146. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

SUBJECT

  • Cambodian Army Morale and ARVN Operations

As you requested, our Defense Attaché in Phnom Penh has provided information on the status of FANK morale and on the effectiveness of ARVN operations in Cambodia.2 The major points follow.

Morale. The morale of FANK forces remains high.

  • —Some are tired, but most feel more secure and capable.
  • —Almost 20,000 have been trained and equipped in either South Vietnam or Thailand, and about two new battalions are now returning to Cambodia every 10 to 12 days.
  • —These trained troops are quite effective, and the best of them will hopefully be assigned the highest priority missions. Leadership at the battalion and brigade level, however, remains a problem.
  • FANK has made remarkable progress under difficult conditions but one must not forget that it is an amateur military force with only modest support involved in an active war.

ARVN Operations. ARVN operations against the enemy in Cambodia are generally effective.

  • —Certain ARVN units, however, have committed some outrageous acts against the Cambodian people.
  • —Coordination between ARVN and FANK ranges from excellent to poor.
  • —If there is close contact between senior leaders on both sides, coordination at lower levels is generally good. Contacts at the senior level seem to depend more on personalities and friendships than on an objective, systematic approach.
  • —In sum, coordination between FANK and ARVN is not as close and effective as it should be, but it is improving.

The security situation. The overall security situation in Cambodia is better.

  • —As FANK grows and improves, it gains more flexibility. And for the moment at least, enemy main forces are having to contend with the ARVN.
  • —Small and occasionally dramatic enemy attacks, along with terrorist incidents, can be expected almost anywhere. They draw attention but don’t have a great effect on national security.
  • —Phnom Penh could be subjected to a rocket or mortar attack, but no major military attack is anticipated. An enemy buildup for such an effort would take time and would surely not go undetected.

Lon Nol. The military has been functioning well since Lon Nol’s illness.3

  • —In fact, a number of programs have been proceeding better because of his absence. Subordinates who previously had to check out all details with him are now free to act on their own.
  • Lon Nol’s return will be welcomed, of course, because he is a leader who acts as a powerful unifying force.
  • —But he should be advised to give up some of his previous duties and allow others to make some of the decisions as they have now begun to do. Otherwise, there could be friction and a loss of efficiency as well.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 512, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XII. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Smyser sent it to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, March 2, recommending that he forward it to Nixon. Haig approved for Kissinger.
  2. In backchannel message 537 to Haig, February 28, Ladd provided the requested information. (Ibid.)
  3. In a March 6 memorandum to Nixon on actions in Cambodia, Kissinger noted that Lon Nol would be released soon from Tripler Hospital in Hawaii and would convalesce there for another month before returning to Cambodia. (Ibid., Box 582, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Actions on Cambodia, Vol. VII)