239. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

3102. Department pass O’Brien at White House. Working Group of 21. We are informed Dept is considering instructing USDel take position in Working Group that US Govt will not contribute in excess of 33–1/3 per cent-whether by assessed or voluntary contribution-to cost of ONUC and UNEF for second half of 1963.

We fully understand that such position would be desirable in light of general Congressional attitude towards unsatisfactory UN financial situation and past reliance of that organization on what are thought excessive contributions from US. We appreciate that this attitude has been aggravated by such factors as continued failure majority UN members pay their arrears despite GA acceptance of ICJ opinion, failure of UN members fully to subscribe UN bond issue, Special Fund project in Cuba, and UNESCO pamphlet.

Despite this Congressional attitude, we find it difficult relate insistence on 33–1/3 per cent limitation on such US contributions to vital US interest in UN operations in Middle East and Congo. This vital interest was clearly expressed in Cleveland’s memo of Jan 21 to Secy concerning UN financing.2 This memo pointed out that in “the real world of international politics . . . there will doubtless be cases where the US interest would call for US support beyond its ‘fair share’-despite the cost in dollars and damage to the principle of collective responsibility.” It indicated that there was “compelling ration-ale for . . . recognizing that, for other major operations (those not financed by countries directly concerned), we can use UN for peace-keeping [Page 527] (in larger operations) only if we are prepared to pay more than one-third of cost.”

We agree completely with foregoing statements. Accordingly, we have very grave doubts about wisdom of position Dept now considering if US really desires continuation of ONUC and UNEF operations in second half of 1963. Further, in our view, such position likely adversely affect rather than improve UN financial position.

Our reasoning is as follows:

1.
US is one of rather small minority of UN member states interested in continuing ONUC and UNEF operations at anything like their present levels. Indeed, there is undoubtedly absolute majority of states which believe it would be better for organization discontinue both operations immediately. We realize that it difficult for US Govt accept this assessment of situation because of its belief that these operations have been extremely important to US and vital to UN itself if its peace-keeping ability were to be maintained. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our assessment is sound and that sizeable majority of members would prefer have UN spend its available funds on economic assistance rather than use them for UNEF and ONUC. Certainly this is and always has been position of all LA states.
2.
It is for foregoing reason that it has been necessary, in effect, for US to “buy” votes for Congo and UNEF financing reses over years. There has simply not been any possibility of securing two-thirds majority for assessment on basis of regular scale of assessments of any sizeable amount of money for two UN military operations. As result, US has made substantial voluntary contributions in order secure necessary two-thirds by ensuring reduction of assessment percentages of many states. Fact that US alone made such voluntary cash contributions in case of ONUC, despite our efforts to convince others to contribute, is clear evidence of fact that few, if any, of major powers consider operation to be as important as we did.
3.
It has been largely because of US willingness to make these very large contributions for ONUC that this govt has been able call tune. By and large, Congo operation has been run by SYG exactly as we wished, and other countries (except Sov bloc) have been prepared accept this in silence so long as they were not required pay large amounts for operation. It cannot be expected that this acquiescence in US domination of Congo operation can continue if we now take position that we have no greater responsibility for financing costs of this operation than we have for financing regular budget.
4.
If we now insist that all costs of ONUC and UNEF for second half of 1963 ($50–60 million) be financed on basis of regular scale of assessments, it will mean that we are requesting less-developed countries to [Page 528] contribute at five times rate at which they have contributed for last two years. There is absolutely no possibility of securing two-thirds votes in Assembly on this basis.
5.
It has been proposed that only portion of UNEF and ONUC costs be assessed on basis of regular scale and that balance be secured by voluntary contributions with US share of voluntary contributions being at 33–1/3 per cent. First of all, on this basis it unlikely that more than total of $10 million, if that, could be assessed on basis of regular scale: balance would have be raised by voluntary contributions. Even assuming, which we believe impossible, that $30 million could be assessed on basis of regular scale, there is no chance securing necessary $30 million balance from voluntary contributions from other govts if US can offer no more than $10 million. Most members, including particularly other potential contributors, namely, Commonwealth and Western Europe, simply do not accept proposition that US fair share is only 33–1/3 percent. It important that we face up to this fact when making our calculations. This proposal is in our view highly unlikely to produce desired results, and if we stood on it we must be prepared to see UNEF and ONUC soon brought to halt.
6.
Apart from causing wind-up of ONUC and UNEF, proposed US position is likely worsen UN financial situation and our ability to deal with it. It will antagonize less-developed countries, and make it less likely they will pay arrears and less likely they will support US in applying Art 19 when it becomes applicable in 1964 to USSR. It will antagonize other major powers, who, as mentioned above, simply do not accept proposition that US share of UN peace-keeping operations should be no more than 33–1/3 percent. Certainly these countries will not be encouraged to buy additional UN bonds.
7.
In our view, UN financial situation today is better than it was year ago and is likely improve if we take constructive action in Working Group, and if we avoid kind of action described above. In considering failure of UN sell entire $200 million bond issue, we must recognize that any real chance of selling entire issue was almost surely lost as result of long delay on part of US Govt in deciding that it would purchase UN bonds. Failure sell entire issue should not be taken as indication of lack of responsibility on part of other UN members, particularly when it is noted that fifty-eight countries have made purchases or pledges and that number of these are buying bonds in relatively greater amounts than is US. With respect to arrears, we must recall that Assembly accepted advisory opinion of ICJ only on Dec 19, 1962, and that we cannot reasonably expect that govts which were awaiting this event could take necessary legislative action to commence payment of arrears by this date. As matter of fact, however, Greece, which had made no payment [Page 529] on UNEF and ONUC since 1957, has not paid up all its arrears totalling almost $300,000. Further, all LA govts, which until last Assembly had refused make payments for ONUC and UNEF, have now announced publicly they will pay their arrears. In our view, this is real progress, and indeed as much progress as we could hope for at this stage. We do not think that we should now jeopardize further progress by taking position which cannot be accepted by countries in arrears and will in fact antagonize them.
8.
We must recognize that major cause of financial predicament of UN today is amount of arrears owed by Communist bloc, China, and France. Vast majority of UN members consider that they are in no position contribute to solution of these arrears problems until they are called upon to vote on application of Art 19 of Charter to countries in arrears. They believe that only US is possibly in position at this time to deal with countries in question and bring about payment of arrears owed by them. We cannot see how position Dept now considering can favorably affect this situation.
9.
Finally, in our opinion there is reasonable possibility of securing in Working Group majority support for financing formula which will be more palatable to Congress than that used in past, in that it will reduce US percentage significantly below past 45–49 per cent and will provide that other major contributors come along with us in paying either by assessments or by voluntary contributions an amount in excess of regular budget percentages. We believe this can be worked out either on basis of regular scale of assessments or on basis of assessed plus voluntary contributions.
10.
In our view it is important that we choose immediately which of these courses to follow. It would be most difficult to negotiate two alternative proposals either of which might be satisfactory to us. It would be unwise to expend heavy energies now to work out satisfactory formula for special scale including committee, etc., and be faced with possible necessity within two or three months of attempting to scrap it if it then appeared it would run into Congressional difficulties. We would much prefer to choose now even though choice were to give up special scale for present. This would provide best chance of preventing adoption of special scale calling for US assessment of over 33–1/3 percent and would permit US to focus Working Group’s attention in next two or three weeks on constructive proposal along lines previous financing patterns.
11.

