209. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)1

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Hello. I received a short message from Brezhnev to the President. The text I will read you. OK?

[Page 614]

K: Yes.

D: “Dear Mr. President:

The events in the Middle East become more and more dangerous. Our two powers, as we both have agreed, must do the utmost in order to keep the events from going beyond the limits, when they could take even more dangerous turn.

K: Right.

D: If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm could be done even to the immediate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. We believe that neither you, nor we want to see it. If it is so then prompt and effective political decisions are needed. We have conviction that with due willingness our two powers can facilitate the finding of such decisions.

K: Right.

D: Since time is essential and now not only every day but every hour counts.

K: Right.

D: My colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to Moscow to conduct appropriate negotiations with him as with your authorized personal representative. It would be good if he could come tomorrow, October 20. I will appreciate your speedy reply.

Sincerely, L. Brezhnev, October 19, 1973”

K: You are friendly, aren’t you?

D: Hum?

K: That’s a friendly suggestion.

D: Of course it is.

K: Well, I will have to get to the President and call you back.

D: Okay.

K: Okay, bye.2

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, Box 23. No classification marking.
  2. At 11:10 a.m., Kissinger called Dobrynin back and asked him to send a copy of the message so he had something to show the President. (Ibid.) Dobrynin gave the Secretary a written copy of the message at 11:45 a.m. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 7)