837.00/4085: Telegram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 2—2:27 a.m.]
329. I had at his request a further interview with Sergio Carbo this afternoon.
Owing to the increased strength which the Army has obtained since the events of Friday the government itself has felt itself correspondingly weaker. There is in the first place a healthy reaction among the soldiers themselves against those elements in the government and especially those members of the Student Council whom they consider identified with the Communist organization, and in the second place, there is an increasing divergence between those individuals in the government who support the attitude of the soldiers and believe in the necessity of maintaining public order and those who wish frankly to join with the extremist labor and Communist groups. The Army is more united in Habana than at any time during the past month and Batista’s position is correspondingly stronger. Owing to his close connection with Batista and his present influence over him Carbo has more power today than the Student Council and consequently than Grau San Martín whose sole support is in the students.
Carbo stated that he had reached the conclusion that a change in the present government was desirable provided such change was predicated from this fusion into a national party of those existing factions which favored the realization of a program of social reform—by this he meant, he explained, a fusion of the A.B.C, the less radical portion of the Student Council, the progressive elements in the Unión Nacionalista and Gómez parties, and the O.C.R.R., such fusion to [Page 462] support the new provisional government. In reply to my inquiry he stated that any such project must, of course, imply not only the support but the active participation of the Army. He made it clear that the Army leaders were no longer willing to stand the attempt on the part of the students to dominate by emphasizing that the soldiers were already disarming students as well as other civilians and intended to disband the so-called “caskets army” composed of about 2,000 students armed with rifles and machine guns.
I told him that I was heartily in favor of any government in Cuba that could rally popular opinion of real importance and that could prove it was capable of maintaining order and that could inspire confidence in its intent to carry out the general program already agreed upon. I told him further that in my conversations with the leaders of the groups which he had mentioned I had obtained the clear impression that they would agree to the project he had in mind provided they were offered a fair deal; that if he offered them authority as well as requesting their support they would in all probability accede to the suggestion. I told him that I would not agree in any sense further to mediate but that if he and they desired to consult me behind the scenes I was willing to be of all possible service for the purpose of unifying Cuban public opinion in the support of a provisional government in which all classes could have confidence.
He discussed with me at great length the administration’s policies in the United States. He asked if the United States would oppose a policy of social and economic reform in Cuba. I stated that in my judgment my Government would not only not oppose but would in every proper manner actively support such a program provided it were carried out with the consent of a majority of the Cuban people through the medium of a constituted government. He promised me he would oppose any move by the present government to declare a moratorium on the foreign debt in the hope that change in the existing situation would result in the creation of a government that would be recognized and which could handle that question in a constructive and friendly manner with the bankers. He told me that in compliance with his promise to me in our last interview a decree would be issued tomorrow ordering the Army to dislodge from any sugar central all individuals other than the employees whom the managers desired to retain and calling for the expulsion from the Republic of all foreign agitators and Communists.
He will begin tomorrow conversations with the leaders of the political parties above mentioned.