96. Memorandum From Jack
Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
Washington, September 23, 1985
SUBJECT
- Preparations for Geneva Meeting: Proposals to Broaden the
Agenda
Following your approval of my earlier memorandum, commenting on Jim
Billington’s suggestions,2 I convened two very
close-hold groups over the weekend to work out some ideas regarding the
sort of proposals we could make to give greater emphasis to the regional
issue and bilateral elements of our agenda, and thus diminish the almost
exclusive focus on SDI which has
developed as a result of Soviet tactics.
Attached are concept papers covering these two areas. The first, on
regional issues, was worked by Steve
Sestanovich, Mark
Palmer, Peter
Rodman and Eric Edelman from State. The one on contacts
and communication was worked by Bud Korengold, Mark Palmer and Max Robinson from
State. I believe that both provide sound and imaginative approaches.
If these approaches are approved in principle, I would see the sequence
of events as follows:
1) Lay groundwork for making the proposals in the
meetings with Shevardnadze this
week, but not make actual concrete proposals.
2) Plan to make the regional proposal by diplomatic channels next week or
shortly thereafter, then follow it with a speech by the President on the
subject.
3) Plan to make the proposals on contacts and communication over the next
couple of weeks, and have a presidential speech on the subject a week or
so before his UNGA address.
4) Wrap it all together, along with a public formulation of our arms
control proposals, in the UNGA
address.
5) Have the President give, on the eve of his departure for Geneva, a TV
address to the American people (which might also be carried on
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EURONET), in which he would
set forth his vision of what the future of U.S.-Soviet relations could
be like if Gorbachev is willing
to engage us in a constructive way.3
This, I realize, is a very ambitious scenario, and will require a lot of
fast work. Still, I believe it is doable if we get a rapid go-ahead to
proceed with the preparations. Therefore, I would recommend that you
authorize us to proceed to make plans along these lines, which require
the following:
1) Drafting appropriate talking points for the meetings this week (some
suggestions are attached);4
2) Setting times (on a close-hold basis) for the public appearances
required;
3) Formulating the concrete proposals and drafting the speeches.
Palmer has forwarded copies of
the papers at Tabs I and II to Secretary Shultz for his consideration as well.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That you approve proceeding with a “regional conflict initiative” as
outlined in Tab I.5
2. That you approve proceeding with the initiatives in the bilateral
contacts area, as outlined in Tab II.
Tab I
Paper Prepared by an Interagency Working
Group6
Regional Conflicts and US-Soviet Relations:
Concept Paper
In preparation for the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, we have sought to emphasize the
importance of a broader agenda than arms control alone, without
seeming to make our objections to Soviet conduct a pretext for
avoiding serious negotiation of strategic issues. This goal
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goes beyond preparations
for the meeting in Geneva: we want the Soviets and the public to see
that a fundamental improvement in relations is possible only if the
problems created by Soviet Third World activities in the late 70’s
are dealt with.
Basic Concept
A major Presidential initiative to advance these goals would have the
following form:
—First, a proposal for cease-fires and negotiations among the
warring parties in the key countries where Soviet (or proxy)
involvement has created the greatest Western
concern—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, the Horn, Southern
Africa.
—Second, with the opening of such negotiations, a separate set of
Soviet-American talks to eliminate each side’s military presence
in the country and its role in the flow of arms into the area of
conflict.
These two levels of talks, if successful, would lay the basis for a
third element of a long-term solution—the reintegration (with
American assistance of some sort) of these countries into the
international economy.
Advantages
The critical test for any such proposal is whether it can be
seriously presented and defended in public: does it clarify US policies without creating any
unmanageable opportunities for the Soviet side? From this point of
view, the above formula has several important advantages.
1) Unlike global approaches that are sometimes put forward (e.g. the
Basic Principles of 1972 or other “codes of conduct”),7 this plan
deals with concrete cases that are known to have worsened US-Soviet relations.
2) It can be presented as a realistic approach that tries to get at
the underlying conflicts that have drawn the superpowers in, rather
than simply trying to negotiate US-Soviet agreement from the top down.
3) By requiring negotiations among warring parties, it legitimizes
the freedom fighters that oppose pro-Soviet regimes. Here the plan
follows the pattern of the President’s March proposal on Nicaragua.
It reflects the interest he has taken in such liberation
struggles.
4) The proposal also follows directly from the President’s recent
statements about Soviet “intentions.” The great uncertainty created
by more expansive Soviet conduct during the 70’s was precisely that
it was
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based not on
traditional inter-state ties but on creating new, repressive
Communist regimes.
5) The timing of the plan would allow the President to say that it
builds logically on the US-Soviet
regional discussions that grew out of his 1984 UNGA proposal. By improving
understanding of each side’s position, these have cleared the ground
for a serious initiative.
6) Finally, the main measure of seriousness will be what the proposal
offers the Soviets. In fact, it seems to offer them a version of
something they have long wanted—discussion of the US global presence. This version,
however, protects us by making talks contingent on (and separate
from) political negotiations that their clients almost certainly
cannot accept. It also limits the talks to specific areas. These
features make it hard for the Soviets to accept without detracting
from the plan’s credibility.
