265. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk1

SUBJECT

  • Subjects for Discussion with the President on September 9 Relating to the 18th General Assembly

In our meeting with the President on September 9, there are a number of points I believe it would be useful for you to highlight. We do not yet need to ask the President to make specific decisions on individual issues, except the very important question whether he will address the General Assembly. However, a number of policy questions covered in the Strategy Paper for the Eighteenth General Assembly should be brought to his attention because of their political ramifications with a view to having the President provide us with any further guidance. Accordingly, I recommend that in addition to discussing the possibility of a Presidential statement to the General Assembly, you touch on the following points:

1.
Congo. The Secretary-General expressed the view that if UNOC is to be retained beyond December 31, the minimum viable level is 6,000 men, which would cost $30 million. We have pressed for his agreement at the 3,000-man level, which our JCS believes feasible, at a cost of about $10 million. We have suggested a compromise to the Secretary-General under which there would be 6,000 troops in the Congo on January 1, 1964, but they would be phased down to 3,000 by March 30, looking [Page 586] toward their total withdrawal by June 30. We estimate the cost at $15 million. We would have to mobilize a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly for the necessary financing (hopefully on the basis of the formula adopted at the Fourth Special Session). It may be possible to get such support in the Assembly if, as now seems possible, U Thant’s report does not recommend against it. The critical decision will be whether the United States should take an initiative early in the General Assembly session to this end. More consultations with key U.N. members are required. We will also want to consult with selected members of Congress, especially on the Appropriations Committee, if we decide to pursue this course in the General Assembly.
2.
Enlargement of Councils. The question of enlargement of United Nations councils is assuming increasing importance to the new members, especially in Africa. There are indications that the U.S.S.R. may be prepared to support or take an initiative on enlargement of the Economic and Social Council and possibly of the Security Council (unlinking this from the Chinese representation question). We must measure the pressures and determine whether we should take any lead in securing enlargement of the Councils. We should not abandon our announced position that the new members are entitled to greater representation. However, our recent experiences in the Security Council require us realistically to admit that we would be in a less favorable position in an enlarged Security Council. There may be a major decision for the President to take on this question during the course of the Assembly. Any Charter amendment would require ratification in accordance with our Constitutional processes, including Senate advice and consent.
3.
Chinese Representation. We expect to be able to mobilize the necessary support to maintain our position on Chinese representation. However, if the Soviets should decide to relax their position and opt for a “two China” solution (there is one unconfirmed report to this effect) we will face serious difficulties in the Assembly. The President should be made aware of this possibility even though it is remote.
4.
“Cold War” Issues.
(a)
Korea. We expect to be able to maintain our position on the Korean unification item, but the amount of support will be affected by whether and how the October elections are held.
(b)
Hungary. For the first time since 1956 there is no Hungarian item on the provisional agenda, and we do not anticipate taking an initiative. Support would not be forthcoming in view of the general amnesty and the Secretary-General’s trip. We will need to decide during the Assembly whether to express again a reservation on the Hungarian credentials as we did at the Fourth Special General Assembly. In view of [Page 587] the past keen Congressional interest, we can expect some domestic fall-out.
(c)
Tibet. India now is willing to have the Tibetan item inscribed and would support a resolution limited to human rights. There is an even chance therefore that two or three countries may again ask Assembly consideration.
5.

Colonial Issues. We cannot assess the full dimensions of the Portuguese territories question until we know the outcome of Mr. Ball’s efforts in Lisbon.

In the case of South Africa, we must expect to be pressed again to take far-reaching sanctions, including suspension or expulsion.

We will be pressed again by the United Kingdom to help it on Southern Rhodesia.

Consideration of these items is likely to stimulate strong emotions and possibly staged walkouts. We will be required to take a strong stand in favor of orderly procedures.

6.

Human Rights. We will be pressed to take a vigorous stand against religious persecution in South Vietnam.

On a broader scale, given increasing preoccupation of the world community with the human rights questions, we will need to decide whether to encourage the United Nations to intensify its activity in this area. One possibility would be the establishment of a U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights.

7.
Reference of Article 19 Question to ICJ. The question of applying Article 19 to the Communist bloc for non-payment of dues will not arise directly. However, we can expect a sharp division in the Assembly on whether Article 19 has automatic application. While holding firmly to the view of automaticity, we will probably be pressed for a decision to refer this question to the Court. Our initial estimate is that we could accept a properly framed question to the Court, though we will wish to make a final decision on the matter in light of developments.
8.
Disarmament and Nuclear Issues. In general, we will seek to remand most of the disarmament and nuclear issues to the 18-nation Disarmament Commission. In addition, we will have to (a) counter pressures from third countries, including Canada, for more far-reaching measures than we would like; (b) oppose any unpoliced moratorium; (c) face a final decision on whether to support the Brazilian proposal for a denuclearized Latin American zone. Finally, the presence of Gromyko and other foreign ministers will offer further opportunity for quiet probes.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by Joseph J. Sisco and William B. Buffum on September 7. Copies were sent to Ball, W. Averell Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, Abram Chayes, Phillips Talbot, G. Mennen Williams, William R. Tyler, Roger Hilsman, Jr., William C. Foster, and Edwin M. Martin. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the Secretary saw it.