454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0
964. Ref: Embtel 1453.1
Appreciate very useful assessment contained reftel as well as excellent reporting Embassy has sent in during present Laos crisis. Recognize that this has been accomplished in face great difficulties and obviously required full cooperation all elements C.T. Following are Department’s views on policy questions we see arising from PDJ situation:
Our objective in respect to KL is to: (a) preserve his presence on PDJ with enough force to give Souvanna appearance of having some independent military support and (b) keep KL strong enough so that PL must mount full-scale overt attack to overcome him. We do not believe that KL’s can win if PL open up such all out attack with VM help. However, if KL has enough strength to require heavy PL/VM assault, international attention will again be directed toward clear evidence communist violation and thus preserve maximum number US options.
At this juncture preservation of cease-fire with international help offers KL best chance for survival on PDJ. We are concerned that any overt move no matter how justifiable morally, such as effort to retake XK with Meo help would blow up cease-fire and turn international effort around to stopping KL. Therefore we believe that KL should concentrate on strengthening his defensive position and that he and FAR/Meo should avoid initiating attacks.
Appears to us two main problems affecting KL’s morale are: (1) Lost territory such as XK and Khang Khay which cease-fire leaves in PL hands and (2) Deuane’s rise in status to point where he is receiving international attention and is, as pointed out Reftel, making claim to speak as “true” neutralist commander. Actions by Souvanna appear to be key to both problems and require essentially according Kong Le absolute status as chief neutralist military leader in PDJ.
Since cease-fire rules out recapture by force Kong Le should not agree to loss of any area and permit status to be left in abeyance for moment. At same time Souvanna could support KL by insisting as neutralist leader on principle that areas formerly controlled by neutralists [Page 969] should return to neutralist hands. (Perhaps by referring to agreements among Lao themselves.) Furthermore as leader he could insist on designating commanders for respective neutralist areas and would thereupon designate those who remained loyal. He would refuse accept any other as belonging to him.
In our view best way handle Deuane would be along same lines, i.e., Souvanna rule him out unequivocally as neutralist, announce that he had deserted to PL, and place mantle of true neutralist on KL. Whether or not Deuane is ever accepted back into neutralist fold (obviously not successful tactic first time) will depend upon Souvanna but in any case Deuane and Thiep could be brought back as subordinates to KL. From here it seems very remote that Deuane would accept any such status when he is tasting success.
Your 1461 just received.2 Believe we have little to add to foregoing except emphasize our view that giving Deuane any neutralist information seems to be playing communist game for them. Do not believe Xieng Khouang-Khang Khay swap should be favorably regarded.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Cross, cleared in substance with Hilsman and in draft with Rice, and approved by Koren. Sent priority to CINCPAC, and to Bangkok, Paris, London, Ottawa, and New Delhi.↩
- Document 453.↩
- Dated April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos)↩