246. Editorial Note
Speaking from the White House Briefing Room at 3:10 p.m. on April 7, 1980, President Jimmy Carter charged the Ayatollah Khomeini with full responsibility for not placing the hostages under Iranian Government control and announced that the United States was breaking diplomatic relations with Iran. Carter simultaneously imposed several measures against Iran. First, he ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to put into effect official economic sanctions prohibiting exports from the United States to Iran in accordance with the sanctions approved by 10 members of the UN Security Council on January 13 but vetoed by the Soviet Union. (See Document 147.) He expected the shipment of food and medicine to be minimal or nonexistent. Second, he stated that Iran’s assets would be formally inventoried as would be the outstanding claims of U.S. citizens and corporations. This was to facilitate the processing and payment of these claims. Carter also promised to initiate legislation in Congress for claims against Iran. Third, Carter announced a strict enforcement of visa issuance, including the invalidation of all visas currently issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the United States, the non-reinstatement of current visas, and new visas only for “compelling and proven humanitarian reasons.”
In his concluding remarks, Carter said that the United States had “acted at all times with exceptional patience and restraint in this crisis,” had supported Secretary General Waldheim’s efforts, and would continue to consult with its allies and other friendly governments on these steps, and “on additional measures which may be required.” Carter also stated that “the steps I have ordered today are those that are necessary now. Other action may become necessary if these steps do not produce the prompt release of the hostages.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 611–612)
Carter’s instructions to the Department of State for breaking relations, the text of Executive Order 12205 for economic sanctions, his message to Congress reporting on U.S. actions, and the text of Executive Order 12206 on visas are ibid., pages 612–615. U.S. allies were informed of these developments in telegram 91816, April 8. They were asked to withdraw their Ambassadors as a sign of solidarity, to think of a complete break in relations, and to adhere to the economic sanctions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800175–0062) An undated paper prepared in the Department of State, entitled “European Reaction to Our Request on Iran,” listed the responses of U.S. allies (including Canada and the EC Commission) to telegram 91816. As reported in this paper, the EC–9 Ambassadors met with Bani-Sadr on April 12 to demand the release of the hostages, their respective governments agreed to consider further steps, and the modalities of [Page 667] economic sanctions would be discussed at an upcoming meeting. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Group Demarches)
The Director of the Office of Iranian Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Henry Precht, called in Iranian Ambassador Ali Agah to tell him all Iranian diplomats would have to leave the country immediately. Agah angrily told Precht that the hostages were well cared for and were under the complete control of the Iranian government. Precht responded: “Bullshit!” As Carter later recalled in an April 8 diary entry, he congratulated Precht in a note that reads: “One of the elements of good diplomatic language was to be concise and accurate and clear, and his reply to the Iranians proved that he was a master of this technique.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, pages 505–506)
At 2 p.m. that afternoon in Tehran (5:30 a.m. EST) and thus prior to Carter’s announcement, Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Swiss Ambassador Erik Lang, lawyers Christian Bourguet and Hector Villalon, and Archbishop Hilarion Capucci had lunch. According to Lang, “it was a sad and frustrating luncheon because we realized that the inevitable was about to happen.” Lang reported that they had “engaged in one last brainstorming session, the only card remaining to be played being a visit by Capucci to the Imam.” They held out little hope. When Lang left the lunch, Ghotbzadeh thanked him for his services. Lang said he was prepared to continue working but, if so, it “will be under much more difficult conditions.” Ghotbzadeh answered: “I know that, and I appreciate it.” (Cable from Lang to the Department of State, April 7, and cable from Kaiser to the Department of State, April 7; Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 2)