11. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to Secretary of State Shultz1

SUBJECT

  • Soviet Back Channel Initiative (TS)

For some weeks now we have been in a dialogue with the Soviets via a former Kennedy staffer.2 Kennedy has made it clear that he has personally been involved in facilitating these exchanges. The Soviets initiated these exchanges by telling us they had an important new arms control proposal to convey, and wished to convey it directly to a special Presidential emissary. Kennedy has made it clear that the Soviets do not wish to convey this proposal through normal diplomatic channels, and would prefer that the emissary would be someone “close to the President.” The Soviets have conveyed a similar message via Duane Andreas3 and Richard Nixon. (TS)

Immediately following your departure for Africa,4 the Soviets changed their tactics. They said they are planning to upgrade the Chief of their Geneva delegation. Their man would be Yuli Vorontsov, roughly the equivalent to John Whitehead, an experienced professional. They evidently propose confidential high-level talks on the margins of the formal Geneva talks. They want to know who the representative (singular) of the President will be. Within minutes of my hearing about this, Kennedy called me to pressure us to name a new, high-level person like Laxalt or Rumsfeld.5 (TS)

You, I and Cap agreed that we could not change our delegation on the eve of the negotiations. We decided we would tell Dobrynin:

—The President is serious about continuing this process.

—The President recognizes the significance of the Soviets upgrading their delegation in Geneva.

—When Max Kampelman meets their new man in Geneva, Max will tell him who your personal representative is. Initially, at least, it will be Max himself. We’ll tell them that he is soon to be named Counsellor; that will upgrade him. And we could indicate that he may [Page 68] soon come back to Washington and be replaced by another Presidential representative. (TS)

The President approved this procedure as an initial step. At the same time he wants to be certain we are being fully responsive to the Soviet desire to “convey a new proposal.” He believes we should give the Soviets a road map for future arms control negotiations. If the Soviets present something interesting to Max Kampelman, as his personal representative in Geneva, the President would be prepared to send a delegation to Moscow headed by someone closer to him who would not be in normal diplomatic channels. It was suggested (not by me) that I be that emissary, and the President agreed. I would only go, however, if the Soviet proposal were significant and if I were to be accompanied by Perle and Nitze. At the same time we signal to the Soviets the possibility of a visit by me, we would also indicate that this could be followed by a session between you and Shevardnadze, which in turn could lead to a Summit. All of these meetings would, of course, be conditioned on the Soviets being forthcoming in the negotiations. (TS)

I understand via Mike Armacost that you have objected to this process on two grounds:

1. It puts the NSC into the “operations.”

2. It injects a new layer into the negotiations.

With regard to point 2, injecting a new layer seems to be the heart of the Soviet proposal. With regard to point 1, I have no desire to get the NSC into “operations” whatever the word means. But you and I agreed that there would be special circumstances in which the President would desire to use the NSC. The important thing is that you be completely informed, and I have assured you that I intend faithfully to do this. (TS)

In my judgment to proceed only with step 1, that is, telling the Soviets that Kampelman is our man, leaves the President vulnerable to a possible Soviet propaganda attack on the grounds that he was not responsive. It also leaves him vulnerable to a political attack from Kennedy. Kennedy had made it abundantly clear to me that he favors a separate Presidential emissary. I have assured him that if the Soviets come up with a real proposal, the President intends to be responsive. I have also told him that henceforth we are switching to secure channels and he will no longer be in the information loop. He is not pleased with this and told me somewhat testily that he would then get his information “from the other side.” There is no doubt in my mind that if we are not responsive, we will come under attack from Kennedy. A defense that we don’t want to add another layer does little to protect the President, who remains deeply interested in pursuing every possible channel to get a good arms control agreement. (TS)

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I understand via Mike that you would support a proposal that would have us tell the Soviets that if their new initiative represents a significant move forward in the negotiation process, you would be prepared to have an early meeting with Shevardnadze. Once again, assuming progress, this could be followed by a summit. The sequence would then be Vorontsov to Kampelman, who would be upgraded and given the designation of Presidential emissary, Shultz to Shevardnadze and a summit (which by the way the President feels strongly would be held in the United States). (TS)

I will present your proposal to the President on Monday.6 In the meantime, we are communicating to the President’s counterparts in the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Japan to let them know of this initiative, and that we intend to respond in a positive vein. We are not at this point providing specifics of our response to them, although we are indicating that Kampelman would be the initial channel.7 (TS)

Frank C. Carlucci8
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Chronology—Official (12/31/1986–01/25/1987). Top Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Regan.
  2. Lawrence Horowitz.
  3. Chief Executive Officer of Archer Daniels Midland.
  4. From January 8 to 14 Shultz traveled to Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia.
  5. References are to Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
  6. January 12.
  7. Attached but not printed is a draft message from Carlucci to Dobrynin. “With the president’s approval,” Shultz wrote in his memoirs, “I instructed Max Kampelman, our overall coordinator of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva and therefore Vorontsov’s opposite number, to inform Vorontsov that he would be our representative in any private-channel communications.” As an indication of his new role, Kampelman received the title “Counselor to the Secretary of State.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 869–870)
  8. Carlucci signed “Frank” above his typed signature.