On June 1, the Intelligence Advisory Committee approved the attached
National Intelligence Estimate of the effects of certain possible
developments on the military security and political stability of
Laos and Cambodia through the end of this year. The principal
conclusions of this estimate are:
Attachment
Effects of Certain Possible
Developments on the Military Security and Political
Stability of Laos and Cambodia Through 1954
i. present situation in laos
and cambodia
A. Military Security
1. Viet Minh forces are operating in Laos and Cambodia, but do
not currently present an imminent threat to the existence of the
native governments. However, this is so only because the
security of Laos and Cambodia is supported by French regular
forces and extensive French assistance to native forces. (See
page 7 for force strengths [post, page 1028].)
Laois
2. Viet Minh regular troops in Laos are organic to regular Viet
Minh divisions and are Vietnamese invaders, not Laotians. Viet
Minh regional forces, scattered throughout Laos, are
pre-dominantly Vietnamese, but include Laotians as well. These
regional troops have effectively conducted guerrilla-type
operations at company level and are considered equal in
effectiveness to companies of the Laotian National Army. They
could be easily organized into larger units, with a consequent
increase in their capabilities. There are no known armed
non-Communist dissident forces in Laos.
3. The defense of Laos has depended primarily on French
Expeditionary Forces. For military reasons, the French may at
any time reduce or increase the present strength of regular
units in that country. If such strength is reduced substantially
below 10,000, Laos would be seriously exposed to Viet Minh
attack or subversion.
4. The Laotian National Army, numbering 14,500, is organized into
six infantry battalions, seven light infantry battalions, and
one parachute battalion. The combat effectiveness of the Army as
a whole is only fair. It is inadequately trained and lacks
experienced native officers and NCO’s. The Laotian National
Guard is poorly trained and equipped.
5. The Laotian military establishment depends almost entirely on
outside support. France (and, indirectly, the US) furnishes all
equipment and almost all the necessary funds. The French train,
advise, and tactically direct the Laotian forces. All French
expeditionary and Laotian National Army troops in the country
are under French operational command. Approximately 300 French
officers and NCO’s serve in the Laotian National Army, and
French officers occupy most field grade positions.
[Page 1025]
Cambodia
6. Two Viet Minh regular battalions, organic to a Viet Minh
division, are now in northeast Cambodia. These troops are
Vietnamese invaders who entered Cambodia in March 1954. In
addition, small units of Viet Minh regulars, regional troops,
and militia are scattered throughout Cambodia. The combat
effectiveness of these regional and militia forces is generally
only fair, but those east of the Mekong river will probably be
raised to a high standard of organization and training before
the end of 1954.
7. There are also in Cambodia several hundred armed non-Communist
dissidents, who are followers of the Nationalist leader,
Son Ngoc Thanh.
8. The Cambodian Royal Army, numbering 14,000, is organized into
ten regular infantry, one parachute, and three light infantry
battalions. Cambodian armed forces are heavily dependent on the
French for finance, equipment, training, and advice, though less
so than is the case in Laos. However, the Cambodian government
exercises much greater command responsibilities than does the
Laotian government. French officers and NCO’s, who formerly
served in the Royal Army, are at present in the process of being
withdrawn. The Cambodian King has full administrative control
over all royal forces, and operational command west of the
Mekong river.
9. The Cambodian Royal Army is reasonably well equipped and
trained, but has a number of deficiencies, chief among which are
a lack of adequate numbers of trained officers and NCO’s, a low
standard of discipline and responsibility in the officer corps,
and an almost paralytic defensive-mindedness. In time, the
effectiveness of the Royal Army may be increased as a result of
the efforts of General Nhiek
Tioulong, recently appointed by the King as
Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, and Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces.
B. Political
Stability
10. The political situation in both Laos and Cambodia is
uncertain, but at present is relatively quiet. In Cambodia, the
royal institution is held in high regard by the people, who have
traditionally accepted monarchical authority, and the King is
personally popular. Moreover, Cambodia enjoys a high degree of
cultural, ethnic, and religious homogeneity. In Laos, the
population is largely apolitical. In neither country is there
any appreciable economic or social unrest. In both countries, a
tradition of governing elite subordinate to the throne attracts
most educated Laotians and Cambodians to government service.
11. Communism has thus far made little progress in either Laos or
Cambodia. The Viet Minh is unpopular in both countries because
its
[Page 1026]
members are
Vietnamese, who are heartily disliked by both the Laotians and
the Cambodians. Communist sponsored “free governments” and
“independence forces” in Laos and Cambodia are viewed as parts
of the Viet Minh and thus far have evoked little support in
those countries. Communist political influence is believed to be
minimal outside those areas firmly occupied by Viet Minh forces.
The “Nationalist” appeal of the Communists, which has been
relatively successful in Vietnam, has been blunted in Laos by
the general political inertness of the country, and in Cambodia
by the vigorous nationalist efforts of the King.
12. The Cambodian government derives considerable domestic
support from the fact that it is anti-French. The Laotian
government, on the other hand, is outwardly pro-French, but this
policy does not adversely affect the government’s domestic
strength.
13. However, both Laos and Cambodia are vulnerable to Communist
pressures, chiefly because of their military weakness. Moreover,
in times of crisis their political leadership is often
unpredictable, especially in Cambodia. There has been a
widespread tendency in both countries to regard the war against
the Viet Minh as being “someone else’s business”. In addition,
the Communists may be able at any time to take advantage of the
fact that in Laos, and especially in Cambodia, there are rival
cliques presently contending for political power.
