837.00/4131: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 5—1:32 a.m.]
340. Batista came to the Embassy this morning to see me and I had a conversation with him alone for about one hour and a half.
He gave me in great detail the history of the battle between the officers and the soldiers at the National Hotel. He insists that the causes of the fighting were primarily the continued and successful efforts of the officers to pass arms and ammunition through the lines of sentries around the hotel and, secondly, to the report that had come to him that the officers had planned a concerted revolutionary movement for the afternoon of October 2nd in connivance with other revolutionary groups within the city of Habana. He referred to the conditions which he had offered the officers at noon and to which they made no reply as well as to the fact that the renewal of the fighting at 3 o’clock that afternoon was due to the officers at a moment when he himself was prepared to agree to an extension of the truce until the following morning at least. Finally he assured me that the deaths of officers and soldiers after the surrender of the former was due to firing by the officers and that in the excitement which ensued it was utterly impossible for him to control the soldiers.
He gave me his word of honor upon his official responsibility that none of the officers now in the prisons would be molested in any way. He told me further that in order to provide greater measures of security for them in view of the efforts of the students to stir up the soldiers to insist upon the immediate execution of the principal officers, he had arranged for their removal to the national prison on the Isle of Pines to which they would be taken in groups [of] 20 or 30 during the night so that crowds which might endanger them would not collect at the railway stations. He concluded by stating that while it was utterly impossible for him to avoid the trial of the officers by courts-martial he would postpone such trials for as long a period as might be possible in order that passions might cool and he would further see to it that the courts were composed of lawyers and not of soldiers or sergeants. I made certain requests of him with regard to medical attention for several of the officers who were ill and he assured me that the measures I requested would be carried out.
He expressed the deepest regret for the loss of life of Mr. Lotspicht and to the danger to which various other Americans had been exposed as well as for the damage done to American property. He explained that the death of Lotspicht and the danger resulting [Page 470] to other Americans was due entirely to the fact that they were in apartment houses from which opponents of the soldiers were shooting and that while he had personally given orders to sacrifice the lives of the soldiers themselves rather than endanger foreign lives it was, of course, impossible to control the soldiers at moments when they were being shot at.
He then told me, in response to an inquiry from me as to whether he intended to permit a continuance of the intolerable conditions which had now existed for the last 5 weeks on the sugar plantations, that the Army would seize all foreign agitators and arrange for their immediate expulsion from Cuba and at the same time imprison 1 Cuban Communistic leaders and would also guarantee the rights of the legitimate managers of such properties.
We then had a protracted and very frank discussion of the present situation in Cuba. He asked me for my advice as well as my opinion and I gave it to him. I told him that in my judgment he himself was the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority. I added that this was due in part to the fact that he appeared to have the loyal support of a large part of his troops and in part to the very determined and effective action taken by the troops in Habana as well as in a lesser degree in other cities against the Communistic and extreme radical elements. This I told him had rallied to his own support the very great majority of the commercial and financial interests in Cuba who are looking for protection and who could only find such protection in himself; that by his refusal to permit Grau San Martín to turn the Cuban newspapers over to the students and the workmen in the newspaper plants he had assured himself of the support of the press; that the leaders of the important political factions with the exception of Menocal, namely, Mendieta, Gómez, Martínez Saenz and Silverio were in accord that his control of the Army as Chief of Staff should be continued as the only possible solution and were willing to support him in that capacity. In some manner it must be evident to him, I said, that the present government of Cuba did not fill any of the conditions which the United States Government had announced as making possible recognition by us and that I felt sure that he would realize that the events of the National Hotel had diminished very materially that very small amount of popular support which the Grau San Martín regime may previously have possessed. I told him further that from my conversations with the representatives of the Latin American Republic[s] here the affair involving the officers had very definitely removed the probability of recognition on the part of those Republics. I emphasized as clearly as I could the position of the present government as I saw it; that it had failed in the 4 weeks in which it had been in office to adopt one constructive measure; that it [Page 471] possessed far less popular confidence today than when it first came into power; that it was without the support of the commercial and financial interests in Cuba; that without recognition by foreign governments the financial situation of the government was so paralyzed that even if it repudiated every obligation it would not for long be able to pay salaries or function as a government; and that should the present government go down in disaster that disaster would necessarily inextricably involve not only himself but the safety of the Republic, which he had publicly pledged himself to maintain. I concluded by saying that it appeared to me after my conversations with Carbo and with himself that all that stood between an equitable agreement on the part of all important factors in the country (almost all of which supported an identic program for the provisional government) was the unpatriotic and futile obstinacy of a small group of young men who should be studying in the university instead of playing politics and of a few individuals who had joined with them from selfish motives. I urged him in the interest of the Republic of Cuba itself to act as intermediary between the groups now at variance and through the force of authority which he represented in his person to insist that an immediate fair and reasonable solution be found so that Cuba might once more possess a government which had the confidence of all and which would have a fair opportunity to tide over the critical situation which now lay ahead.
Batista most emphatically agreed. He reminded me of his repeated interviews with Mendieta, Gómez and the leaders of the A.B.C. and declared that he was willing to insist on any solution acceptable to all which might gain the support of the important elements in public opinion here. He emphasized the fact that in his opinion Menocal must be left out of any such solution but declared that while the A.B.C. was in his opinion unquestionably conspiring against the Army he felt that the leaders of the A.B.C. were both patriotic and able men with whom he could work. He then, however, expressed the belief that should any rapid change in the government be made it might be difficult to control his troops without further bloodshed which he desired at all hazards to avoid. I told him that, of course, I was in agreement with him on the latter point and that he necessarily was the sole judge of the attitude of his own troops and that the matter of whether one individual or another was in the Presidency or in the Cabinet was a matter of complete indifference to me. I said that what I urged no matter whether Grau San Martín remained in the government or not was that a solution be found which represented effectively the desire of the Cuban people and which at the same time would make it possible for confidence in government to be restored in the Republic. I made it very clear before [Page 472] he left that I felt that any further coup d’état or revolutionary movement from whatever side it came would under present conditions be more prejudicial than beneficial but that it was my considered opinion that [a] swing to the extremely important position which now occupied his influence in obtaining a patriotic solution in these moments of crisis must necessarily be regarded as preponderant.
He asked if I would let him see me frequently during the next few days in order that he might talk over conditions with me. I told him that I would be happy to see him at any time.
The situation as regards my relations with Batista is, of course, anomalous. I feel it necessary to make plain, however, that there does not exist at the present time in Cuba any authority whatever except himself and that in the event of further disturbances which may endanger the lives and properties of Americans or foreigners in the Republic it seems to be essential that this relationship be maintained.