed in the United States, in any sense responsive to a social movement.
The students did not even know of the movement until 24 hours before it took place. Batista himself has confirmed my knowledge that they and the radical professors were not called in until the sergeants felt they dared not carry out their protest mutiny without civilian support. It was only at the last moment that these civilian elements joined by other extreme radicals succeeded in persuading the soldiers to turn the mutiny into a political revolution to place a new government in power.
During the past 6 weeks that the present government has been in control the following developments have taken place: The government is supported by a small number of professors and a portion, probably a minority, of the university students; by a scattered number of small offshoots from the large secret societies most of which offshoots are concentrated in Habana; by a few radicals of all shades belonging to the “lunatic fringe” of the older parties; and by the Army. It has sedulously cultivated the labor unions and has probably gained the sympathy of some of them but since there is not as yet in Cuba effective national organization of labor outside of Communism such support as there may be by the unions is regional.
The government is opposed by all of the five organized revolutionary parties who were opposed to Machado; by the three old political parties whose strength in the provinces is still very strong; small merchants and business men; by the small farmer and colono class which is altogether conservative in tendency and which constitutes the bulk of the population in the provinces; and finally by all the larger Cuban and foreign commercial and financial interests.
During these 6 weeks no constructive measure has been undertaken; many decrees have been issued and most of them have been [Page 489] disregarded; every branch of the public administration has been utterly disorganized; employees who have spent their life in the public service and who had no political color have been replaced by boys of 20 or 21 who have neither training nor qualifications. The Customs, Public Instruction, Post Office and Sanitary services are in a state of utter chaos; almost every judge in the Republic has been replaced by a so-called revolutionary.
The condition of the treasury is desperate; salaries can be paid for one more month; customs receipts are constantly shrinking and since taxpayers are refusing to pay taxes internal revenues are practically non-existent.
There is neither protection for life nor property. The houses of all political leaders opposed to the government are searched by squads of soldiers at any time; imprisonments occur without any semblance of legal authority; properties belonging to Cubans, foreigners and Americans have been seized by laborers, the owners’ representatives have fled or have been driven off and the government has been unable or unwilling to restore the properties to their rightful owners; assassinations are recommencing and as in the days of Machado the President and his chief supporters only go about in armored cars surrounded by soldiers with machine guns. Those who dare to attack the government on the radio or in the press are in danger of seizure by soldiers or students if they do not go into hiding. The flight of political exiles to the United States has already commenced and two of the principal leaders of the revolutionary parties have now fled in justified fear of their lives.
As cynically admitted by one of the leading members of the Student Directorate the government has sought to gain popular support by raising the cry of anti-Americanism but in reality the groups now supporting the government are the only elements in Cuba which are actually anti-American. It is only in the university and among the professional agitators that there exists any real anti-Americanism in Cuba so far.
In determining our course in view of these facts and bearing in mind the ultimate objectives which you have laid down it seems to me that we have the following alternatives:
(1) To recognize the present government without further delay.
The advantages of this step are as follows: We would presumably allay anti-American propaganda; we would avoid the present difficulties arising from having to deal with an unrecognized government; we might through influence prevent dangerous economic and financial measures being taken; recognition might offer us the opportunity of bettering the disastrous economic conditions in Cuba which affect every class and which are gravely prejudicial to our own export trade; [Page 490] finally recognition would help temporarily to strengthen and to maintain the present government.
The disadvantages are as follows: We would recognize a government supported by a scant minority and only capable of maintaining itself through the present adherence of a disorganized and undisciplined Army; we would incur exactly the same reproach which the Hoover administration incurred for not withdrawing recognition from Machado, namely, that through recognition and the moral and financial support which that implies we are forcing upon the Cuban people a dictatorship against the will of the great majority of the people; we would incur the lasting hostility of the organized political parties who will not go to national elections held under this regime as well as of the professional and commercial classes who foresee ruin under this government; we would apparently favor the small anti-American as against the large pro-American groups; we would not promote permanent stability for the reason that with the political parties refusing to go to elections and all the financial and commercial interests clamoring for a government in which they can have confidence, there is no possible doubt that one revolutionary attempt after another will be made until the government is overthrown and in the meantime there will be no sugar crop and no permanent economic improvement; finally for all of these reasons we would postpone the time when national elections can be held and a permanent constitutional government be elected with which we can undertake the ratification of new treaty relations, and which would itself be fitted to undertake those permanent social and economic reforms which alone can bring about real stability in Cuba.
(2) The second alternative is to withhold recognition until a provisional government is constituted which offers guarantees acceptable both to the political and non-political forces in the Republic.
The arguments above set forth are of course applicable to this alternative in reverse order. From the point of view of immediate expediency the first alternative is preferable. From the point of view of permanent policy in Cuba the second alternative seems to me the one we must adopt. It is a policy based on justice to the Cuban people, one which will hasten rather than retard the creation of a constitutional government in Cuba and one which will expedite eventual stability. Our own commercial and export interests in Cuba cannot be revived under this government. Only confidence can accomplish that and there is no confidence either in the policies nor stability of this regime, whether it be recognized or not.
I have felt it essential to lay these facts before you for the determination by the President and yourself of the policy we should pursue. While my knowledge of sentiment in Latin America is largely [Page 491] based upon my conversations with the Latin American representatives here, it would seem as if we were supported generally in the continent in the attitude we have so far assumed.