Non-Communist Dissidence
14. A source of weakness in Cambodia is the existence of
non-Communist dissidence. The principal dissident is
Son Ngoc Thanh, who is believed to be
essentially an independent nationalist. A premier of Cambodia
under the Japanese during World War II, Thanh is believed to
have a latent political following throughout the country,
particularly among students, intellectual groups, and younger
army officers who see in him the embodiment of Cambodian
independence aspirations. Thanh’s political influence has been
sapped in recent months by the nationalist efforts of the King,
but is still far greater than the small size of his present
armed following would suggest. Cambodia’s political stability
would be greatly enhanced if he should rally to the government,
but his future behavior cannot be predicted and it is
conceivable that he might join forces with the Viet Minh. In
addition to Thanh, there are a number of former dissident
leaders who have rallied to the King, but who continue to enjoy
warlord-like “autonomous” powers in certain regions of Cambodia.
These people are essentially opportunists, whose future loyalty
cannot be assured.
15. There are no significant non-Communist dissident groups in
Laos. However, Prince Petsarath, now resident in Thailand, is a
pretender
[Page 1027]
to the
Laotian throne and has at times been reported to be planning a
coup d’état.
ii. the effect of certain
possible developments on the security and stability of laos
and cambodia
16. The future security and stability of Laos and Cambodia will
almost certainly be determined by outside developments. The fate
of these kingdoms will be largely fixed, not by their own
efforts, but by a number of interacting factors, chief among
which are probably: (a) the trend of
developments in Vietnam; (b) the scale
and nature of outside assistance given the governments of Laos
and Cambodia, and (c) the nature and
strength of Viet Minh military and political pressures against
those countries.
Developments in Vietnam
17. Developments in Vietnam will have an immediate effect on Laos
and Cambodia. A strong non-Communist position in Vietnam would
tend to assure military security and political stability.
However, if key areas of Vietnam fell to the Communists,
pressure on Laos and Cambodia would be greatly increased. The
military capabilities of these countries are so slight that they
would almost certainly request outside aid to defend themselves.
If such aid were not immediately supplied, Laos would be quickly
overrun, or its government would seek accommodation with the
Communists. Cambodia might hold out longer, but in the end it
too would be forced to surrender or accommodate. If a negotiated
settlement placed the Communists in a position which would
enable them eventually, but not immediately, to dominate
Vietnam, the immediate danger to Laos and Cambodia would be less
and the Laotian and Cambodian governments could probably
maintain control for some time.
French Withdrawal
18. If, as a result of a negotiated agreement with the Communists
covering all of Indochina, French and Viet Minh regular units
were actually withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia (leaving Viet
Minh irregular forces still operating in those countries),
native forces could probably preserve for some time
approximately the present degree of security and stability in
Cambodia and a certain minimum security and stability in Laos,
provided French cadres and the present scale and nature of
French material aid remained available to the native armies.
However, such an agreement with the Communists would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement and police,
and in these circumstances the native armies could probably not
for long successfully resist the Viet Minh without increased
outside support.
[Page 1028]
Outside Assistance
19. Under the adverse alternatives discussed in the two preceding
paragraphs, outside support on a scale larger than the French
could provide would be required to assure a satisfactory level
of security and stability in close countries. If such additional
support were not quickly forthcoming, the resistance of Laos and
Cambodia to Communism would collapse.
20. If outside support took the form of a security system
involving multinational guarantees for the security of Laos and
Cambodia and could be implemented in time, that would probably
permit Laos and Cambodia to maintain their security, despite
rising pressures from the Communists in Vietnam and a probably
growing degree of internal Communist unrest in both countries,
we believe that the requirements of such a security system will
be: (a) adequate MDAP-type aid; (b) effective
protective forces appropriately located in the area; and (c) assurance of assistance in the event
of internal subversion as well as external attack. The success
of the above measures, in the long run, would also require the
maintenance and development of a political and psychological
atmosphere which would motivate any indigenous peoples against
Communism.
Partition
21. If Laos and Cambodia were partitioned, the will of the
non-Communist remnants to maintain their independence would
greatly decrease, and their ability to do so would be weakened
because of the new establishment in those countries of strong
and legalized Communist positions. Under such circumstances
probably nothing but military occupation of those countries
would assure their continued freedom from Communist control.
Force Strengths
laos
|
Regulars |
Other |
Total |
Viet Minh |
10,300 |
8,500 |
18,800 |
French Expeditionary Corps |
18,000 (5,000 Laotian) |
2,000 (attchd Laotian militia) |
20,000 |
Laotian Nat’l Forces |
14,500 (Nat’l Army) |
6,500 (Nat’l Guard & semi-milit) |
21,000 |
[Page 1029]
cambodia
|
Regulars |
Other |
Total |
Viet Minh |
2,200 |
6,500 |
8,700 |
French Expeditionary Corps |
5,000 (3,000 infantry, 2,000 service) |
1,000 (attchd Cambodian militia) |
6,000 |
Cambodian Royal Forces |
14,000 |
19,000 (Natl Guard 4,000; semi-milit 15,000) |
33,000 |