Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

94. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 17, 1961, 9 p.m.

Secto 166. Following based uncleared memorandum of conversation: Gromyko called on me at 2:30 at his request.¹ He expressed cautious optimism on prospects for agreement provided both sides want independent and neutral Laos. He considers cease-fire situation now as “almost ideal” and expressed great surprise I had raised question about it at this morning’s meeting asking co-chairmen to solicit ICC cooperation in reporting all violations. He had impression we were seeking pretext to stir things up. I explained we had received information of substantial fighting in Padong area which ICC was not reporting and could lead to deteriorating situation directly affecting negotiations here. I expressed our concern with ICC procedures for reporting only when requested by both sides, which I explained is tantamount to no investigation. Unsatisfactory discussion followed. Gromyko insisted we can’t change ICC operating rules and if we look at situation with magnifying glass we will raise abnormal suspicions, and I maintained suspicions will arise only to extent violations are concealed and not reported.

On conference procedures, I asked Gromyko for his views about getting right down to committee work without waiting until end of general debate which will take a few days. He preferred to wait until all proposals ventilated in debate, but saw no objection meanwhile to informal talks perhaps to explore areas of common ground.

We touched on disarmament only briefly and I commented that lack of progress on test ban was not good augury for general disarmament talks. In this connection, I inquired whether “troika” principle was in fact far-reaching Soviet doctrine. He said that in test ban talks principle was well-founded but hoped some headway could nevertheless be made in preliminary talks on general disarmament in Washington in June and Moscow in July.

I took Gromyko to task for holding fast to tripartite approach on question of Lao seating at conference, observing that tripartite discussion among Lao themselves was one thing but not legitimate and proper solution for purposes of international conference. I told Gromyko his adamancy on this point was not calculated to improve Soviet-American relations, since there were after all but two governments—recognized by one side or other—involved. Gromyko got the point but claimed Pathet Lao were central element in picture, disclaimed existence of any Soviet instructions to Pathet Lao, and said Soviets had got nothing out of Pathet Lao seating.

Other noteworthy points mentioned were:

1. Soviet airlift which Gromyko described only as supplying economic aid and equated with our aid to Phoumi. (He also contended our intelligence information on airlift incorrect and there have been ten US flights for each Soviet flight.);

2. Canadian stress in Green’s speech today on need for effective control and supervision in any new arrangements for Laos, which Gromyko observed would present delicate problem of possible infringements on Lao sovereignty;

3. Gromyko’s reference to still incomplete withdrawal of KMT irregulars from Burma and Laos as matter giving them serious concern. On latter point, I told him Burmese apparently no longer much concerned and suggested if this was particularly sore point with Communist Chinese they might find discussions with Burmese reassuring.

Discussion with Gromyko was somewhat more relaxed and informal than our first talk here² but held little of substance that was very promising.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1761. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Vientiane, and Bangkok.
1. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting, US/MC/21, May 17, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1868.
2. See Document 88.