Possible Complications and Objections
We would have to deal with some obvious difficulties in the
initiative.
1) Some would find its scope one-sided—why not add the Middle East,
or the Philippines? Is South Africa itself included? The first point
would be answered on grounds of realism: our focus is on problems
that have most damaged relations by raising the most extreme fears
about Soviet purposes. The Philippines is not yet such a problem.
The Middle East also has a different place in US-Soviet relations; its conflicts do
not fit the pattern of this initiative. Including South Africa might
increase the appearance of comprehensiveness; the SAG would certainly resent it, but
calling for dialogue wouldn’t alter our basic orientation there.
2) The appearance of condominium is a possible, but superficial,
objection. We ought to repeat ceaselessly that the plan’s goal is to
keep the superpowers out. Keeping their
discussions separate from the internal talks would strengthen this
point.
3) Some affected allies or friends would worry that their interests
might be slighted. Pakistan may be the most serious case of this,
but couching the proposal in broad terms would probably make it much
less unsettling than an initiative limited simply to Afghanistan. In
any event, full pre-briefing on the plan would be necessary.
4) Certain on-going mediation processes might also seem to be
undercut by the plan. (For example, Angola-Namibia.) We should
emphasize that the strength of the approach lies in its broad applicability; implementation may vary,
case by case. At the same time, we would note that existing
processes have not brought peace, and this initiative can add to the
incentives that other approaches have tried to create.
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5) A call for cease-fires and negotiation may appear somewhat empty
in the absence of any mediation mechanism. We might consider
spelling out the kinds of structures that could play this role. The
existence of Contadora in Central America has been invaluable;
comparable (not necessarily parallel) devices should be considered
in other regions, as well as the involvement of recognized impartial
outsiders. (In some cases, our European allies might play a
role.)
6) Finally, resources should not be over-promised. Proposals dressed
up as a “Marshall Plan” for
this or that area arouse suspicions that they are empty grand
designs, not likely to be funded. The plan’s emphasis must be on
reintegration into the world economy, with resources from diverse
sources, not on a US aid program.
(We can note, of course, our commitment to the Kissinger Commission’s aid
levels,8 Ethiopian relief, etc.)
Implementation
The sequence for presenting this approach to the Soviets, and
publicly, should be as follows:
1) A discussion of the problem with Shevardnadze. The President’s presentation would be
firm: we must find a way to restrain the use of force, particularly
by the superpowers, in regional disputes. Otherwise, the U.S. will
be constrained to act more forcefully itself.
2) A formal proposal by diplomatic channels a day or two before a
Presidential speech on the topic.
3) A major Presidential address on the overall problem with an
announcement of our proposal.
4) Further mention of the proposal, as part of our four-part agenda,
in the President’s UNGA
address.
5) On the eve of the President’s departure for Geneva, a televised
Presidential message to the American people which would set forth
his “vision” of what the meeting could accomplish if Gorbachev is willing to build a
more constructive relationship.
Soviet Responses
Rejection is most likely, but the Soviets might also counter with a
re-worked proposal, either redefining the areas (e.g., adding the
Middle East), turning it inside-out (superpower talks first, local
ceasefires later), or proposing one case at a time. They would be
most tempted to accept in Cambodia, given their client’s military
strength and our own difficulties with a Khmer Rouge role.
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Tab II
Paper Prepared by an Interagency Working
Group9
NEW INITIATIVES: CONTACTS,
COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION
As part of a program to emphasize the four areas of our agenda with
the Soviets, we should develop a forward-looking set of proposals
for a massive expansion of contacts and exchanges with the USSR. This will focus attention on
one of the greatest Soviet weaknesses: its closed society.
The approach is best summed up in the speech the President gave last
year to the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, namely, that
“nothing is more worthy of our attention than finding ways to reach
out and establish better communication with the people and the
government of the Soviet Union.”10
Focus will be on three areas:
—Working cooperatively now on today’s
toughest human problems.
—Opening up our societies to each other.
—Preparing our next generations for better understanding and a
more just and secure peace.
Specifically, the new initiatives would range over a wide spectrum,
from joint consultations on stemming terrorism and drug abuse to
vastly increased educational, television and youth exchanges,
bolstered tourism and sister-city programs, an invitation to a
Soviet cosmonaut to ride our space shuttle and even an offer of
National Football League highlights to Soviet television.
To maximize the chance that the Soviet Union will give serious
consideration to our ideas, we must present them officially to the
Soviets before we announce them publicly. The President could lay
the groundwork in his meeting with Shevardnadze, and we could follow up with specific
proposals in diplomatic channels over the next couple of weeks.
Then, about mid-October the President could deliver a speech on the
subject.
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Under Tab A is a set of suggested talking
points for the President to prepare the ground with Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze. He would
reaffirm his hope that agreement will be reached in Geneva on
matters already on the table but stress his desire that he and
Gorbachev can seize this
historic chance to chart an even more ambitious cooperative program
for the sake of future generations.
Under Tab B you will find an outline list of
possible initiatives. If approved in principle, we will proceed to
staff them in detail with an eye to making formal proposals over the
next two weeks.11
