229. Notes of the 485th Meeting of the National Security Council0

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Korea.]

In taking up the report of the Task Force on Korea,1 Rusk summarized the history of political development of that country and outlined U.S. aims and intentions. He also cited certain economic figures. In response to a question by the President about the relative status of North and South Korea, Mr. McConaughy replied that approximately 35% of the working force is unemployed or only partially employed in South Korea, in contrast to no unemployment in North Korea. He added quickly that this figure for North Korea was deceiving because of the Communist methods of utilizing labor, frequently under slave conditions. Although agriculture is better in South Korea, manufacturing is more highly developed in the north where the gross national product is rising, but only to be plowed back into the industrial base and war potential. He went on to say that the greatest hindrance to Korean development was the continued animosity between Japan and South Korea and the failure to re-establish relations which would prove mutually beneficial. He said that one of the principal missions of Ambassadors Berger and Reischauer should be to attempt to establish a reconciliation between the two countries.

McNamara wanted to go on record as opposing any decrease in the level of the armed forces of Korea at this time. He felt that any proposed decrease would first of all alienate the new military leadership; secondly, it would contribute further to the serious unemployment problem; and thirdly, it was well worth keeping effective troops on the front line at a cost of only $5 per month, especially when a decrease of approximately 100,000 soldiers would save only $6 million per year.

The President asked if it would be possible to increase to any measurable extent the contribution of the armed forces to civilian work. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief, UNC, replied that road and mining projects are presently being performed by certain units of the armed forces, but expressed the opinion that little more could be done without an unacceptable decrease in military effectiveness. Lemnitzer interrupted with the observation that from a military standpoint force levels are presently below that which is necessary for an adequate defense of Korea. He said that he is simply repeating the views which he and Generals Taylor and [Page 481] Decker have expressed previously. He cited the 157-mile front which must still be defended against the same threat and even against a more highly efficient North Korean force than existed during wartime—all this even without regard to the fact that a state of war technically still exists.

The President expressed the view that the economic and political situation in and about Korea were such as to present a hopeless situation. McConaughy confirmed that it was bad and perhaps would not improve principally because of an unstable economy, limited resources and an explosive population. Rostow disagreed with the acceptance of a hopeless economic situation and cited the following three factors as the basis for a certain degree of optimism:

1.
New effective economic and social planning.
2.
Young, aggressive, capable people in government.
3.
Better relations with Japan.

The President concluded that the best opportunity for improvement among those mentioned would appear to be the improvement of Korean-Japan relations and directed Ambassador Berger to concentrate on the issue. The President suggested that the U.S. should also have a look at its own program and position and asked what we should demand of the Koreans. McConaughy and Berger agreed that a start should be made by demanding a decrease in corruption. The President stated that he would take up the subject of improvement in relations with Korea with the Japanese Prime Minister next week.

General Decker stated that in his view the most ominous and difficult problem in Korea is the control of the country by a bunch of junior officers and suggested that the United States demand the return of control of the armed forces and the country immediately to senior officers “rather than to a bunch of lieutenant colonels.” He went on to say that he had already conveyed this idea to the Korean officer who has just departed the U.S. to become the new Defense Minister. The President disagreed with General Decker and expressed the opinion that the United States had no alternative except to deal with the people in power.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, National Security Council (III). Although no drafter is indicated on the source text, these notes were prepared by Howard L. Burris, Vice President Johnson’s military aide.
  2. See the source note, Document 225.