396.1 GE/6–1954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Heath)

confidential

Participants:

  • General Smith, Under Secretary of State
  • Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State
  • Mr. Heath, Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam
  • Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Vietnamese Foreign Minister and Chief of Delegation to Geneva Conference

At noon today the Under Secretary, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Robertson and Ambassador Heath, called on Dinh at the latter’s residence. The Under Secretary explained it would be necessary for him to return to the States tomorrow but he would leave Ambassadors Johnson and Heath to represent the United States who would maintain association with and support of the Vietnamese and the [Page 1197] other two delegations from Indochina. The Under Secretary said that it was possible that Secretary Dulles might have to make a trip abroad towards the end of the month, in which case, the Under Secretary could not return promptly to Geneva since it was necessary that either the Secretary or himself always be present in Washington. The Under Secretary said that after two weeks or so either the Secretary, himself or possibly Deputy Under Secretary Murphy might return to Geneva.

The Under Secretary said he wished to take this occasion to assure Foreign Minister Dinh of his great pleasure in having been associated with him at this conference. The support which the American Delegation had so far given to the Vietnamese Delegation would be continued to the extent possible. Dinh replied that he himself had planned to call on the Under Secretary to take leave of him since along with the rest of his government, he had offered his resignation to Bao Dai. He would continue on provisionally in charge of the delegation until the new Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, named his successor. He planned to return to university life. The Under Secretary hoped that the new government would continue to avail itself of the services of Mr. Dinh and other capable men and expressed the hope they would be associated again in international gatherings.

Dinh replied that he and his delegation were exceedingly grateful for the unfailing support of the American Delegation and the Under Secretary’s assurance that support would be extended in the future. He recalled in conversation a few days ago the Under Secretary had stated that if there were national determination in Vietnam the assistance of other nations could be provided. Mr. Dinh felt that the new government would reveal and develop the national determination of Vietnam. He went on to say that the conduct of the Vietnamese Delegation at this conference had been difficult. For while the government of Vietnam had principle on its side it did not have force behind it. The Under Secretary stated that unfortunately this conference had demonstrated as had so often been demonstrated in the past that, in negotiating with the Communists there was no chance of success unless the other parties had force and determination behind them—the only factors which the Communists respected. Dinh said that as a professor of diplomatic history who had carefully studied Soviet-American relations he thought that all American representatives were of the same mind as the Under Secretary that force and determination were the only things the Communists respected. The Under Secretary recalled Stalin’s remark to Hopkins and Averell Harriman who in a war-time negotiation had raised the question of the attitude of the Pope evoking Stalin’s contemptuous question, “how many divisions does he have”.

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Dinh said that he would not hide the fact that there was disquietude in Vietnam over the advent of Mendes France to the French premiership. He thought it was highly imprudent for Mendes France to announce that he was going to negotiate a peace by July 20 or resign.1 That statement put Mendes France in the weak position of a supplicant to the Communist states. Dinh, however, went on to say that perhaps the line of Mendes France might work out all right in the end provided he did not capitulate [to] the Communists. There were still leaders and forces in France against capitulation to the Communists in Indochina and if Mendes France showed that honest effort to negotiate honest agreement had failed, then those forces would be encouraged to insist France take a stronger line.

The Under Secretary said he expected to see Mendes France tomorrow afternoon. While he would be very circumspect in what he said he felt that he would be able to make him understand that the people of the United States would never associate themselves with an abject surrender or capitulation to Communist demands in Indochina. Dinh thanked him for that assurance and said he hoped that Mr. Eden would give similar warning to Mendes France.

In conclusion Dinh said that in spite of the situation he thought there were still forces in France and Vietnam, which with the help of other free nations would enable us to get “around the cape” in this difficult passage in which the free world found itself. He hoped before long he would be able to make a trip to the States and visit some American universities. The Under Secretary and Mr. Robertson said they would be personally delighted to welcome him if he visited the States.

  1. See the editorial note, p. 1128.