298. Telegram From the White House to Vientiane0
The President is personally concerned to make sure that all U.S. representatives use full persuasive power with General Phoumi to obtain his cooperation in effort to establish effective Souvanna government which can prevent Communist takeover. State and White House [Page 634] believe that you can make a particular contribution here. Accordingly you should speak to Phoumi at earliest opportunity and make clear to him that your government really will not allow itself to be driven into a war in Laos by Phoumi’s intransigence. You should emphasize further that Souvanna is increasingly at odds with Pathet Lao and that we now have a real opportunity to unite non-Communists with strong international support. Phoumi can play a major role in increasing the prospect for such success but he cannot expect U.S. support if he blocks it.
We recognize that the situation in Vientiane is fast-moving, and the tone and temper in which you deliver this message will obviously be affected by the immediate tactical situation—and of course by the advice of the Ambassador. The important thing is that you should leave him in no doubt whatever that all branches of the U.S. Government are at one in execution of policy set by President.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 2/23/62–2/28/62. Top Secret. This unnumbered telegram was not sent through Department of State channels. This cable was apparently dispatched on February 23, but the message was not delivered to Phoumi until March 6; see Document 304.↩