53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0
1100. Eyes Only Ambassador Brown, Gavin, Bruce, Charge Unger, Creel. Soviets disturbing delay in executing call cease-fire faces us with [Page 130] obvious dangers: 1) buildup of enemy supplies and base for operations continues with no indication of abatement; even gradual increase in evidence. 2) Over-all military situation deteriorates and Communists in position to exploit weakening situation of FAL at will which could place RLG in untenable position while waiting for cease-fire to be accomplished. 3) Aura of pre-ceasefire atmosphere and current political speculation associated with Souvanna Phouma’s travels could tempt King and Phoumi to contemplate concessions inimical to our interests.
In view fact this continuing decay could result in sudden collapse military situation and place us at extreme disadvantage at conference table President has authorized the carrying-out of the following action in order bolster military position FAL and restore morale RLG to appreciable degree:
JCS by separate orders tonight authorizing CINCPAC order PEO personnel Laos and LTAG personnel to 1) lift all restrictions with respect their participation combat operations; 2) use of rank; 3) wearing of uniforms. This will enable US military personnel to provide essential leadership and guidance so essential for conduct of operations. They will operate in all essentials comparable to MAAG. Phoumi must understand that in order for LTAG teams to be effective with FAL units there must be no restriction to their participating fully with combat elements at all levels.
We are informing French Ambassador of this action tomorrow morning; also UK Ambassador. French may indeed protest but action will be carried out over such protest if necessary.
In informing British and French of this action we are taking to stiffen FAL posture, we are requesting their approval and cooperation and advising them that should overt action of this type within scope operation indulged in by Communists themselves be used as pretext for Communist retaliation, our next step will be to consider appropriate SEATO action in which we would expect their support.
For Brown: Request you return to Vientiane at once to inform Prime Minister and Phoumi and if possible King of this decision. In order provide necessary authority for this action you should ask RLG to place appropriate request our hands so that military assistance will be covered by agreement with RLG.
In your discussion this whole situation with Phoumi should be made clear US taking this additional step to ensure integrity of Laos and we urge him in all seriousness to put forth every effort achieve tactical [Page 131] advantage on ground as rapidly as possible. In discussion with Phoumi emphasize President’s view he must give us something to support.1
Military channels informing Boyle of his authority to call for airlift and supplies without restriction. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Suggest you stimulate USOM give maximum civilian help throughout as much of countryside as possible as vital supplement to military operations and morale of people.
While it is hoped that Soviet response may be forthcoming with respect to appeal for cease-fire the above authorized action will be indication that US not willing allow situation to deteriorate interminably while awaiting their pleasure.
During this waiting period it is not only military situation which is deteriorating. Political atmosphere surrounding RLG and King during this uncertain waiting period not wholesome nor productive of strength to withstand Communist threats or blandishments. It especially important to show determination in view serious talks upcoming with Souvanna Phouma here next week. We will leave him under no illusion that US is willing fall in line with position he building up by consultations with Communist leaders. He must understand US cooperation only available on basis he willing cooperate achieve genuine neutral Laos but not one ordered by Communist dictation.
For Bangkok: You should inform Sarit immediately what steps we are taking. You should additionally request Sarit to make the two 105 batteries previously requested available immediately, informing him that replacements are on the way arriving early May. You should further inform Sarit that we believe this action will give necessary assurance and lift to RLG morale increasing effectiveness FAL. He may consider advisable parallel our approach to Phoumi urging him to make supreme effort in consonance with this assistance to redress military situation in order improve RLG prestige and bargaining position should international conference ensue.
Further inform Sarit US is committing its personnel in uniform parallel to commitment his artillery and thereby engages US in commitment to him communicated by Secretary of State.2
For Paris and London: You should inform GOF and HMG of action being taken re American military personnel in Laos urging sympathetic cooperation this step.
[Page 132]Fully aware above action in technical violation Geneva Accords. This only in small measure redresses imbalance caused by massive violation of actual communist signatories and one of co-chairmen over extended period. It remains open to us to insist that all parties return to such accords with complete compliance; obviously we cannot accept unilateral contempt these accords by Communists alongside of obligation on our side requiring meticulous compliance.
UK reps will recall above action in line with paramilitary steps preceding formal SEATO action already discussed principal SEATO allies.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1461. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Steeves, cleared in draft by Fontana and in substance by the President, and approved by Rusk. Sent also niact to Bangkok as 1587, to London as 4844, to Paris as 4316, and to CINCPAC POLAD unnumbered.
This cable was the result of a meeting at the White House attended by Rusk, Bowles, the President, and Department of Defense officials including almost certainly McNamara. There is no reference to the meeting in the President’s Appointment Book, Kennedy Library, merely an indication that the President returned to his office from 6:45 to 7:45 p.m. In Rusk’s Appointment Book for 1961 at the Johnson Library, there is an entry indicating that there was a White House meeting on Laos attended by Rusk and Bowles from 6:45 p.m. which the President joined at 7 p.m. A subsequent memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy, April 18, indicates that the April 13 meeting included Departments of State and Defense participants. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/17/61–4/21/61)
↩ - Brown’s discussion with Phoumi is reported in telegram 1871 from Vientiane, April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1561)↩
- Unger’s discussion with Sarit is reported in telegram 1861 from Bangkok, April 15. (Ibid.)↩