7. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

Dear Mr. Robertson: I refer to your letter of 11 July 1955 requesting an expression of views by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the effect the proposed transfer of one Chinese Nationalist Division from Taiwan to Quemoy would have on the defensibility of Taiwan and the Pescadores.2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that while the movement of one additional division from Taiwan would reduce the garrison’s strength on the island, this reduction would not substantially diminish the defensibility of Taiwan and the Pescadores. On the other hand the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the deployment of an additional GRC division to Quemoy would not substantially increase the defensibility of Quemoy.3

As you know, the movement of the division to Quemoy is already in progress and will be completed in the near future despite representations against the move by Chief, MAAG Formosa, and despite Chiang Kai Shek’s statement of 27 June 1955 to General Chase that he did not plan to move the division immediately.4

In view of this, and of the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed above, there appears to be no military basis for further [Page 14] representations to Chiang Kai Shek on the movement of one division from Taiwan to Quemoy.

Sincerely yours,

A.C. Davis
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–355. The letter was seen by Murphy and Hoover, as indicated by their initials on the source text and on an attached note.
  2. Robertson’s letter of July 11 to Davis noted that under the U.S.-Chinese exchange of notes of December 10, 1954, “it appears we could claim the right to veto the proposed move, if it were determined that the transfer of the additional division would ‘substantially’ diminish the defensibility of Taiwan and the Pescadores” and requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide an authoritative military judgment on the effect of the proposed transfer. (Ibid., 793.5/7–1155)
  3. According to a memorandum of the substance of discussion at a State–JCS meeting on July 29, Admiral Radford informally stated the JCS view, and the following discussion ensued:

    “Mr. Robertson said that the State Department, of course, accepted this military opinion but confirmed that he would be glad to have JCS views on just what sort of development would be considered to affect the defensibility of Formosa. He remarked that there must be some point at which continued movement of troops away from Formosa would endanger its defense. Both Admiral Radford and General Taylor commented that this was an exceedingly difficult question to answer, and Admiral Duncan, sitting for Admiral Carney, remarked that the answer really had to depend on the complex of circumstances existing at the time when such movement might be proposed.” (Ibid, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

  4. See vol. ii, Document 279.