Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/2064

The Chargé in Germany (Gordon) to the Secretary of State

No. 2421

Berlin, May 20, 1933.
[Received June 3.]

Sir: In amplification of my telegrams No. 81 and 84 of May 17 and 19,¹⁸ respectively, and with reference to despatch No. 2409 of May 19,¹⁹ going forward in this pouch, I have the honor to report that even those who felt certain that Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag on German Foreign Policy and Disarmament would be conciliatory in tone, were surprised at the moderation displayed by him on this important occasion. The speech showed Hitler for the first time as a statesman speaking to the world, not the brown-shirt politician appealing to the emotions of his listeners.

It was without doubt a skillful piece of work, carefully balanced, to enable Hitler to appear firm and determined in the eyes of his followers and, at the same time, to convince the world that his foreign policy was conciliatory. Taken all in all, it was an able presentation of the German case. Hitler has maneuvered cleverly. Germany has escaped the threatened foreign political isolation. The prospects for future disarmament discussion are now more favorable. The Disarmament Conference has been saved and a basis for further negotiations at Geneva has been created. The real proof of Germany’s sincerity, however, will be her actions and deeds at Geneva.

Hitler has categorically rejected war as a solution for political problems. He accepted the proposals contained in President Roosevelt’s message, declaring that Germany was willing to cooperate with the other nations on a footing of equality. Does this mean that the Nazi regime in Germany sincerely believes in a solution of international disputes by pacific means? Or is this merely a tactical move to shift the responsibility for a possible disruption of the Disarmament Conference onto France? The question also arises, to what extent the threat of sanctions was responsible for Hitler’s sudden change of front. However that may be, the fact remains that Hitler is not prepared to oppose the whole world. He must resort to a flexible foreign policy in order to gain time for the necessary internal political consolidation.

In private conversation, Nazis admit that Hitler’s conciliatory tone was due in no small measure to this consideration. They prefer to believe that in less time than the five-year transitional period, which Hitler is willing to accept for the restoration of Germany’s national security, the Third Reich will be sufficiently consolidated to permit the real Hitler—the advocate of the doctrine of force, as laid down in his book My Struggle and in numerous political speeches—to abandon the policy of fulfillment which he has always condemned as treasonable.

Hitler’s argument that the Peace Conference should have reorganized the European States on the principles of national ideas and nationality must be very alluring to the German expansionists. Carried to a logical conclusion it would mean a German Reich comprising not only most of the territory ceded by Germany as a result of the Versailles Treaty, but also parts of Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Tyrol, and the whole of Austria. His statement that if the territorial reorganization of Europe had been carried out on this basis, the war and the sacrifice in blood would perhaps not have been quite in vain, is strangely naive. So far as Germany is concerned, this is undoubtedly true, for if a peace treaty had been concluded on this basis, the defeated German Reich would have emerged from the war with considerable territorial acquisitions.

In his efforts to pacify and appease world opinion, Hitler has made certain other statements which an impartial observer, watching developments in Germany at close range, cannot let go by without criticism.

His remarks about the futility of a new war, the destruction and chaos which is certain to follow, cannot be reconciled with the fulminations of Baron von Neurath, his own Foreign Minister, in a very recent article, demanding increased armaments; or von Papen’s recent speech glorifying death on the battlefield and contending that it is un-German to die at home on a mattress.

The glorification of war by Hitler’s own party, as reflected in speeches of its leaders, the Nazi songs and literature, the militaristic propaganda over the Government-owned radio, the so-called patriotic films which are now so much in vogue in Germany, and the especially severe penalty for the betrayal of military secrets, are difficult to reconcile with his latest condemnation of war. The whole Nazi philosophy—its concept of justice and the glorification of force—the utter disregard of constitutional liberties at home and the new spirit of militarism in the public schools as announced only recently by the Nazi Reich Minister of the Interior²⁰ (see section 6 of despatch No. 2415 of May 20,²¹ going forward in this pouch), make a poor background for Hitler’s pacific pronouncements in the Reichstag.

Hitler now attributes all of Germany’s ills to the Versailles Treaty. Yet, only a few weeks ago, he traveled around the country denouncing the Marxists as being solely responsible for Germany’s economic collapse. From this it would appear that Hitler conveniently attributes the economic depression in Germany to two different causes, depending upon the case he is arguing. For foreign political purposes, the Versailles Treaty rather than the lost war as such is the source of all evil in the world; for domestic political consumption, the hated Social-Democrats must take all the blame.

Hitler’s statement that no country stands to gain from a new war, that even for the victor the effects of a new war would be disastrous—a most unexpected and unorthodox statement for the Nazi “Fuhrer”—is in marked contrast to the zeal with which pacifists are now being persecuted in the Third Reich for voicing similar views. Many pacifists who are being kept in Schutzhaft or whose books have been burned committed no graver offense.

The Chancellor’s contention that the Nazi Storm Detachments and the Stahlhelm pursued only political aims and should not be counted as parts of Germany’s military strength because they are no more capable of military employment than firemen, athletic associations or nightwatchmen, is absolutely absurd.

