74. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date on a few things. Hanoi radio starting reporting massive air attacks. Their radar probably picked up Commando raid and they are picking up diversionary strikes. Said we attacked one of our own PW camps. Laird is issuing a short statement.2 I worked with Laird and I talked with Rogers3 so we are all on board, that we didn’t hit anything south of the 19th parallel and caused by fact that they were hitting some of our unarmed reconnaisance planes and this was done in protection. Talking about saying something about the Commando operation but they would just say it was another Bay of Pigs and decided not to say anything about it.

P: I don’t want anyone to say anything. There is no point to say anything about it.

K: This morning in Paris the North Vietnamese delegation called a press conference and the delegation said the strikes threatened success of the conference. They stated no conclusions. They maybe will cancel one meeting.

P: Will Bruce say anything. He could step up and say we don’t care if they cancel all the meetings. They are not getting anywhere.

K: At 11:30 this morning Laird put out a statement saying that the strikes were ending at 6 p.m. today and second, no air attacks on PW camps and holding them solely accountable for American lives. The other operation went beautifully, except no one was there. They killed 5 guards.

P: Guards were still there. Why would they have guards there if there were no prisoners. Do you suppose they could have hidden them underground?

K: Guards or caretakers but they were military personnel. If they had hidden them they would have been expecting us and hit us with a buzz saw.

[Page 184]

P: Why do the military guard the place if no one is there.

K: Just to keep the natives from moving in or perhaps just to move people through. It was damn bad luck. The whole operation worked exactly as they planned. The weather is so bad that we are not getting photo reconnaisance on the areas hit. But the visual reports say that we are doing a lot of damage.

P: What do you mean visual reports?

K: The visual reports of the pilots. When they are going over on bombing missions they look and try to determine amount of damage while they are bombing. However, photo recon would be better.

P: When will we get those reports. Well it doesn’t matter. There is no reason to believe that they weren’t successful. On this other operation I want you to hold right to the line and do not discuss it at all. No comment whatsoever. This is the way it is going to be.

K: I will call Laird and tell him that.

P: He knows that. What do they want to talk about it for?

K: They would like to crow about it a little bit. It was a beautifully executed operation deep into enemy territory and their office had a lot to do with it. They are pretty close to the situation to see the importance of not talking about it.

P: We will recognize them and let them know we thought they did a good job. We won’t talk about it now but later we will explain what happened. Get that Col. back here. Get in a group of them. Get Defense to work on similar actions. They must have some others but thought they would get turned down so didn’t propose them. We are going to be out of there in a year so we can do some of these things. What do we care.

K: I have already told Moorer.

P: Proves that something can be done. We need more schemes of this sort. For the past 5 years no schemes because nobody approved them. Well we will approve them. We only have one year left.

K: Hanoi screaming because they are shaking a bit.

P: . . . say we attacked a PW camp . . .

K: Haiphong and Hanoi. Probably shows up on their radar.

P: Do not say that we will leave it out that we might bomb these. Keep them guessing.

K: Did bomb only south of the 19th parallel so that later if they claim we bombed a PW camp we can hold them responsible. However, we did not say we were not going to.

P: Was anybody hurt?

K: 2 slightly injured. But we went in 20 miles from Hanoi Mr. President.

[Page 185]

P: Slightly injured. That’s pretty good. Do you think the prisoners were there and underground.

K: They of course would say no. If they had any reason they would have known that we were coming and radio seemed to indicate that they did not know what was going on.

P: Why don’t we put some of the South Vietnamese on this type of operation. They have a big army. Scare the hell out of these people.

K: Certainly. Now that they have seen that we can do it they are probably doing a lot of thinking. To land 20 miles from their capital and get out does not reassure them.

P: The failure will not be discussed. . . . successful operation. We went in to see if there were any there and got rid of the guards. . . . other operations being planned.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

P: The guys did a hell of a job. We would like to look for another one. How many PWs do they have?

K: Camp or not . . . Have 400 with several hundred missing.

P: This is the only major initiative to negotiate. What will they do with them if we don’t negotiate and just pull out, kill them?

K: Oh, no. We would go back to bombing the living daylights out of them.

P: 7 day strike so that we do not have to maintain the tension during all that time. As you recall 7 day strike hitting complexes up there would give them a blow that would set them back several months.

K: Working on mining plan now.

P: Mining plan provides it seems to me a good possibility and has liability of international argument—hospital, etc. What we need is more imagination in some of the things we can do now. There will be no incentive for us to have a negotiated settlement after March is over. After that war is ended.

K: But we can say that anyway.

P: Good thing to add to the protective reaction. All eyes on the PW thing if it hadn’t had the protective reaction bombings. We do not talk about PW thing. We will talk about it later and tell what happened.

K: Unsuccessful attempt to rescue. However, it worked great with it in conjunction with the strikes.

P: It should be handled basically as a rescue mission. I do not want it described—that would endanger the others.

K: Daring attempt at . . .

P: I do not want it described. It was just one of our routine (what do you call them?) search and rescue operations. Tell Laird to stonewall it right through. And I want them to come up with some other plan.

[Page 186]

K: We will get the Col. back and get him to report.

P: They must have others. They must have others.

K: Pentagon, you hit it correctly, gave up because they never got it approved.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 7, Chronological File. No classification marking. A typewritten notation on the first page reads, “(paraphrased).”
  2. The text of Laird’s statement on the air strikes on North Vietnam is in telegram 191289 to all diplomatic and consular posts, November 21. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 87, Vietnam)
  3. Kissinger spoke with Laird from 9:45 to 10:10 a.m., and with Rogers at 11:20 a.m. on November 21. (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 7, Chronological File)