29. Telegram From the Chargé in the Republic of China (Cochran) to the Department of State1

143. Foreign Minister called me to his office late yesterday to discuss GRC reserve program and to “warn” me situation likely result in “considerable unpleasantness”. This is strong language and appears properly to indicate intensity of Chinese feeling. He was referring to nine reserve division plan concurred in by MAAG last March and further agreed to at April meeting at representative of CINCPAC and Ministry National Defense level. US position as determined by JCS presented to Yu Ta-Wei by MAAG last week, and he and all MND much disturbed.

Foreign Minister stated President and Yu greatly embarrassed at US reply, which they feel completely discards agreement previously reached. Pointed to terms document signed March by Colonel Nolan, [Page 48] G–5 of MAAG, and to part Chase’s letter to Yu dated March 222 approving this outline plan and recommending that it be “developed in full detail without delay”. Chinese apparently interpreted “develop” to mean implement, for decisions made and actions taken, reversal of which would be most difficult and most embarrassing. Foreign Minister admitted he not familiar all details, but averred Ambassador Rankin was, and asked matter be discussed with and by him in Washington.

I pointed out “agreement” of March and April was ad referendum and subject approval on CINCPAC and JCS level. (In fact, now find letter Ambassador to Yeh dated April 20 specifically so states.) However, Yeh felt approval by Chase, serious, responsible and high ranking officer, committed US to nine division plan. Radford’s approval also being cited.

Have discussed situation with Pride, to whom Ta-wei appealed. Former says Gimo and Yu have actually named division commanders and staff for proposed nine divisions, and crux of problem is this fact. Cannot now cancel designations and not know what else do with these senior officers.

As I understand it, nine division reserve evolved as means of effecting activation [deactivation] non-supported units and recaptured diverted MDA equipment, providing places more personnel of former. As I also understand it, CINCPAC and JCS opposition to nine division plan based on following logic: If US agrees nine division reserve Chinese will continue demand three division combat equipment and eventually hardware for nine divisions; therefore let us not call them divisions. If true, difficulty is one of semantics, but quite upsetting to Chinese, who unwilling call them “groups” or something else. Fear that unless we can find some way out of this dilemma, Chinese will refuse fulfill their part bargain, requiring activation non-supported units and transfer MDAP equipment from them to supported forces [sic].

If difference is simply over what reserve units shall be called, feel we have made our point quite clear, and that Chinese now fully understand we will not provide equipment nine divisions or three divisions or even one full combat division. Foreign Minister himself said that in returning from San Francisco Conference recently, he stopped off in Honolulu under Gimo’s instructions and there gathered from CINCPAC that nine division reserve would be approved, with US to furnish training (as distinct from combat) “equipment” for one division.

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Seems to me there are two possible ways out of present situation. One is: Having made our point—regarding tailored equipment for one division reserve training unit clear, we could concede to Chinese dismay and say in effect “If that is clearly understood we interpose no further objection to your calling the nine reserve groups divisions, although it is obvious they will not be divisions worthy of the name, with only one month’s training per year”. Alternatively, perhaps some other organizational solution could be devised by Chinese or American military authorities. In either event, feel we must grant some validity to magic nature of figure total of thirty divisions (21 plus 9) in Chinese eyes, since this is (a) number US supported on mainland and (b) number we allegedly support in Korea.

As Chase foresaw in his letter to CINCPAC June 8, protesting the decision, refusal support nine division reserve as “agreed to” in March and April has considerably disturbed Chinese military authorities, Ministers Yu and Yeh, and President.

General Smythe of MAAG having read foregoing in draft comments that Chinese devoting all their resistance to this first and easiest to implement of seven points made by JCS, ignoring other six. He feels we should stick to our position until Chinese accept and implement other six major points. Then we can concede on terminology if and when necessary.

Cochran
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/8–1855. Secret. Passed to CINCPAC for information at the Embassy’s request.
  2. Neither these documents nor any of the other documents referred to have been found.