There can be no doubt that in conjunction with the Reichswehr and the police, which is organized in Germany along military lines, the Brown Army and the Stahlhelm constitute a formidable military reserve force. In fact, these semi-military organizations constitute a very effective substitute for the compulsory military service denied Germany by the Versailles Treaty. Military drilling, night marches with heavy knapsacks and steel helmets, and the so-called Geländespiele which offer opportunity for military scouting and maneuvers, constitute the principal occupation in the Storm Detachment. The men are thoroughly trained in the art of modern warfare, map-reading and signaling. All they need in case of war is a rifle. Officially, target practice is permitted only with small calibre rifles, but reports from various quarters have it that practice with army rifles and even machine guns is engaged in secretly.

The Nazis have a large motor corps throughout the Reich, organized along strictly military lines, and large aviation units the members of which wear special uniforms resembling the uniforms of regular army aviators in other countries. If not bombing planes, Germany certainly would not lack pursuit and reconnoitering planes in the event of war. The huge Nazi rallies which have taken place recently showed how easily these forces can be mobilized on short notice.

The absurdity of the Chancellor’s attempt to deny the military value of the Storm Detachments and the Stahlhelm is all the more apparent when one recalls that in America during the war raw recruits, without the slightest idea of the rudiments of military training, were sent to France with only a short period of training.

Hitler’s tactics with respect to the Brown Army and the Stahlhelm remind one of the specious way in which he vigorously denied the true character and purpose of the Storm Detachments during the early days of the Nazi movement. These formations are known in Germany as the S. A., the abbreviation for Sturm-Abteilungen, their original function having been to break up the meetings of political opponents. However, to evade the suppression of these detachments by the authorities, Hitler brazenly contended at the time that these abbreviations stood for Sport-Abteilungen, in other words, harmless sport detachments.

In attributing the causes of the world economic crisis and all of Germany’s ills to the Versailles Treaty, Hitler cited the large number of suicides in Germany since the signing of this treaty in support of his arguments against it. If the large number of suicides during the past fourteen years proves the viciousness of the Versailles Treaty, then the alarmingly large number of suicides since Hitler’s accession to power may be taken as eloquent testimony to the brutality and truculence of his own regime.

As a result of Germany’s increasingly difficult foreign political situation, as reflected by the developments at Geneva, the speeches of Lord Hailsham and Paul-Boncour, Alfred Rosenberg’s fiasco in London, and the growing tension between the Reich and Austria, those groups in Germany which are opposed to the present Government hoped that foreign political pressure might eventually prove Hitler’s undoing and that the present regime would be soon replaced by a military dictatorship as a step to monarchical restoration, these hopes of a large section of the German population have now been blasted by Hitler’s unexpected tone of moderation.

As an opposition leader, Hitler violently condemned the policy of fulfillment initiated by Rathenau²² and continued by his successors, notably Stresemann²³ and Brüning,²⁴ who had been violently assailed for this by the Nazis as traitors. Hitler had repeatedly evaded, however, the answer to the question as to how he would conduct the nation’s foreign policy when he came into power. His last Reichstag speech shows that with respect to foreign policy, as well as to economics and finance (see despatch No. 2364 of May 5, 1933²⁵), he possesses no magic formula of his own and so must, of necessity, follow in the footsteps of his predecessors.

Most of the statements made by him in the Reichstag could have been made by Stresemann or Brüning without evoking the surprise in foreign countries that his own words caused. Preceding chancellors have demanded the disarmament of other nations in fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty in no less vigorous terms than Hitler, even Hermann Müller, the Social-Democratic Chancellor, firmly demanded, in a speech at Geneva,²⁶ universal disarmament and equality of status for Germany. At that time Chancellor Müller was defamed by the Nazis, who declared that on their accession to power they would immediately tear up the Versailles Treaty and proceed to rearm.

If there were still free speech in Germany, former Chancellor Brüning, who has been the object of vile Nazi attacks because he insisted on a strict observance of international treaties, could point this out to the German People. But Hitler has no open opposition. He brooks no criticism. He can afford to respect the treaties and be more of a pacifist than any of his predecessors without running serious risk of evoking real opposition.

From the standpoint of those moderate political elements in Germany which are now completely muzzled, their inability to proclaim the vindication of their own foreign policy may be deplorable.

From the standpoint of international problems awaiting a speedy solution, Hitler’s freedom from opposition is unquestionably a distinct advantage, provided, of course, that the policy of moderation enunciated by him is not again discarded at the first suitable opportunity.

This latter consideration is of course infinitely more important, and in writing the foregoing I have had no intention of detracting from the value of the unexpectedly reasonable and statesmanlike attitude adopted, overtly at least, by the Chancellor. I merely thought, as I said above, that the Department would wish me to formulate the criticisms which could hardly fail to come to the mind of anyone attentively observing the situation here.

Respectfully yours,

George A. Gordon

18. Telegram No. 84, May 19, not printed.
19. Not printed.
20. Wilhelm Frick.
21. Vol. ii, p. 319.
22. Walter Rathenau, German Minister for Foreign Affairs during 1922.
23. Gustav Stresemann, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1923–29.
24. Heinrich Brüning, Chanceior of Germany, 1930–32.
25. Not printed.
26. Delivered before the League of Nations Assembly, September 7, 1928; for text, see League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 64: Records of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly: Plenary Meetings: Text of the Debates, pp. 56–59.