Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/5–3054: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation¹

top secret
niact

Washington, June 1, 1954—3:37 p.m.

Tedul 146. For Under Secretary from Secretary in New York. Reference: Dulte 134² and Tedul 144.³

1. In these matters we must bear in mind the basic Presidential instructions, of which Congressional committees were informed, from which we should not depart without previously informing these committees.

2. It seems unlikely that the basic settlement will be one with which we would want to be formally identified or attempt to guarantee. Certainly this cannot be known at this juncture. Therefore discussion of control commission is awkward without knowing what it is that will be controlled or US responsibility in relation thereto. Under these circumstances it seems that in any suggestions or arguments we make, real composition of control commission must be carefully safeguarded so as to avoid other parties feeling that because they have deferred to our views regarding composition of control commission we are committed to some basic decision or solution.

3. In view of the misconduct of Poland and Czechoslovakia on NNSC we should under no circumstances give any acquiescence to their playing a like role in relation to Indochina. Furthermore, I do not see why Indonesia should play supervisory role merely because of the accident that it happened to attend a single meeting at Colombo which was called for a different purpose. It has nothing to contribute but its own fears. By every test of stability and ability to contribute, Thailand [out?]ranks Indonesia. So also does the Philippines. It seems to me that the key role in supervision might be assumed by India and Pakistan as the only two Asian nations of the area which are perhaps generally acceptable and which can make any contribution. These two might pick up their own associates.

4. My view in general is that on this matter we should make suggestions which indicate our best judgment but that we should not take any “final” position in the sense of, stating that one setup is acceptable and another setup unacceptable. Our necessary reservation with reference to the ultimate solution forbids, it seems to me, action on our part other than contribution of friendly advice at this juncture.

Murphy

1. Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to London as telegram 6483, to Paris as telegram 4338, and to Saigon as telegram 2467.
2. Dated May 30, p. 981.
3. Dated May 31, p. 989.