Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, August 2, 1956—noon.

325. Reference: Deptel 26.² Despite favorable treatment US at Semarang (our telegram 289³) I feel compelled to share my concern with Department re our vulnerable position in economic area. Slowness of follow-up by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to my expressions of willingness to discuss enlarged aid program, coupled with RI apparent approval Nasser’s nationalization Suez Canal⁴ and expected arrival Soviet trade delegation (reported our telegram 320)⁵ may well develop trend limiting freedom action we attempting preserve.

Prime Minister has just today asked if I could see him Saturday a.m. August 4. Djuanda is seeing Prime Minister same matter Friday August 3 and I presume purpose is aid. I also plan see President either third or fourth August which may be last opportunity before his departure USSR. Strict adherence your caution of reference telegram this stage may well cause Prime Minister doubt our sincerity extend greater assistance. On other hand, I do not wish to go much beyond this caveat without some assurance that more aid is definitely in cards. I am fully aware of many problems engaging your attention at this time but my hand would be strengthened in both these discussions if Department could give me more definite information re present status additional aid plans.⁶

Baird agrees and will try to see Djuanda before my talk with Prime Minister in order probe for indication current Indo Government thinking on aid.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/8–256. Confidential; Priority.
2. See footnote 4, supra.
3. Telegram 289 from Djakarta, July 30, reported that Sukarno had given a speech the previous day at Semarang that was a “virtual eulogy” of the United States. At its conclusion, he left the rostrum and went into the audience to shake hands with Cumming, who had been invited to attend. The Ambassador commented: “This speech alone would seem justify whole cost Sukarno visit since I believe Semarang remarks give assurance what Sukarno really believes in his heart and represent fixed position to which he will increasingly return.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/7–3056)
4. On July 26, Egyptian President Nasser ordered the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company; telegram 303 from Djakarta, July 31, reported favorable Indonesian reactions to this. (Ibid., 974.7301/7–3156)
5. Telegram 320 from Djakarta, August 1, reported that a Soviet trade delegation was scheduled to arrive in Djakarta around August 9. (Ibid., 456D.6141/8–156)
6. Telegram 197 to Djakarta, August 2, reported that no firm figures were yet available because of Congressional reductions in U.S. aid programs, but added, for Cumming’s information only, “There is no doubt more aid definitely in cards but how much more aid still remains to be determined and it would be unfortunate boost Indonesian hopes too high. In addition availability of funds, Sukarno handling of himself in Moscow will be important consideration.” (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/8–256) Telegram 354 from Djakarta, August 4, reported that Ali had raised the subject with Cumming that morning and had referred to press reports that $35 million had been earmarked for Indonesia and that Cumming had replied as instructed. (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/8–456)