396.1 GE/7–154: Telegram

JohnsonKuznetsov Meeting, Geneva, July 1, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

secret
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Secto 550. Repeated information Paris 4, Saigon 2, Moscow 1. Paris eyes only Ambassador; Saigon eyes only McClintock; Moscow eyes only Ambassador. Department limit distribution. Following lunch today, Kuznetsov initiated discussion and set forth at length Soviet views regarding composition and authority international commission. (Novikov and Larischev were also present but took no part in substantive conversation. Bonsal, Getz and Yager accompanied me.) Conversation was completely friendly and frank in tone.

On composition, he expressed incomprehension at US opposition to such Communist powers as Poland and Czechoslovakia. He said commission must include powers acceptable to Viet Minh and made clear Soviets will continue insist on inclusion Communist element. He said Colombo powers did not meet this definition although Viet Minh willing to accept some of them. He particularly pushed Molotov‘s threepower proposal (India, Poland or Czechoslovakia and Indonesia “or some other Asiatic state”), as a reasonable compromise.

I replied as forcefully as possible stressing firmness our position on composition and making clear that I was not only expressing views US Government but strong personal convictions based upon my intimate experience with Korean armistice. I pointed out that disregarding controversial question of ideology, evident close coordination between Chinese and North Koreans on one hand Poles and Czechs on other, the latter in no case ever finding even most minor flaw in Chinese and North Korean performance while Swedes and Swiss had not hesitated call their shots against UNC when they felt it justified. I pointed out conclusions on unworkability Korean system not only that of US but of Swedes and Swiss. I also pointed out composition must not only be acceptable Viet Minh side and stressed reasonableness of Colombo powers, none of which could be characterized as partisans of [Page 1269] France or expected act as such, none of which had recognized either Vietnam or Viet Minh and all of which were Asiatic states.

On subject role of international commission, Kuznetsov stated Chauvel had made considerable step forward in direction meeting Viet Minh requirements in that he had abandoned thesis joint commissions composed of belligerents should be “subordinate” to international commission. According to him, sticking point now is insistence that decisions of international commission should be mandatory so far as belligerents concerned.

Kuznetsov stated this unacceptable and proposed that international commission make “recommendations”, either by unanimous or majority vote depending on cases, and that, if these unacceptable to either side, matter be referred to guarantors. I stressed impracticability as would introduce delay and controversy precisely in cases where urgent clearcut decisions and action vital if cessation hostilities to be preserved and revival of war to be avoided. I added, for purpose of debate, that since Kuznetsov had said French had made considerable step forward in narrowing gap on this point, it was now up to other side to take similar step. I expressed hope that good faith with which parties approach armistice would reduce controversy and violations to minimum but stressed importance that, as evidence of such good faith, parties should beforehand agree to abide by decisions or, if Kuznetsov preferred the term, recommendations of international commission.

I also pointed out impracticability attempting separate those issues upon which majority and unanimous votes would be required. No matter how carefully prior definition carried out commission would probably be tied up in hopeless procedural wrangle on which category any given case fell just at time decisions most urgently needed. Also stressed that category of cases for which Soviets envisaged unanimous decisions was just the category in which it would be most important commission be able act quickly without being blocked by requirement for unanimous decision. Important point was not perfection of decision from standpoint both sides but ability quickly reach decision when most needed. In reply, Kuznetsov said this would mean that views of only part of commission would be imposed on one side and this unacceptable. He said neither side should be subject to “commands” of commission.

I avoided discussion of role of guarantor states.

Kuznetsov alleged we had rejected Molotov‘s June 14 proposal without adequate analysis and study on purely political grounds. I denied this and said that our interest was solely in direction of assisting in finding practical and effective system international supervision.

I feel conversation should be of some usefulness in additionally impressing Soviets with firmness our positions as well, I hope in some [Page 1270] small degree, with their logical basis. However, I am under no illusions as to effectiveness our logic in shaking their Communist convictions (and instructions). As was to be expected, on his part Kuznetsov showed no slightest sign of ability or willingness to shift from any present Soviet positions.

Johnson