293. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative’s Naval
Aide (Bagley) to
the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)0
Washington,
February 12,
1962.
Attached notes outline situation in Laos as of today.
The contingency paper1 you have already seen is
pertinent, but does not direct itself to the new approach to Souvanna.
This raises new questions as to the role of the King which I have
cited.
Our tactics are pretty well set. I suggest the need now is to discuss the
contingencies in detail, and that should be the emphasis with the
President.2 State has had a tendency to discuss pros and
cons of short-term procedures without facing future consequences.
I checked with DOD(ISA) on their views on
our Laos policy. Their main point is to repeat Ambassador Brown’s warning that when we go direct
to Souvanna, we burn all bridges with Phoumi/Boun Oum, probably regardless of the outcome.
Sec/State and his advisors will have a full-blown talk on SEATO tomorrow.3
[Attachment]
LAOS
Governor Harriman’s main
premise will be the need to cease U.S. support for Phoumi. He will
cite Phoumi’s continued intransigence to U.S. guidance as the
principal reason.
To drop Phoumi, the U.S. must see some other alternative. The
question of someone else leading the RLG has been reviewed for weeks
without an acceptable answer. Hence, the new tactic—approach
Souvanna directly,
determine his plans for composing a coalition government
[Page 621]
and for reconstitution of
the Army and, if acceptable, support presentation of his proposals
to the King. This will be a U.S.-UK-France tripartite approach to Souvanna contingent on ceasing
PL activity in the Nam Tha area.
The UK and France are going along
with us but are leery of “cabinet-making” which would place ultimate
responsibility for events in Laos on the Western powers. The direct
approach, if the Souvanna
proposals are unacceptable to us, will compromise our pres-ent
tenuous relationship with the RLG and probably prevent further
influence on them. If successful, however, it will avoid the dilemma
of when and how to place sanctions on the RLG to encourage
Phoumi/Boun Oum to
negotiate on their own.
A satisfactory Souvanna
solution could not be implemented without the concurrence of the
King. He has not indicated great trust in Souvanna and this could be the
weakest point of the new tactic.
Phoumi has meanwhile increased emphasis on a de facto partition of
Laos (based on cease-fire lines) as the best solution remaining. A
fall-back on this idea is a north-south partition. Phoumi would probably have Thai and
SVN sympathy in a move for
partition, but the King would resist a southern bastion. A second
“Phoumi solution” is a government headed by the King.
There is still the possibility of a Princes’ meeting in Luang
Prabang. Boun Oum has stated
this depends on a cease-fire, a withdrawal of VM forces from Laos, and a military representatives’
meeting at Ban Hin Heup to discuss the cessation of hostilities.
The crux of any discussion is the possible contingencies (some of
these are in the attached memo which you have seen) and what we
would do. If we disregard the political origins, a partition along
the current cease-fire lines would be strategically sound to defend
Thailand, but would not cover the area of infiltration into SVN. A north-south partition would
accomplish the latter, but not the former. Both solutions would
extend the role of Laos as a sharp line of demarcation between east
and west which the ideal “neutral” solution would avoid.
The Souvanna approach is
attractive because it avoids the levy of military sanctions on the
RLG. If this were done to break the Defense/Interior impasse, the
RLG would be weak for subsequent negotiations on other ministries
and personalities, as well as during the period the national army
was reconstituted.
The neutral Laos we seek depends on Soviet good faith. It also
depends on the Soviets being able to control the ChiComs at a time when their mutual
relations are at a low ebb. Regardless of whether a political
solution is reached, this remains a risk, particularly re
infiltration via Laos into SVN.
