9. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, The White House, Washington, August 5, 1955, 12:30 p.m.1

SUBJECT

  • China

I said that I wanted to review with the President the basic thinking now underlying what I was doing in relation to Communist China as follows:

Chiang was absolutely opposed to giving up Quemoy and the Matsus. He believed that this withdrawal would be disastrous, and whether or not we agreed with his reasoning we had to accept the fact of his present position.

These coastal islands are militarily untenable by the Nationalists without large U.S. assistance. We do not desire to have to get into a major war with China, and indeed it is doubtful that the President has authority to use the armed forces of the United States in defense of Quemoy and the Matsus, if, as increasingly appears, the Chinese [Page 16] Communists themselves distinguish between Quemoy and the Matsus and our treaty area.

However, to allow Quemoy and the Matsus to be taken by the Communists and to allow large Nationalist forces to be destroyed there would have a grave effect upon morale in Korea, Japan, Formosa, the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

Therefore, the Department had to find diplomatic means through which to prevent a Chinese Communist attack.

We had started on this program prior to the Bandung Conference and had moved that program forward at Bandung. That had produced Chou En-lai’s offer to talk with us, and after three months used up by talks with intermediaries, we had responded by setting up the bilateral talks at Geneva for limited purposes.

We were using the time thus gained to try to build up a world opinion which would compel the Chinese Communists to accept the status quo and not seek to change it by force. This was a result which we could hope to achieve since the position we sought was basically the same position that the rest of the world takes with respect to the non-use of force to unify such areas as Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and indeed Ireland.

I referred to President Rhee’s recent statement of intention to incorporate certain tracts north of the armistice line into South Korea.2 I said that his logic in wanting it was even more powerful than that of the Chinese Communists in wanting to incorporate Quemoy and the Matsus with their areas. However, we had made clear that we would not be acquiescent in Rhee’s use of force for this purpose.

This was the general line I had taken in my breakfast talk with Eden at Geneva3 and it was a line which I had taken in my last two press conferences4 and I felt that we were making some headway.

As to the talks at Geneva, I said that we were not anxious to push them to a conclusion except as to getting out our civilians who are being subjected to inhuman treatment. Otherwise, we needed time by which to stabilize the situation.

I said that I had no desire or present intention to have talks with Chou En-lai. This thought had been injected into the scene by Senator George and it was difficult to get it out because it was one of those eventualities which was impossible to deal with on a “never never” basis but which when not dealt with on that basis left open a crack which many tried to press wider open.

The President indicated that he was aware of and in full accord with this program and that he welcomed this opportunity to have a [Page 17] quiet chat about it. He remarked that he always tried to handle his press conferences so as to avoid putting any spokes into my diplomatic efforts. I said that I had great admiration for the skill with which he handled his press conferences.

JFD
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/8–555. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Dulles. An attached note indicates that the source text was seen by Hoover and that copies were distributed on an “eyes only” basis to Murphy, Robertson, Bowie, and Morton.
  2. Reference is to a statement issued by the Republic of Korea on August 2.
  3. On July 22; see vol. ii, Document 314.
  4. On July 26 (see ibid., Document 319) and August 2 (see Document 3).