10. Telegram From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, at Geneva1

391. 1. Department concurs in general approach you have proposed for fourth meeting Aug 8 and commends your clear analysis existing situation and your resourcefulness in devising tactics to meet it.2

2. U.S. has already met Chinese Communists on points two and three. With respect to point one we have already advised as to status [Page 18] of Chinese nationals, which is that they are free to depart if they wish.

3. U.S. will not supply a name list of all Chinese nationals in U.S. For your discretionary use (a) this could not be done without subjecting many who hold allegiance to Republic of China and their relatives in China to harassment, (b) it is not our policy to give any other government a list of all of their nationals in U.S. and (c) we recognize Republic of China as government of China.

4. Whenever CPR takes the same position with respect to U.S. nationals in China that the U.S. has taken, namely, that they are free to return and will be given exit visas on request, U.S. will take further step of authorizing Indian Embassy in U.S. to facilitate travel of Chinese here who desire to return to mainland and to transmit funds for this purpose. Indian Embassy may publicly make known that it is prepared to facilitate travel to mainland of any Chinese nationals who desire to return.

5. U.S. would expect on its side to avail of the services of U.K. in Communist China to facilitate return of U.S. citizens who desire to return.

6. Dept prefers that agreement if reached on return of civilians be announced by you and by Wang in Geneva. Announcement should be identic. Announcement in Washington and Peiping would not be considered desirable. Dept will be prepared to give you advice on wording of statement when agreement is in prospect.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles; cleared with McConaughy and approved for transmission by Robertson. McConaughy wrote to Johnson in a letter of August 8, “There is a pronounced feeling of satisfaction here with the way you have handled the first week of the negotiations. The Secretary himself is following every development closely. He has drafted some of the telegrams to you himself and ordered last Tuesday [August 2] that henceforth all messages to you which conveyed anything in the nature of instructions were to be personally approved by him.”

    The letter was the first of the series of official–informal letters between McConaughy and Johnson pertaining to the Ambassadorial talks. (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)

  2. Johnson commented in telegram 314 from Geneva, August 4, that he was convinced that the Chinese did not seriously expect to obtain point one of Wang’s August 2 proposal but that “something in field of point four of Wang’s proposal is Chou’s minimum price for release remaining Americans”. He continued as follows:

    “Therefore tactic which I had planned prior to receipt Deptel 360 was to put forward in informal conversational style a representation proposal in strict accordance with my instructions as something I was willing recommend my government’s consideration but didn’t feel I could do so until they had come further on Americans in China. My hope was that without necessarily freezing on any particular position or bargaining point four for Americans I could get myself in position to keep representation cheese dangling in front of them in return for performance on Americans while also avoiding danger their claiming settlement civilians accomplished when agreement reached on representation.

    “I continue feel this is best tactic and should be carried out at Monday’s meeting although in view passage time would now present in form of something tentatively being considered by my government.” (Ibid., Central Files, 611.93/8–555)

    Telegram 360 to Geneva, August 3, told Johnson that points one and four would require some time for study and instructed him to press for the immediate release of all Americans. (Ibid., 611.93/8–255)