Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

257. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, August 29, 1958, 6 p.m.

588. Deptel 679.¹ Agree general line Department thinking as summarized reference telegram. We particularly agree with Department’s thinking that it not feasible to carry out British plan without cooperation Greek Cypriots and GOG. Sentiment here against plan as now envisaged continues to harden and will be further encouraged by Makarios press statement yesterday² in which he flatly rejected plan, indicated his almost complete alienation from Britain, and suggested his intention to press for UN intervention. We have feeling, however, that it would be more practical in light current situation here (as well, perhaps [garble] as for Turks) and more productive over long term, if plan and proposed actions could if possible be kept even more fuzzy than outlined reference telegram. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] At same time much can be accomplished with them through patient discussion. Macmillan’s recent operation³ was apparently based on partial recognition this situation but he was not sufficiently frank with Greeks and was too specific in his August 15 statement. Nevertheless situation has been left sufficiently flexible to warrant hope that progress can be made along lines Department suggests provided ambiguity and vagueness can be maintained and sufficient flexibility be preserved so that successive steps can be decided upon as events develop. Evidence our willingness play more active role would in itself have important influence on Greek attitude, and, incidentally, should improve overall US relations with GOG.

To illustrate our thinking we offer following comments on two of currently most important factors:

1. Makarios. We agree on his importance but still believe, as we have for some months, that he can most easily be handled by allowing his return Cyprus [1 line of source text not declassified] where he will be exposed to direct Greek Cypriot pressures, as well as Foot influence. Greek public and governmental opinion, which has been smarting under belief that British plan heavily weighted to favor Turks, also would be beneficially affected by Makarios’ return in early future and prior any concrete British steps in implementation of plan. Nicosia telegram to Department 114⁴ offers hope of progress along this line.

2. Government representatives. Britain might make separate “[garble—clarifying ?] statement” on this subject, perhaps only at Turk spokesman level, to effect that contemplated functions government representatives really within traditional competence ConGens and that therefore if special representatives not appointed Governor will feel free to call upon ConGens for advice and counsel he desires. It might be added that he would naturally expect ConGens to make such arrangements as they felt appropriate for informing themselves of opinions and desires of their respective ethnic communities. We would hope Greeks could be persuaded not to react definitively against some such formula.

Riddleberger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2958. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.
1. Document 256.
2. Presumably a reference to an August 27 letter from Makarios to Macmillan which was released to the press; for text, see RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1958, pp. 387–388.
3. Reference is to Macmillan’s August 7–13 trip to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.
4. Telegram 114 from Nicosia, August 26, reported that Foot proposed to hold out to Makarios the hope for a quick return to Cyprus in return for the Archbishop’s aid in keeping political violence suppressed. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2658)