693.002 Manchuria/204: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Johnson)
215. Your 797, July 12, 11 p.m., paragraphs 3 and following, and your 813, July 15, 8 p.m.
1. The Department appreciates and has given careful thought to your comments.
2. Instruct Peck to reply to Soong orally and informally along the following lines:
The American Government has at all times, and particularly in periods of special difficulty such as the past 9 months, given sympathetic consideration to views expressed to it and requests made of it by responsible authorities of the Chinese Government. In determining its course of action, positive or negative, in reference to various issues and questions, it has been guided by well-known principles and has constantly had in mind certain equally well-known objectives. However, it has not by itself the power to shape the course of events entirely in conformity with the principles to which it adheres and the objectives to which it is committed. It desires that treaty obligations be respected and the rights and interests of all concerned be shown due regard, and it directs its efforts toward those ends. At the same time it is opposed to resort to force as an instrument of policy. It realizes that there has occurred in the Far East a serious breach of the peace which is of rightful concern to the whole world. It realizes that the peace machinery has not proven adequate either to prevent this breach or to take care, as yet, of the situation and [Page 166] problems presented in connection therewith. It still hopes that the problems inherent in the present situation will be resolved in accordance with the spirit and the provisions of treaties to which the disputant powers along with others are parties. It has exerted its influence and will continue to do so on behalf of peace and justice. In relation to matters which have been and are at issue between the disputants, it has refrained from taking sides. Where American or general world rights and interests have been involved and acts impairing or jeopardizing those rights and interests have been the acts of one of the disputants and not of the other, it has expressed its views to the disputant responsible for those acts. In general, it has addressed itself equally, in the same terms and at the same time, to both disputants.
The position of the American Government with regard to fundamental issues which are rightfully and necessarily of concern to it was clearly set forth in the notes addressed to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on January 799 last and was reaffirmed and elucidated in the letter of the Secretary of State to Senator Borah of February 23 last.1 That position has also been recorded in the expressions by the American Government of its concurrence in the views of the League of Nations as set forth in several of the League’s resolutions.
In reference to such matters as interference by the present Manchuria régime with the Customs service in Manchuria, the American Government has expressed its views in quarters where it has been felt that the expression thereof would have the maximum of effect. The American Government has refrained from lending its influence on behalf of any proposals from any source for a solution inconsistent with the provisions of existing agreements and/or the position to which it and other countries are committed by published declarations of policy. The American Government feels that any new step on its part in this connection at this time would be likely not to improve the situation.
With regard to the question of China’s finances, the American Government realizes that the Chinese Government is constantly confronted with difficult and unusual problems in that field. However, the American Government notes that, whereas the Customs receipts of China amounted in 1926 to Taels 80,435,962, these receipts amounted in 1931 to 246,064,000. It will be remembered that the American Government took the lead in 1928 in concluding with the Chinese [Page 167] Government a tariff treaty2 in consequence of which, similar treaties having soon been concluded by China with other powers, it became possible for China to make her own tariff schedules—with the resultant increase in her Customs revenues referred to above. Assuming that the whole amount of the Customs revenues collected in Manchuria be now withheld, by whatever acts, the amount of the Customs revenues still received by the Chinese Government will be almost three times the amount received in 1926. It is the feeling of the American Government that the United States and several other powers have in attitude shown themselves friendly to and have in action given substantial practical assistance to the National Government. Not only have they made it possible for that Government to acquire greatly increased revenues, but they have been generous in relation to various of China’s financial commitments to them. At the present moment practically all governments are confronted with unusual financial difficulties and all nations are having to meet by their own efforts extraordinary fiscal and economic problems. The Chinese Government and people are no exception. The American Government has noted with gratification during recent years the fact that the Chinese people appear increasingly willing to come to the aid of their Government in moments of financial crisis, and the American Government hopes that this tendency will prove sufficiently developed to produce for the Chinese Government the income needed to meet its requirements.
With regard to the spread in China of so-called communism, the American Government appreciates the seriousness of the menace that confronts the Chinese Government and is well aware that the spread of communism may have an adverse effect on foreign interests there and in relation to general world concern on behalf of stability and order. Judging by past events, the American Government is compelled to doubt whether this menace can be eliminated by military operations primarily and exclusively. It would seem that communism exists and is made possible primarily by reason of unsatisfactory political and economic conditions and that therefore perhaps the most promising measures for preventing its spread must be measures calculated to eliminate the underlying causes and factors which provide soil for it and contribute to its growth.
The American Government realizes that the Chinese Government is confronted with hard facts and that its problems will not be solved by mere invocation on anybody’s part of theories. It wishes to be helpful and it endeavors to be so. It is not able to offer or to suggest ways and means whereby these problems may speedily be solved, but [Page 168] it can and it does endeavor not to place obstacles in the way of efforts of the Chinese Government to find for them fair, equitable and abiding solutions. It cannot offer, nor would it at present advise the Chinese Government to seek loans. It can and it does reaffirm its continued good will and its continued adherence to the traditional principles of its Far Eastern policy, to the definite provisions of the various treaties to which it is party, and to its recent statements of policy. It can and it does express the hope that the National Government will surmount its present difficulties and will become increasingly effective.
Having in mind Minister Soong’s request for advice, the American Government feels that the best advice which it can give the Chinese Government is advice which it would equally give to any other government, namely, that no commitment be entered into contrary to or bringing into controversy obligations in connection with previous and outstanding commitments to other countries, such as the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, and, in the case of members of the League, the Covenant of the League. Each nation should endeavor to keep its legal and its moral position clear and to safeguard its reputation for observance of both the spirit and the letter of its treaty pledges. The American Government notes with gratification and approval that Minister Soong apparently has that conception and intention in relation to principles, policy and procedure. Moreover, and in addition, the American Government believes it especially desirable, in view of the solicitous concern which the nations have manifested with regard to the situation which has developed in Manchuria, that, pending the submission by the Commission of the League of Nations of its report, no action be taken which might prejudice or destroy existing rights, add to the complexity of the situation which the Commission is surveying, or unfavorably impress the Commission and those who await its report. Obviously no assurance can be given with regard to the contents of the Commission’s report and the action which may be taken later; but it is the measured opinion of the American Government that the work of the Commission may be expected to throw light on the problem and its effort be to contribute toward effecting by peaceful means a practical and just solution.
3. Peck should make sure that Soong understands that this is an authorized statement, official as between the Department and its officers but unofficial and informal as between him and Soong, to queries which were raised in the course of Soong’s conversation, as reported, with Peck. Peck may deviate at his discretion from the text but [Page 169] should accurately convey the substance of the above. He should not leave a memorandum.
- Telegram in two sections.↩
- See telegram No. 2, January 7, noon, to the Consul General at Nanking, and footnote 9, vol. iii, p. 7.↩
- See telegram No. 50, February 24, 2 p.m., to the Consul General at Shanghai, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 83.↩
- Signed at Peking, July 25, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. ii, p. 475.↩