289. Memorandum for the Record0

A meeting on Laos was held at the Department of State, 1430, 6 February. State was represented by Messrs. McGhee, Harriman, Johnson, [Page 614] Rice, Cleveland, Sullivan and Cross. Defense representatives were Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Bundy and Colonel McCrea. CIA representatives were Messrs. Helms, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Mr. Harriman opened the meeting by stating that he was still under a directive by the President to seek disengagement in Laos. State had originally prepared a paper dealing with the problems of isolating Phoumi and employing sanctions against the RLG.1 Analysis indicated that it would be difficult to achieve U.S. objectives in this manner. State would have therefore wished to consider another alternative: Directing the United States, British and French Ambassadors in Vientiane to approach Souvanna directly to get from him a proposed cabinet including 8 or 9 representatives from the RLG and the Vientiane neutrals. If Souvanna would propose a satisfactory cabinet and if he would indicate that he would deal with the integration of forces in a way acceptable to the United States, the United States would then agree to support him and would so inform the King. If the King agrees, U.S support would then go to the Souvanna government. It is contemplated that the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, and possibly Ambassador Harriman, might have to go to Laos to put this plan into effect. It is felt that their presence would (a) prevent the launching of a general offensive by the Communists; (b) put pressure on the King and Phoumi to approve this procedure and (c) put pressure on the Communists and Souphanouvong, if necessary. Secretary Harriman noted that there was little likelihood of a successful government under Souvanna unless he had 8 or 9 “stalwarts” from the RLG and Vientiane neutrals in his cabinet. Phoumi’s participation in the government would be invited but would not be necessary.

The key role of the King in the success or failure of this plan was noted. It was also recognized that this procedure may have the effect of merely postponing critical decisions with respect to sanctions against the RLG, or of dealing with Phoumi in the event he refuses to go along and moves the government to Savannakhet. One opinion was expressed that if the King refused to approve this procedure, further cooperation with the RLG would be impracticable and Laos would be lost. The majority opinion, however, was that such a procedure by the United States would not start an irreversible chain of events, and that it might clarify the situation without disappointing pro-Western assets such as the FAR and some of the responsible Vientiane leadership.

It was noted that the first problem was to achieve a cease-fire at Nam Tha and it was concluded that if Souvanna has sufficient authority [Page 615] to bring about such a situation, the best method of getting him to use it would be to instigate the proposed approach. Mr. McGhee said that one of the key questions was whether this or any approach would permit us to deliver a good portion of the army and pro-West leadership to Souvanna so that Souvanna might have some hope of balancing pro-Communist influences. Ambassador Harriman said that he would consider it very hard to swallow that we go ahead with negotiations if the Communists take Nam Tha.

It was the consensus that the British and French Ambassadors in Vientiane should be authorized to approach Souvanna Phouma and tell him that the United States would deal directly with him concerning the establishment of a coalition government if the offensive at Nam Tha were called off.

W.S. McCrea2

Colonel, USA
Assistant to the Director, FER
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Laos 7, T–028–69. Secret. Prepared by McCrea of DOD/ISA.
  2. Apparent reference to Document 260.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.