On 21 February 1961, the United States Intelligence Board approved an
Estimate on “Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of
Action with Respect to Laos” (SNIE
58–61). A Brief of this Estimate is attached for your information in
advance of the regular distribution which will be forthcoming.
[Attachment]
BRIEF
SNIE 58–61: Probable
Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action with Respect
to Laos
This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the
United States Intelligence Board on 21 February 1961. It was
prepared in response to a requirement of OASD, ISA for an estimate of Communist
reactions to selected hypothetical US sponsored courses of action,
and is not intended to cover the full range of possibilities of U.S.
initiative in Laos. Significant judgments of the Estimate are:
Except possibly in the case of the more extreme U.S. military
measures, we believe that Soviet leaders would not match
U.S.-sponsored
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military
actions in Laos with corresponding, step-by-step, Bloc military
measures. Except in the case of the most modest U.S. military
measures Bloc leaders would almost certainly expect that most of
world opinion would be sharply critical of the U.S., and that this
fact would deter the U.S. from pressing too far.* [* Joint Staff footnote to SNIE 58–61. It is the opinion of the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff, that reactions of the Bloc and the
non-Communist world to U.S. sponsored measures would depend
significantly on the vigor, forthrightness and success of these
measures. Accordingly the Bloc leaders would not necessarily expect
“most of world opinion” to be “sharply critical of the U.S.”
Forthright U.S. action in the Taiwan Straits and in Korea attest to
the fact that a significant segment of world opinion could be
expected to applaud heartily U.S. sponsored military action taken
against a Communist threat against all of Southeast Asia and its
attendant challenge to the Free World. The considerations of timing,
vigor and success of possible U.S. sponsored measures are not
weighed in the assessments that follow. The Director for
Intelligence, Joint Staff, believes that without careful weighing of
these factors the judgments as to probable Bloc and non-Communist
reactions must be viewed with reserve.]2 Responses to
lesser U.S. measures would be designed far more for their political
than their military effects. The Soviets do not want to prejudice
their chances of negotiating with the U.S. on issues more important
to them than Laos. This may restrain them from stepping up military
pressures in Laos on their own initiative; it will be less likely to
restrain them from military responses to U.S. military initiatives
in Laos.
The direct delivery of military supplies to Vientiane by U.S.
aircraft, sustained U.S. reconnaissance flights over Laos, the use
of unmarked Thai or other aircraft to augment present airlift in
Laos, or the assignment of volunteer Thai specialists to FAL units would draw a vigorous
diplomatic and propaganda reaction. None of these measures would be
likely to cause the Communists to cease their military efforts in
Laos, to feel the need to make any concessions, or themselves to
step up the tempo in Laos.
If the U.S. were to commit “Volunteer” combat aircraft to ground
support operations in Laos, the Bloc would probably seek to increase
PL AAA capabilities, possibly
covertly introducing DRV AAA units,
and Soviet threats would be made against bases supporting the air
operations. The chances are about even that “volunteer” Communist
ground attack aircraft would be committed in Laos.
If Chinese Nationalist irregulars were committed to combat action in
Laos, as long as these forces did not significantly affect the
course of
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fighting in Laos
and did not make raids into China, Soviet and Chinese Communist
reactions would probably be confined to vigorous
propaganda-political exploitation.
If a token force of U.S. and allied ground forces were overtly
assembled in northeast Thailand, DRV
troops would probably be deployed along the Laos border, and threats
of DRV intervention might be made.
None of the foregoing measures would cause the Communists to cease
their military support of the PL.
If the U.S. were to commit a volunteer, composite-nationality ground
force in Laos, and the security of the PL forces were threatened, additional numbers of
(DRV) “Lao” or “border” forces
would probably be committed to stabilize the situation. It is
unlikely that Chinese Communist “volunteers” would be committed,
although we cannot rule out this possibility.
The overt commitment of U.S. and allied nation combat aircraft in
Laos would probably be regarded by the Bloc as indicating a major
commitment by the U.S. to the support of non-Communist forces in
Laos, and that this challenge obliged it to make a strong political
and military response. They would probably move to negotiate,
calculating that they could both get a settlement that would protect
Communist assets in Laos and at the same time reap considerable
political benefit. It is possible that they might commit Bloc air or
ground forces, but would in any event build up their readiness
posture in the general area and issue strong threats against the
U.S. and participating allies to cease their air operations.
If overt U.S. and allied ground forces were committed to garrison or
combat duty in Laos, Bloc reactions would probably be similar to,
but more intense than, those described for air action above. In
particular, the chances are about even that the USSR would at the same time sponsor
DRV intervention in Laos, and it
might even acquiesce in Chinese Communist intervention.
If the U.S. issued a solemn, private warning to the Bloc powers to
cease their military support efforts in Laos or face possible U.S.
air and amphibious action against the DRV, the Soviets would certainly regard defense of
North Vietnam against such an attack as imperative. They would
probably feel that their total interests could best be served by
making public the U.S. warning and castigating it as a threat to
world peace. Simultaneously, Moscow would probably announce its
determination to defend the DRV
against attack and stress that any such U.S. action would carry the
risk of general war, calculating that worldwide pressures on the
U.S. would dissuade it from its threat and force it into
negotiations on terms acceptable to the Communist side.
