185. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
487. Following is summary of two-hour talk which Ambassador Harriman (accompanied by myself and DCM) had yesterday afternoon with Boun Oum, Phoumi and Sopsaisana. (Although Ambassador Harriman is quoted in first person throughout following report, pressure of time did not permit clearance of it with him prior his departure early this morning.)
After opening pleasantries I said I had just returned from audience with King in Luang Prabang. I told Phoumi one thing which had struck me as result hearing from King somewhat garbled version of my talks with Souvanna (Embtel 486)1 was fertile imagination of RLG “intelligence [Page 422] service.” (Phoumi gave good-natured grimace in Sopsaisana’s direction at this juncture.)2 I said I had given King full account of my talks with Souvanna and now wished do likewise with them.
As they were aware my mission to meet with Souvanna in Rangoon had been undertaken at President’s request in pursuance of decision taken by three foreign ministers in Paris to support Souvanna as Prime Minister new Lao Government National Union provided we were satisfied he could meet certain specific conditions which would give reasonable assurances that under his premiership Laos would not fall under Communist control. Our extensive talks had revealed there was one fundamental point on which he had been unable, at least thus far, to meet our conditions. This was composition of center group of eight in his proposed government of 14. Souvanna wished allocate 7 of these 8 places to his close friends who had followed him in exile to Xieng Khouang. I had told Souvanna that on this basis President would not be able support him. I had advised that to make such support possible there would have to be at least three, and preferably four, Ministers in center group selected from outside Xieng Khouang circle. I had also suggested to him formula of center group of nine, with Souvanna as Prime Minister and four each from Xieng Khouang and from other parts of Laos. Souvanna said this would be very difficult but he would think it over. I said I hoped Phoumi and Boun Oum would press this point vigorously in their negotiations with the other two Princes.
On other major points talks had been considerably more satisfactory—for example, Souvanna’s ideas re formation national army, regrouping and disbandment surplus forces, especially PL, necessity that this be accomplished before elections, holding of elections, his concept that NLHX would be principal adversary in elections, role of ICC, and interdiction of passage of Viet Minh troops through Laos into South Vietnam. Aside from one major point of composition of new government, his ideas were reasonably sensible and his general attitude indicated to me that he was sincerely desirous of bringing about peaceful, united, independent, neutral Laos which would not be under Communist domination. This was also our objective. From my discussions with Soviet Delegation in Geneva I felt there was good reason to believe neutral Laos along lines Finland was also their present desire. I had urged Souvanna to negotiate with RLG in good faith. I hoped that RLG could [Page 423] also demonstrate by its actions that it was prepared to get down to brass tacks around negotiating table to work out peaceful solution.
Phoumi asked me what Souvanna had said about the King. I told him Souvanna said that King had his respect, affection and fidelity and that without the monarchy Laos would be lost. Phoumi replied that was all very well but why hadn’t Souvanna gone to Luang Prabang to see King as he had promised to do at Phnom Penh. He felt this was an indispensable action on Souvanna’s part to demonstrate his loyalty to King and constitution without which he would not be deserving of support for position of Prime Minister. Most significant point in Zurich communique was expression of loyalty all three parties to King and constitution and it was up to Souvanna to demonstrate this by his actions.
RLG could not consider question possibility Souvanna as Prime Minister until his loyalty to King demonstrated without betrayal their ideals. (I refrained from reminding Phoumi of attempted suspension of constitution by revolutionary committee and difficulties Ambassador Brown had encountered in January in persuading present RLG to regularize their position by following constitutional procedures for their investiture.) He said that what King meant when he said he wanted recommendation from three Princes was that he should first be satisfied as to Souvanna’s loyalty.
Moreover, Zurich communique provided for designation of new Prime Minister and government by King. Souvanna’s insistence on agreed nomination by three Princes of a single candidate for Prime Minister would go counter to communique and constitution.
