375. Editorial Note

An advanced copy of SNID 58–5–62 was approved by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 23. It was entitled, “Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible U.S. Actions With Respect to Laos.” and was prepared and submitted in response to specific assumptions and courses of action provided by the Laos Task Force under William Sullivan.

The estimate had as general assumptions that while Hanoi, Beijing, and Moscow might disagree on tactics, there were no fundamental differences on Laos. If the situation reached the point of armed conflict between the United States and China, this could change. However, the Soviet Union was not likely to abandon its influence in Laos and North Vietnam to China. The estimate stated that all the Communist powers probably suspected the United States of insincerity or at least procrastination in bringing Phoumi to serious negotiations. With Pathet Lao military successes, they had lots some interest in a coalition government. The Communists, the estimate continued, probably interpreted [Page 786] the U.S. troop movements to Thailand as an attempt to deter them from further military action in Laos, but they recognized that it placed the United States in an improved position to intervene. Under these circumstances, the Communists—the Pathet Lao directed by Hanoi and supported by the Soviet Union and China—would not alter their current tactic of suspending major military action while waiting for the RLG to accept their terms for a political settlement.

The estimate then examined the various courses of action under Assumption One: that neither side had openly repudiated the cease-fire or the principle of a negotiated settlement, and that U.S. policy sought a neutralist settlement. The first course of action was A, providing Laos with assistance to the level of South Vietnam. The estimate stated that the Communists would most certainly respond by increasing their military investment in Laos—more North Vietnamese, increased logistics support, more artillery, perhaps an expanded airlift, but they would almost certainly not take the towns along the Mekong. Under Course B, the United States building up its forces to 20,000 troops in Thailand, the response would probably be North Vietnamese reinforcements to Laos, Chinese troops to the border with Laos, and a resumption of negotiations. Under Course C, U.S.-Thai-and willing SEATO members’ troops crossing into Laos and garrisoning Royal Lao Government-held areas with a clear indication that there would be no offensive action against Communist-held positions, the response would be additional North Vietnamese forces and probably Chinese “volunteers” into northern Laos with stepped up Soviet logistics support. The Pathet Lao would harass U.S. and allied forces, but would not attempt to drive them from Laos. The Communist side would probably revert to a negotiated settlement with the withdrawal of U.S.-Thai-SEATO forces as a condition.

Assumption Two held that the Communist side attacked the remaining towns in Royal Lao Government hands and U.S. policy shifted from a negotiated settlement to a de facto partition. Course of Action D had U.S.-Thai-SEATO troops taking the offensive to secure southern Laos. The Communist side would not be expecting this response, since their own attack would be based on the calculation that the U.S. would not intervene. However, they would resist strenuously with additional North Vietnamese troops and probably Chinese “volunteers” along with rapidly stepped up Soviet logistics support. They would assume that the United States would not be able to sustain a prolonged and unpopular war and in due course would seek a negotiated settlement. Course of Action E had the United States and its allies taking the action in D plus attempting to retake Sayaboury Province—with the exception of Luang Prabang—and the northern towns along the Mekong. The Communist response would be vigorous opposition, with North Vietnamese and almost certainly Chinese intervention, [Page 787] probably without the fiction that they were “volunteers.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/1/62–6/5/62)