296. Memorandum From the President’s Special Representative for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy0

SUBJECT

  • Capabilities of the Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces

There are some recent developments with respect to the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) forces about which you should know. From a [Page 624] condition of near collapse in May, 1961, the RLG forces were built up by efforts of U.S. advisers to a point where, in December 1961, it was estimated that with their improved capability, plus a potential resistance among the hill tribes if they were organized and equipped, the RLG forces could hold all the territory of Laos loyal to Vientiane and gradually force pro-communist rebels back toward the North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist Chinese borders. It was also estimated that, over the next year or two, if the tribal elements were armed and supported, favorable military action could be effected in North Vietnam and all of Laos.

This improvement in RLG forces resulted from the fact that U.S. advisers had about a year before gotten their hands on the tactical, organizational, and training throttle and were able to effect some changes. One significant training reform was a 12 weeks’ course in guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla warfare given by a team including MAAG personnel. Meo ability to interdict road traffic and harass troop movements added greatly to the capability of the RLG forces to prevent capture by the enemy of any of the major Mekong cities above the Nam Ca Dinh without overt and considerable reinforced Vietnamese Communist participation.

This appraisal was based on an assumption of no significant increase in the current pro-communist forces, including North Vietnamese advisers and technicians, or in the degree of logistic support being provided to Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Communist China and the USSR.

In a reassessment of U.S. policy in Laos, in January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the application of diplomatic restraints on military counteractions and political pressures to make concessions to Prince Souvanna Phouma had the effect of undermining the prestige, determination and effectiveness of the legal pro-Western government and its armed forces. However, they continued to estimate that the military position of the RLG forces was stronger then, vis-a-vis the Pathet Lao (PL)/Souvanna forces, than it was at the beginning of the cease-fire, because of its recently developed competence in weapons, tactics, leaders and ability to perform in combat. A larger and more flexible airlift than the enemy and use of the Thai railroads for bulk shipping gave added operational capability which could be advantageous in the rainy season.

More recent intelligence and consequent reassessment by CINCPAC and CHMAAG of the capability of the RLG forces indicated that the communist forces have been reinforced with sizeable Viet Minh (VM) cadre, units, and combat materiel and equipment during the past two months. There is now estimated to be in Laos 9,000 VM (6,000 combat troops, 3,000 advisors). The ability of the VM to reinforce or take over from PL/KL units at most, if not all, major fronts, plus the use of [Page 625] recently-acquired armored vehicles gives the enemy greatly increased flexibility and striking power. The RLG forces as now constituted have no significant reserve and strong enemy attacks can force them to give ground and retreat. In spite of the increased effectiveness of the enemy forces, RLG forces have been used to pressure the enemy in sensitive spots. These operations also serve as warnings to the Pathet Lao not to intrude on sensitive points of forces. However, several serious routs to RLG forces resulted from such operations in January. CHMAAG states that field commander knowledge of enemy buildup may be the reason for only token resistance by RLG forces in January, in contrast to their previous military success in the last few months of 1961. He was not so concerned that RLG forces failed, as that was predictable in light of the enemy buildup, but he was disturbed because RLG commanders and troops concerned have “already put on track shoes and have been ready to break and run at first indication of VM presence.” Some of the VM troops were regulars, in spite of denials by Soviet First Secretary in Vientiane that none were present, and it is no surprise that the RLG force “has no stomach and no real capability”1 for engaging VM regulars who, as they well know, defeated the French. Development of RLG confidence and capabilities is going to require a period of years, if it can be done at all.

McGeorge Bundy2
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 2/2/62–2/22/62. Top Secret.
  2. The quotes are taken from CHMAAG ML–OPT 494, January 25; see footnote 3, Document 280.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.