Suggest that our course of action in Working Group be as fol:

That we make strong statement along lines of draft submitted Dept, indicating our serious dissatisfaction with present financial situation of UN and attitudes of members; that we indicate that as long as this situation [Page 530] continues US will not be in mood to be particularly forthcoming supporting future UN peace-keeping operations and that in particular we are unable to accept for 1963 special scale of assessments in which US percentage is in excess of 33–1/3 percent; that we indicate we would like to see UN work its way out of its difficulties and are prepared to work in cooperation with others towards constructive solution of immediate problem of providing finances for UNEF and ONUC during last six months 1963; that we are prepared to support our normal percentage of such costs but that our willingness to go further than this will depend on present conditions being substantially improved; that subject to this condition being fulfilled we would be prepared to negotiate assessment res for costs of ONUC and UNEF for second half of 1963 along general lines of past reses which combine assessments with voluntary contributions but with certain modifications as fol:

(A)
That for last six months 1963 all UNEF expense (estimated $10 million) and first $10 million of ONUC (estimated $40–$50 million) be assessed on basis regular scale of assessments;
(B)
That assessment percentages for less developed countries beyond initial amount assessed on regular scale should be at least 50 percent of those in regular scale rather than 20 percent as in assessment res for ONUC in 1961. We would base this argument on fact that costs to be financed in 1963 are less than half of those which had to be financed in 1961;
(C)
That US will consider making voluntary contribution (subject to Congressional approval) towards deficit resulting from assessment of less than 100 per cent of costs, provided burden is shared by other larger countries, and it does not increase total US percentage above, say, 38 percent of total costs.

12.
Given (A) strong pressure in Working Group for special scale of assessments and (B) our need secure voluntary contributions from other “developed” states, it occurs to us that fol “compromise” might be possible. Instead of having GA merely appeal in general terms as in past for voluntary contributions to fill gap resulting from assessment of less than 100 percent of costs, GA might recommend that, or invite, the 15–20 developed member states, which are assessed significant percentages, to make voluntary contributions sufficient bring their total contribution to certain specific percentages which would be above regular scale percentages. For example, GA might invite US make voluntary contribution sufficient to bring its total percentage to 38 percent. Thus, GA res would specify percentages totaling 100 percent, but contributions in excess of regular scale percentage would be voluntary. This approach would avoid our 33–1/3 percent limitation problem and at same time be more likely bring contributions from such countries as Canada and Australia which have found difficulty in past in responding to general appeal for voluntary contributions.
13.
Crucial element in our thinking is need to have respectable negotiating position which can attract support of our friends from beginning. We must be able to hold out hope that US will be prepared to contribute more than 33–1/3 percent of total costs if we are to exert any real leadership toward constructive results.

Stevenson
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, UN 10. Secret; Limited Distribution. Passed to the White House at 11:05 p.m.
  2. Document 233.