300. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State0

1485. 1. As Foreign Minister fell ill upon his return I was only able to see him today re Paris tripartite talks on Cyprus. He opened by remarking he had hoped not to pester the Americans after developments in UNGA where in his opinion we had abandoned our benevolent neutrality and prevented GOG from obtaining good majority for guaranteed independence, but subsequent development would certainly interest US particularly in light of Rountree’s remark that US hoped to play constructive role in solution. He then gave me very much same information set forth in Paris Polto 1770 and London 3303,1 emphasizing however importance Greek-Turk reconciliation at this time would have on Near Eastern situation. If agreement can be reached, Averoff thought it would have great effect on Nasser, particularly after latter’s Port Said speech,2 and help stem Soviet penetration in that area. [Page 756] If agreement could be reached with Turks, GOG planned several manifestations of good relations including visit to Ankara. Averoff said he and Zorlu agreed provisional solution would create more problems than it solved and it was preferable to attempt final solution based upon independence. [1 line of source text not declassified] In Averoff opinion two things were now essential—speed and indication of British attitude.

2. UK Ambassador was leaving as I arrived and Foreign Minister said he did not give clear reply but asked for more details. (I talked to Allen last night who was moderately hopeful that Greeks and Turks might get together in principle but feared they would eventually haggle over details.) Averoff said he outlined progress to date but now required reply whether HMG had any objection to principles so far reached. If UK reply were favorable, Zorlu and Averoff planned to meet secretly in Switzerland in near future. Foreign Minister thought we might help by urging HMG to make speedy and favorable reply. I hope we can.3

3. When I asked about Makarios’ attitude Averoff said if agreement could be reached GOG planned to publish and run the risk. After all, he remarked, Archbishop had proposed independence. Foreign Minister underlined again speed and secrecy were essential.

Reverting again to good effect of Cyprus solution on Near East situation, Averoff recommended we urge Hussein of Jordan to send message to Nasser supporting Port Said speech. He thought Nasser would reply cordially and this would have good and stabilizing effect in Jordan and Iraq.

4. Averoff added he thought Turks were sincere in their desire for settlement. Both governments now were compelled to recognize neither enosis nor partition was likely and independence was natural compromise. If HMG meant what it had previously said about necessity of Greece and Turkey coming to terms over Cyprus, now was the time to help both parties. But he repeated speed was essential.

Riddleberger
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2458. Secret; Limit Distribution.
  2. Polto 1770, December 19, reported that the Greek, Turkish, and British Foreign Ministers had held talks on Cyprus during the NATO Ministerial Meeting, and in the view of Averoff, progress toward a final solution for the island was being made. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–1958) Telegram 3303 from London, December 22, reported that Zorlu and Lloyd met in Paris on December 18 and that Zorlu told Lloyd that the Greek and Turkish Governments would hold talks to reach an agreed plan for Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–2258)
  3. In a December 23 speech at Port Said, UAR President Nasser denounced Communism as a threat to Arab nationalism.
  4. Telegram 3353 from London, December 27, reported that the British Government had responded favorably to the proposed Greek-Turkish bilateral talks on Cyprus and cautioned against any direct U.S. support for Averoff’s initiatives. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2758)