837.00/4136: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 6—4:06 a.m.]
341. Your telegram No. 113, October 5, 7 p.m. I coincide, of course, in the belief expressed by the President that in view of all the circumstances now existing in Cuba there must be some latitude in the application by us of the customary principles governing recognition of a Cuban government. I wish, however, to make it very plain that the capture of the officers does not indicate consolidation of the position of the government but solely a decidedly increased prestige for the Army as distinguished from the government. I appreciate fully the difficulty of realizing that such a distinction can exist in view of the apparent identification of the Army with the Grau San Martín government. It might be remarked, however, that the Army mutiny did not take place in order to place Grau San Martín in power. It occurred for the sole purpose of displacing the officers and when Batista and the other ringleaders found at the last moment that the students and a few others would join with them they then agreed to support a so-called revolutionary government in which Grau San Martín participated. The divergence between the Army and the civilian elements in the government is fast becoming daily more marked. As Batista becomes more influential the power of the students and Grau San Martín diminishes.
There will be held tomorrow night a general assembly of the university students at which I am informed a large majority of the students will pass a resolution repudiating the actions of the Student Council and urging the constitution of a government in which all factions can have confidence. Once this action is taken the Grau San Martín regime will in strict reality only represent some 30 members of the Student Council, a few professors, and the officeholders whom they have appointed.
If our Government recognized the existing Cuban government before it has undergone radical modification such action would imply our lending official support to a regime which is opposed by all business and financial interests in Cuba; by all the powerful political groups and in general, so far as I can estimate the situation after 5 months’ intensive study, not only by all the elements that hold out any promise of being able to govern Cuba but by a very great majority of the people as well. Such action on our part would undoubtedly help to keep the present government in power for a while but popular reaction against it, while delayed, would continue and would increase, until after a series of exhausting efforts which the Republic cannot [Page 474] effect, the government would either be overthrown or else, which is more probable, the country would be plunged into utter anarchy.
Under existing conditions no government can survive whether we recognize it or not unless the major political groups support it and unless the commercial and business classes have confidence in it.
If we extend recognition now we do not promote permanent stability for the reasons above expressed and we incur the antipathy of those classes in Cuba which in reality constitute the dominant portion of public opinion and which, once these abnormal conditions have passed, will govern the country.
If we refrain from taking action now a solution is probable. The students confidentially are stating to their friends that they can no longer hold out. Batista is today already pressing for a compromise. The [memorandum?] left today at the Department announcing a proposed change in the Cabinet is indicative of the change in the uncompromising attitude on that point formerly maintained by the students. I consequently most earnestly recommend that in the true sense of the term we give the Cuban people a further opportunity to settle their own problems without hindering that end through premature action on our part. If a change in the Executive branch of the government in whole or in part can now be brought about which will result in popular support and restore confidence I would most decidedly recommend immediate recognition without waiting until those customary objectives such as the complete maintenance of public order are attained. But I wish to emphasize my strong belief that if we recognize a government now which does not possess at least a considerable measure of popular support we postpone a return by Cuba to normal and stable conditions and we incur once more the same measure of animosity on the part of the mass of the Cuban people as that which we possessed during the last 4 years of the Machado Government.