Phoumi insisted again that question of Souvanna’s loyalty to King was the one important point. If this established there would be no difficulty on other points such as composition of government. I said I felt it essential that there be agreement on composition of government before decision on accepting Souvanna as PriMin and also on general principles of integration and disbanding of forces. I agreed that Souvanna’s loyalty to King and constitution was very important. In fact it was first point stressed by three Foreign Ministers in Paris. But other points, such as composition of government were vital also. It might even be risky to have Souvanna go to Luang Prabang alone first and perhaps get Royal approval his selection as PriMin without being first satisfied on these important points.
I pointed out that King had indicated to me in LP he did not wish be put in position of having to make choice. He stated clearly that he wanted three Princes to get together and reach agreement among themselves on questions of PriMin and govt and then come to him with their agreed recommendations. If they agreed on Souvanna as PriMin he [Page 424] would be prepared, despite his awareness of Souvanna’s faults and weaknesses to approve their choice.
I said there were really only two alternatives in Laos—a peaceful negotiated solution or resumption of hostilities. We much preferred former course. We were not prepared to support RLG in any military initiative on its part to move north to recapture lost areas, in view danger of bringing Chinese Communist forces into Laos and precipitating large-scale war. President had asked me to make this position perfectly clear. To reach peaceful solution would require sincere negotiations carried out in good faith. Time was running out. Such negotiations between opposing parties in Laos should have started several months ago. Phoumi protested he had always been in favor of negotiations and peaceful solution but he had so far made all the concessions and other side none. I replied that I must tell him in all honesty and friendship that while several months ago public opinion had all been on his side, impression was now growing that it was RLG which was dragging its feet. I urged him to negotiate sincerely and earnestly because if he did I thought there was good chance agreement could be reached. I urged him use same determination at negotiating table which he had always shown on battlefield.
Phoumi then shifted to ground that Souvanna had come too much under thumb of Communists to be trusted. He was really under domination of PL and his associates in Xieng Khouang were an unreliable group. (Name of Quinim came up. We all agreed he undesirable and unreliable. Phoumi said he had run government during Souvanna’s premiership. In his only interjection during entire conversation, Boun Oum asserted that Quinim was “the microbe of the whole lot.”) Phoumi said that in view of this factor it would be very difficult to support Souvanna as PriMin.
I said I did not want to get into Lao internal affairs but I did wish to impress on him as strongly as I possibly could need for genuine negotiations to endeavor arrive at peaceful settlement. Phoumi said this was also his objective and he would follow our advice. He stated RLG Delegation would go to Ban Namone tomorrow and did not rule out possibility of three Princes meeting at Ban Hin Heup, as suggested by Souvanna (although he still thought this meeting should be held at LP as he insisted was agreed at Phnom Penh). Phoumi said, however, that he wanted us to know that although he was prepared to pursue negotiations, he had practically no hope of a satisfactory outcome.
In fact, he was confident that he was heading for a defeat (“echec”).
(Comment: I gained strong impression that Phoumi has no real intention of pursuing serious negotiations.)
[Page 425]If peaceful solution proved impossible and RLG were attacked, he was prepared defend himself. He hoped in any event he could count on support from United States.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2061. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to Geneva for Fecon, priority to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon for Harriman, to Phnom Penh, niact to USUN for Rusk, priority to New Delhi, to Ottawa, and priority to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 184. In telegram 430 from Bangkok, September 21, for the President, Rusk, Fecon, and relevant posts, Harriman made a clarification about Brown’s account of his discussions with King Savang. Harriman stated that he had mentioned possible Chinese Communist intervention in response to an attempt by non-Communist forces to move north so as to make it clear to the King, and offset advice from Phoumi, that the best he could hope for through military action was a divided Laos. The King, with tears in his eyes, stated he would abdicate if Laos were divided. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2161)↩
- Also in telegram 430 from Bangkok, Harriman stated that he was convinced that Phoumi had told the King that he, Harriman, had been taken in by Souvanna. When Harriman told Phoumi that much of the time during his audience with the King was wasted correcting misinformation, “Phoumi turned to Sopsaisana with a grimace as a boy might if caught trying to fool teacher.”↩