693.002 Manchuria/196: Telegram
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
813. Your 211, July 13, 6 p.m.
- 1.
- In this matter one must bear in mind a possible analogy with the situation in 1922 when Chinese perpetually sought help from United States and other countries and later turned to Russia. It is of course possible to consider Soong’s request against known background of present preparations for resumption of relations with Soviet Russia.
- 2.
- We have refused to second Japanese intimations that Manchukuo would accept a compromise. Ingram has informed his Government that he believes it no longer possible for a compromise to be arranged, and my information is that Manchukuo has practically completed taking over of customs offices and administration.
- 3.
- It seems to me therefore that question of China’s policy vis-à-vis Manchurian customs is now no longer a point at issue and that in considering question of any advice which we are to give Soong we must choose between informing him that Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria is lost and suggesting that China’s only present course is to await the result of the investigations of the Commission sent out by the League of Nations.
- 4.
- I assume that the United States and the powers are not yet ready to accept the situation created in Manchuria by the Japanese and to advise the Chinese to accept Manchukuo and the loss of Chinese [sovereignty?] in Manchuria with all that that implies.
- 5.
- To advise the Chinese to await the results of the investigations of the Commission sent out by the League will of course imply support of the Commission’s views and promise that something will be done about the matter in the future. Yet this is the only suggestion that occurs to me. We must go on with the procedure started at Geneva.
- 6.
- A Reuter telegram dated Tokyo, July 14th, text of which is being repeated to the Department today,94 indicates a possibility that the way may still be open for negotiations in regard to Manchuria and that the Japanese may yet await action emanating from the League before taking the final step of recognizing Manchukuo, a step which so far as Japan is concerned would preclude any further discussion of the matter in any [apparent omission].
- 6 [bis].
- In considering what advice we may give it is necessary to consider just how much hope properly may be held out to the [Page 143] Chinese for a further consideration of the question of Manchuria which may be of advantage to them.
- 7.
- If there is any foundation in the Reuter report above mentioned, and if there should develop any feeling on the part of the Japanese Government that the adventure in Manchuria is going to prove a more costly and a generally more difficult undertaking than Japan can bear, it is possible that there may yet arrive a moment at which the Japanese Government might be disposed to liquidate the adventure on terms which would at least restore nominal Chinese sovereignty and possibly somewhat more. In such circumstances it would seem likely that an arrangement might be executed with more facility by the mediation of friendly third parties. Such mediation however could only be made on the basis of the mediator possessing the complete confidence of both the Chinese and Japanese Governments. Uchida has emphasized the impossibility of reaching a settlement “so long as the question is encased in formalism and theory.” It occurs to me that provided such a moment does arrive it might be possible for the United States to assist in a settlement. To this end however I believe that while maintaining strictly the entire legal position which we have held it would be of great assistance if we were to show the Japanese the appreciation which we actually do have of the principal difficulties which they have encountered in Manchuria and thus cause them to feel that we have a sympathetic understanding of the facts of the Manchurian question as they see it. It seems to me that only in this way would it be possible for us to be of practical assistance in the event that Japan may at some moment desire to conclude her present adventure on terms which if not satisfactory to the Chinese may eventually be accepted by them as the best way out of the present impasse.
Johnson